FPSLREB Decisions

[1]    The union, Union of Canadian Correctional Officers - Syndicat des agents correctionnels du Canada (UCCO-SACC-CSN), has been certified since March 13, 2001, to represent all employees of the employer included in the Correctional Service group. It represents over 5,500 correctional officers in over 50 penitentiaries in Canada.

[2]    On April 10, 2002, the union tabled its draft plan for renewal of the collective agreement. Between April 10, 2002, and May 20, 2003, there were 38 bargaining sessions, as well as various meetings with Treasury Board, the Commissioner and the Senior Deputy Commissioner of Correctional Service Canada (CSC).

[3]    On June 19, 2003, believing that the employer had interfered in the union's affairs, the union filed a complaint with the Public Service Staff Relations Board (Board) asking that it issue an order requiring the employer:

[Translation]

[...]

TO CEASE issuing any directives aimed at forcing employees to continue participating against their will on various emergency response teams;

TO CEASE all reprisals, issuing warnings and imposing disciplinary action in respect of the refusal by employees to continue to participate on various emergency response teams;

TO INFORM employees of the bargaining unit of the content of the order;

TO POST the said order in all of its institutions;

TO CEASE bargaining in bad faith;

TO ENTER into discussions with the union, among others, regarding the pension plan;

TO CEASE interfering in the union's affairs;

TO ISSUE any other order to protect the rights of the parties.

[...]

[4]    On July 18, 2003, the union filed another complaint that was quite similar to the one issued on June 19, 2003. The employer did not make any argument as to the choice of one or the other of the complaints. For the purposes of the hearing, both complaints are considered and deal with three key elements arising from the complaints.

[5]    The union asked the Board to issue an interim order on an emergency basis. However, the entire matter was referred for hearing before a board member during the week of August 28, 2003.

[6]    At the August 2003 hearing, the union presented its evidence but owing to a lack of time and the parties' availability, the hearing of the matter was postponed to a later date to hear the employer's evidence and the arguments of the parties.

[7]    In the meantime, the union referred the matter to the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal to determine whether there were grounds to issue an interim order. The higher courts agreed that the matter should continue before the Board.

[8]    The hearing continued on December 9, 2003.

[9]    It should be noted that prior to the December 9, 2003 hearing, the union withdrew the requests for an order concerning the bargaining, and specifically, those related to bargaining in bad faith and direction to enter into discussions with the union, among other things, regarding the pension plan.

[10]    When the hearing recommenced on December 9, 2003, the union confirmed that there were now two elements to the complaint. It complained that the employer dealt directly with certain employees, thereby embarrassing the union. It also complained that the employer used threats, reprisals and an abuse of power against employees, and in particular, against members of the emergency teams.

Facts

[11]    During his testimony at the hearing, the union's National President, Sylvain Martel, referred in particular to the documents submitted together (Exhibits P-1 to P-8) regarding the employer's intervention with employees and Exhibits P-9 to P-19, regarding the intimidation of employees.

[12]    Mr. Martel explained that one of the key elements raised by the union during the bargaining period was the issue of the pension fund.

[13]    According to Mr. Martel, employee contributions to the pension fund had been increased over the years to provide for pensions when employees reached the age of 50 years. However, few employees were taking advantage of this opportunity, given the value of the pension provided.

[14]    Mr. Martel very much wanted to improve the pension fund mechanism and that is why his union insisted on resolving this issue at the time of bargaining.

[15]    Mr. Martel explained that the union's approach was the subject of much discussion with the employer. The Treasury Board representative did not wish to discuss the pension fund at the bargaining table. It argued that the issue could be discussed at a different level.

[16]    The union wanted the issue of the pension fund addressed quickly. A union promotional document (Exhibit P-3) was entitled [translation]: "No agreement without a real pension plan". The title page also stated [translation]: "It's negotiable".

[17]    Some unionized employees disagreed with the approach of the union's leaders and implied that a debate about whether or not issues related to the pension fund would be discussed as part of negotiations might delay the bargaining.

[18]    Regardless, an employee who disagreed with the union position sought to obtain an opinion from Treasury Board representatives on the possibility of negotiating the pension fund issue at the bargaining table.

[19]    Through perseverance, the "dissident" employee was successful in getting a response from a Treasury Board representative. In a document, the latter stated the employer's opinion that the pension fund issue was not negotiable at the bargaining table.

[20]    The "dissident" employee sent this opinion to several other unionized employees (Exhibit P-5), which undermined the union's position.

[21]    With respect to the use of electronic mail, the union's President, Mr. Martel, complained that the employer interfered with certain employees in terms of their use of electronic mail, but that, according to him, "dissident" employees used e-mail to challenge the union's position.

[22]    As for the issue of bargaining related to the pension fund, Michel Gauthier, chief negotiator for the union, explained that the union did not issue an ultimatum regarding the location of negotiations on the pension fund, whether at the bargaining table or elsewhere; all that the union wanted was for the pension issue to be resolved quickly. It should be noted that the union withdrew this matter from its complaints.

[23]    The union's other complaint against the employer relates to the emergency or specialized teams. The union explained that, for several years, the employer has agreed with the union that the best way to provide certain specialized services was to establish employee teams (notably, (a) intervention with recalcitrant inmates or group of inmates, (b) response in the event of fire, and (c) training in the use of firearms and other defence weapons).

[24]    Employees in each institution volunteer to be part of a specialized team. These employees are called upon when assistance is needed to remove a recalcitrant inmate from a cell. If the employees are already at work, reassignments are done to transfer the employees to a designated location and they are replaced in their original assignments. If there are not enough specialized employees at work to form the response team, off-duty employees are called in.

[25]    Employees who agree to be members of a response team do not receive any special compensation or additional premium for this work.

[26]    There are slightly more than 900 employees who are members of specialized teams for all prison services.

[27]    In practice, employees volunteer for these emergency teams for a certain number of years. Over time, some resign and are replaced by other volunteer employees.

[28]    Mr. Martel explained that, in September 2002, he discussed with the employer how an employee could withdraw from a response team. There was no agreement on the amount of notice required.

[29]    The employer told him that it felt two-months' notice was needed for an employee to resign from an emergency team.

[30]    Early in 2003, the union introduced a strategy by which employees who were members of the emergency teams informed the employer that they were resigning as members of the teams. Form letters were prepared. The employees sent them in, indicating that 60 days later, specifically, on May 28, 2003, they were resigning as members of a specialized team (Exhibit P-14).

[31]    According to the union, a count on June 11, 2003, showed that 895 employees had sent in their resignations (or withdrawals) from emergency teams, or about 90%.

[32]    The union explained that, in response to this action, the employer allegedly issued warnings to the effect that, as of June, if it needed to bring together an emergency team, for example to remove an inmate from a cell, an employer representative would give the order to a "former member" of the response team. At the first refusal, a warning would be given. The order would be repeated a few seconds later and the member informed that he could be subject to sanctions. A third, fourth and fifth order would be given in the ensuing minute and lastly, the employee could be subject to dismissal.

[33]    When the first incident occurred early in June 2003, the union (national) was informed and employees were told to obey orders rather than suffer sanctions.

[34]    The union mentioned that the same type of order was given to firearms instructors. The latter had also sent in their 60-day advance notices of resignation.

[35]    The document tabled as Exhibit P-18 and others show that employees filed grievances as a result of these incidents, while obeying the order given. Exhibit P-26, prepared by the union, lists the employer's representatives who dealt with the employees.

[36]    Three CSC officers testified to corroborate the fact that they received orders to be part of emergency response teams despite the fact that they had resigned as members of these teams in May. They confirmed that they participated in training courses annually, at least every 12 to 15 months.

[37]    The employer called Fraser McVie. Mr. McVie is the Director General of Security. He has over 30 years of experience in the field.

[38]    Mr. McVie confirmed the union's position on the history of the formation of the emergency teams and how they are used. Referring to the job description for a CX-01 correctional officer (Exhibit E-3), he explained that intervention with recalcitrant inmates is part of every employee's job.

[39]    However, he continued, following some problems with rioting, it was agreed that some employees would receive more specialized training. Teams were formed of interested people and trained for specialized intervention. The members of each team were all interested individuals who volunteered for the team, feeling safer with each other.

[40]    Mr. McVie was informed in the spring of 2003 that employees had sent in their resignations as members of the emergency teams. Without members for the emergency response teams, he felt it was dangerous for institutions to call on employees who had not already been members of an emergency team to deal with an operation.

[41]    That is why he recommended that each institution approach employees who were already trained, meaning those who had been members of the teams prior to April 2003, to handle responses.

[42]    To do so, a direct order has to be given to an employee and if there is a refusal, he or she has to be informed that sanctions will be imposed up to dismissal.

[43]    Under cross-examination, he explained that he was not familiar with everything that had happened beginning in summer 2003. Officials in charge of personnel management and the authorities at each institution are required to handle contact with employees. He was not informed of the number of employees, who had been members of emergency teams, who had allegedly handed in their resignation as of May 2003.

[44]    Daniel Langevin is the employer's negotiator and he testified that he was informed of the fact that Mr. Charko, the Assistant in the Pensions Division, had been in contact with an employee covered by the union certification. He discussed this with the union and agreed that, in future, to avoid any confusion, there would be no replies given directly to an employee.

Arguments

[45]    The union claims that the employer interfered in union affairs by communicating directly with employees regarding the issue of the pension fund. The union also claims that the actions of the employer's representative towards "former members" of the response teams constitute an excessive measure. Although under the current complaint file, the adjudicator does not have to decide on the validity of the sanctions imposed by the employer as is the case with a grievance, the adjudicator must, in this matter, examine whether the nature of the sanctions or threat of sanctions issued by the employer constitute intimidation or interference aimed at controlling the pressure tactics put in place by the union.

[46]    The employer knew, from April 2003, that employees had withdrawn from the response teams; it could have put additional measures in place.

[47]    According to the employer, when a complaint is filed, the burden of proof rests with the union. In this case, the employer acted in good faith to ensure safety and security in the institutions. Using trained employees accustomed to working in a team had proven, over the years, to be the most appropriate way to respond to specific events.

[48]    Maintaining order and intervening to ensure the safety and security of staff and inmates are activities inherent in the task of employees. According to the employer, it merely managed the institutions in a safe and secure manner. The adjudicator does not have to intervene with respect to the orders given to employees and the threats of sanctions because grievances were filed by the employees concerned and these grievances will be examined. The adjudicator in this case must restrict himself to determining the validity of the allegations of interference.

Reasons

[49]    Through its complaint filed under section 23 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA), the union claims that the employer contravenes the prohibitions set out in section 8 of the PSSRA:

8. (1) No person who occupies a managerial or confidential position, whether or not the person is acting on behalf of the employer, shall participate in or interfere with the formation or administration of an employee organization or the representation of employees by such an organization.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), no person shall

1. refuse to employ, to continue to employ, or otherwise discriminate against any person in regard to employment or to any term or condition of employment, because the person is a member of an employee organization or was or is exercising any right under this Act;

2. impose any condition on an appointment or in a contract of employment, or propose the imposition of any condition on an appointment or in a contract of employment, that seeks to restrain an employee or a person seeking employment from becoming a member of an employee organization or exercising any right under this Act; or

3. seek by intimidation, threat of dismissal or any other kind of threat, by the imposition of a pecuniary or any other penalty or by any other means to compel an employee

   1. to become, refrain from becoming or cease to be, or, except as otherwise provided in a collective agreement, to continue to be a member of an employee organization, or

   2. to refrain from exercising any other right under this Act.

(3) No person shall be deemed to have contravened subsection (2) by reason of any act or thing done or omitted in relation to a person who occupies, or is proposed to occupy, a managerial or confidential position.

[50]    Based on the evidence presented, I have identified three types of interference that the union alleges against the employer. They can be summarized as follows:

1. having sent a letter (e-mail) to an employee regarding the pension fund, thereby becoming involved in a controversy between a group of employees and the union over bargaining strategy and consequently undermining the union's ability to represent;
2. having threatened sanctions against employees using the e-mail system to make comments;
3. having threatened disciplinary action against employees in order to have them perform tasks related to the emergency response teams, when these employees were no longer members of these teams, thereby altering the customary mechanism of participation which was voluntary membership.

[51]    Before examining the facts, I will first consider the notion of interference as described in previous Board decisions.

[52]    According to recent Board case law, the employer's intention is not important in analysing subsection 8(1) of the PSSRA. However, a number of other decisions indicate otherwise. In Ager (PSSRB File No. 161-2-167) (1978)(QL) at paragraph 32, the Board dismissed the complaint insofar as it applied to subsection 8(1) of the PSSRA on the grounds that the complainant did not provide evidence of the employer's motivation:

We do not have any direct evidence to support the allegations that, in taking the various actions against Mr. Ager, the respondents had been motivated by their particular sympathies towards one or the other of the parties in the inter-union conflict...

[53]    However, in Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSSRB file Nos. 161-2-791 and 584) (1996)(QL), Ian Deans, for the Board wrote:

In the final analysis, the complainant must be given the information it needs to properly represent the employees in the bargaining unit. Failure to provide this information constitutes a violation of the prohibition contained in subsection 8(1) of the PSSRA. In making this finding, the Board is not stating that the employer and Mr. Harder were in any way motivated in their actions by an "anti-union animus". We are simply stating that in the circumstances of this case, the concerns of the employer and Mr. Harder about privacy issues cannot impede the proper flow of information which the complainant requires for the proper execution of its responsibilities under the PSSRA...

[54]    The decision in Jackson (PSSRB File No. 166-2-399) (1988)(QL), at paragraph 37, is very explicit in talking about the employer's motivation and reads as follows:

Subsection 8(1) [...] require the evidence of an intention to interfere...

[55]    However, none of the Board's decisions appears to have made a thorough analysis of subsection 8(1) and the need for the union to prove that the employer showed bad faith or anti-union animus.

[56]    Subsection 6(1) of the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act is identical to subsection 8(1) of the PSSRA. Consequently, it is interesting to read the decision of Chairperson Yvon Tarte in Public Service Alliance of Canada, House of Commons Security Services Employees Association and Communications and Energy and Paper Workers Union of Canada (PSSRB File Nos. 461-HC-10 to 12). At paragraph 33 of the English decision, we find the following:

The survey questionnaire covers several topics which are or can be the subject matter of collective bargaining between the parties. It is not crucial to this type of complaint that the communication with unionized employees take place during collective bargaining. Nor is evidence of intention to interfere necessary. At the crux of this matter is whether the survey interfered with the complainants' ability to represent their members.

[57]    There is no question in my mind that the purpose of sections 6 to 8 of the Act (PSSRA) is to avoid interference in union activities. Consequently, any action by the employer, whether intentional or not, must be considered in that context.

[58]    In terms of the first point, the evidence shows that there were several requests sent by the "dissident" employee to the employer's representatives (human resources and Treasury Board). It was ultimately in response to the latter's insistence that a representative of the employer stated that [translation] "the pension issue is not negotiable".

[59]    The Assistant Secretary of the Pensions and Benefits Division continued his e-mail by stating [translation] "given the change in regulations concerning amendment of the pension rate (70% at 25 years compared to 70% at 35 years), the answer was not simple".

[60]    It would appear that the reply from a representative of the Pension Division was definitely very technical. The employee who received that reply used it for his own purposes and distributed it to other employees. I cannot conclude, based on the very formal nature of the e-mail and the manner in which the employee managed to obtain it, that the employer's representative wanted to interfere in the union's affairs.

[61]    It should be noted here that the author of the e-mail is the Assistant Secretary of the Pensions and Benefits Division. It is employees and not the union who contribute to the pension fund. The employee is therefore a "client" of the pension fund. The fund's managers may be inclined to reply directly to an employee's request without that response necessarily being interference with the union. Moreover, when the employer was informed, it took action not to reply directly to requests from employees who were members of the UCCO-SACC-CSN, during bargaining.

[62]    Even before the representative of the Pensions Division sent the e-mail, there has been a dispute between the union and some dissident employees.

[63]    As the union negotiator explained, the approach to bargaining was intended to be responsible and sufficiently flexible to avoid creating an impasse on the topic of the pension fund. The "dissident" employee made a lot of noise against the union strategy. However, the union could have defended itself by explaining its conduct at the bargaining table.

[64]    On the second point concerning the employer's comments about the use of e-mail, I have no evidence that the employer's position was different towards employees allegedly "favourable" to the union than towards so-called "dissident" employees. The employer is responsible for maintaining discipline and issuing directives on the use of computers and I have no evidence that it discriminated in this regard. As for the "dissident" employee, the evidence clearly shows that he used his personal e-mail to communicate on the pension fund issue.

[65]    The third point to consider is much more complex. Both parties acknowledge that establishing specialized teams has proven, over the years, to be the most effective way to ensure safety and security and that these teams are essential.

[66]    Similarly, the recruitment mode, insisting that members have an interest and volunteer, and training these volunteers have proven to be a valuable asset in the cohesiveness of the teams and the security of operations.

[67]    If membership is voluntary, then it is possible to resign or withdraw from the team.

[68]    In the current context, we must look at the file from the standpoint of a complaint rather than of a grievance. In May and June 2003, 90% of the employees who were members of the emergency response teams withdrew their voluntary participation on the teams with 60-days' advance notice.

[69]    In June 2003, the institutions were therefore faced with the need to take action but without these response teams in place. In this context, the employer decided to make the same employees, who were previously volunteer members of the emergency teams, do the work. In a case of special intervention, such as a removal from a cell, past experience has shown that the safest way is to bring together a team composed of specifically trained employees, interested in the work, who have developed strong team spirit and have confidence in each other.

[70]    The employer exercised its right to manage and called on employees who were already trained, the "former resignees". This action is in keeping with one of the key elements of past practice, namely, the use of trained individuals capable of carrying out the task. To bring together in a single response team people who are trained and those who are not and who previously showed no interest in such activities could constitute a safety risk.

[71]    Consequently, with respect to the emergency response teams and the control of recalcitrant inmates, and the teams assigned to fire duty, the grounds of internal safety, security and emergency justify the employer's actions. The circumstances surrounding the employer's actions cannot be perceived as interference or the appearance of interference.

[72]    However, do these criteria of emergency, safety and security apply in the case of firearms training or the handling of intervention equipment? The employer called upon "former trainers" to conduct the training courses.

[73]    The evidence showed that in practice, training is required annually every 12 to 16 months. There is apparently some leeway of between three to four months in terms of the need to take the training courses.

[74]    In this context, and given that there were no longer any active trainers (they had resigned), the employer could have delayed the training courses while seeking alternatives.

[75]    According to Mr. McVie's testimony, there are local and regional trainers. In seeking solutions, the employer might have used regional trainers or considered the possibility of using outside trainers.

[76]    Obviously, delaying the course has an economic impact on the employer. However, that is a consequence arising from a situation of fact, caused by the absence of volunteer trainers. The employees exercised their legitimate right to resign on the advice of the union.

[77]    The union does not hide the fact that these resignations (withdrawal of volunteer participation) were orchestrated nationally: 90% of employees who belonged to the specialized teams gave notice of their resignation.

[78]    The fact that the employer threatened disciplinary action, up to dismissal, against a "former instructor" so that he would conduct a course for which there was no demonstrated urgency, disregards the past established procedure, without the valid reason of urgency or safety. In practice, the employer's actions thwarted a lawful activity by employees because that action had an impact on training activities.

[79]    In the absence of evidence that the employer was justified in deviating from the established practice of using "volunteer trainers" for security and safety reasons, the use of trainers who had resigned placed these employees in a difficult situation.

[80]    Should these employees heed the advice of their union regarding the legality of their resignation (withdrawing their name from the list of volunteers) or obey the order to participate in the training?

[81]    In Public Service Alliance of Canada and Carey Barnowski and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Rob Wright and Reid Corrigal (2001 PSSRB 105), the Chairperson, Yvon Tarte, found that an individual's participation in a demonstration orchestrated by the union constitutes participation in a lawful activity protected by section 6 of the PSSRA. There is no doubt that the notices of resignation from the emergency teams are part of a union strategy.

[82]    The following statements are found in a memorandum from the Senior Deputy Commissioner (Tab 15) dated April 9, 2003:

[Translation]

Reply to the notice of withdrawal of services

[...]

CSC management will continue to use and to deploy employees who are trained and qualified to carry out specific tasks. For this reason, you must ensure that your emergency plans are up to date and can be quickly implemented to limit any potential interruption in your daily operations if such service withdrawals should occur.

When you are informed by employees of their withdrawal of services, you are to remind them of their responsibilities regarding their own safety and security, that of their colleagues, the inmates and the public. They are also to be informed that they could be subject to disciplinary action should they decide not to perform the tasks assigned to them. Your regional staff relations officers, in collaboration with their colleagues at headquarters, can guide you in determining the appropriate disciplinary action to take.

[83]    The memorandum speaks of being guided in determining the appropriate disciplinary action to take. As I mentioned earlier, in the case of the emergency response teams, it can be interpreted that the employer, while accepting the notice of resignation from the employees, called upon them for emergency and safety reasons.

[84]    The employer did not differentiate in the choice of disciplinary action to take, whether it pertained to a removal from a cell or a training session. I must ask myself the following question: if dismissal is threatened against an employee who with 60-days' notice withdrew his name from the list of trainers, because he allegedly refused to attend a training session, what measure should be imposed on an employee who did not withdraw his name from the list (or had withdrawn it with only 10-days' notice) and who refused to attend a training session?

[85]    In such circumstances, it is appropriate to examine the scope of the employer's actions.

[86]    As I mentioned earlier, two factors can be taken into consideration: the employer's intention or the consequences of the employer's actions.

[87]    The fact that the employer asks an employee, who has withdrawn his name from the list of volunteer employees, to attend a training session does not constitute an infraction.

[88]    However, threats of dismissal made to a former trainer who withdrew his name from the trainer list, in keeping with the union's recommendation or direction, contradict the volunteer policy applied previously. I must consider the appropriateness of such a request and the appropriateness of a threat of sanctions including dismissal.

[89]    Although detailed evidence was not presented relating to the training courses, the testimony indicates that this annual training is an integral part of security and safety measures. It appears that maintaining an appropriate level of security requires timely training of employees. The testimony shows, however, that this timely training can take place within a framework of 12 to 16 months.

[90]    The evidence shows that requests for training sessions came late in May 2003, which was immediately after employees had withdrawn their names from the trainer list. The notice said that their participation would end on May 28, 2003.

[91]    The day after May 28, 2003, the employer found itself in a difficult situation. It had few if any trainers on the list of volunteers. Past practice called for the use of employee trainers who voluntarily put their names on the list. The employer must evaluate what it will do in future.

[92]    While the training is necessary, in the medium or long term, it is difficult to claim that a session could not be delayed a few weeks.

[93]    The employer's actions late in May and June 2003 towards former trainers, without having evaluated the matter and determined if there was an immediate need to act, risk being perceived by employees as a sanction against their resignation (withdrawal from the volunteer list).

[94]    In these circumstances, the employer's demands on the former trainers put these individuals in a position of having to reconsider the resignations they had sent on their union's advice.

[95]    Given the circumstances at the time and the lack of an immediate need to hold training sessions, the consequence of the employer's actions was confrontation with the former trainers. In this context, the employer's actions essentially contradicted the word of the union.

[96]    I must conclude that, at the time, the employer's actions toward the former trainers had the effect of contradicting the union's advice. Accordingly, it constituted interference in union activities.

[97]    Unlike the situation with the emergency and fire teams, for which the arguments presented by the employer regarding immediate need and risk to safety and security make it possible to refute the union's allegations of interference, no evidence or claim of that nature can be accepted in connection with the training.

[98]    However, I cannot issue a permanent order concerning the employer's actions with respect to the training courses. After examining the various options available for providing these courses, the employer could reach the conclusion that it must use employees who have already worked as trainers, but that decision will have to be based on valid operational requirements.

[99]    The training is an integral part of security measures. While the time during the year at which it can be given may vary, it does not change the fact that there is a relative need for the training to be given.

[100]    Accordingly, I dismiss the union's complaint regarding the employer's sending information on the pension fund, the directives on the use of e-mail, and the orders given to the emergency and fire response teams.

[101]    I partially allow the complaint regarding the training courses to the following extent:

• I find that, given the circumstances, the threats of sanctions and the lack of an immediate need to act, the employer's orders to those in charge of the training courses, in May and summer 2003, constituted interference in the union's affairs contrary to the prohibitions set out in subsection 8(1) of the Act and represent a restriction of the freedom of an employee to participate in a lawful activity of the union.

[102]    I am not issuing a permanent order with respect to the employer's actions, given that my decision refers to the circumstances and to the way in which the actions were taken in May and June 2003.

Jean-Pierre Tessier
Board Member

OTTAWA, June 21, 2004

P.S.S.R.B. Translation