FPSLREB Decisions

I. Complaint before the Board

1 This is a decision with regards to an application for interim relief by the complainant, Ms. Irene J. Bremsak, with regards to her complaint of unfair labour practices against the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (“the bargaining agent” or PIPSC). The details of the relief requested are discussed below.

2 The complainant filed a complaint against the bargaining agent, alleging unfair labour practices with respect to three matters. The first is a request that the bargaining agent apologize to her for actions it took in a dispute between the complainant and another member of the bargaining agent. The second involves a letter that the National President of the bargaining agent sent that she describes as threatening and harassing. The final matter is the bargaining agent’s decision to temporarily suspend the complainant from her elected positions with the bargaining agent because she initiated an “outside” process against it (i.e., she filed a complaint with the Public Service Labour Relations Board (“the Board”)). The complaint was made pursuant to section 190 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act (“the Act”).

3 The complaint has also requested that the Board grant interim relief, before a final resolution of her complaint. As discussed below, an application for interim relief is based on a limited review of the merits of the case. In this case, there was no hearing, and the evidence is drawn from the information on file as provided by the parties, as well as from a conference call on May 2, 2008. Lengthy written submissions were also obtained from the parties. The complainant provided a written submission dated May 7, 2008, the bargaining agent provided a submission dated May 23, 2008, and the complainant provided a reply submission dated May 29, 2008.

4 On June 6, 2008, the Board wrote to the complainant’s representative, with a copy to the bargaining agent, as follows:

As you know a Board member has considered your application for interim relief. I have been directed to advise you that your application has been denied. A full decision with reasons will be issued in due course.

This is that full decision with reasons.

II. Summary of the evidence

A. Events leading up to the complaint

5 The complainant is an employee of the Canada Revenue Agency and a member of the bargaining agent. Prior to April 9, 2008, she held a number of elected positions within the bargaining agent.

6 The events giving rise to this complaint appear to have started in June 2007 at a Regional Council meeting of the bargaining agent. There was a dispute about the interpretation of the regional constitution, and the complainant participated in this dispute by sending an email to a number of members of the bargaining agent. Another member of the bargaining agent filed an internal complaint against the complainant about this email. Attempts to informally resolve this complaint were unsuccessful, and on September 12, 2007, the National President of the bargaining agent, Ms. Michèle Demers, wrote to the complainant to advise her that the Executive Committee had found the complaint to be valid. The Executive Committee also requested that the complainant apologize to the member who had complained against her.

7 The complainant then filed an internal complaint against the National President, alleging bias and partisan politics. She alleged in her correspondence to the bargaining agent that Ms. Demers “deliberately created undue stress and anxiety during my last week of pregnancy, knowing it would be difficult for me to respond. I believe that you are intentionally trying to harm me and my unborn child by creating stress.”

8 The Complaints Committee of the bargaining agent reviewed the complaint to them and, on September 19, 2007, the complainant was advised that there was no basis for her complaint against Ms. Demers, the National President. Further, the Complaints Committee found that the language of the complaint was inappropriate and they suggested that the complaint was vexatious. The recommendation from the Complaints Committee, to the Executive Committee, was that it reject the complaint because it was without merit. At that point, the complainant was given the opportunity to provide a written submission to the Board of Directors of the bargaining agent.

9 On the same day as the Complaints Committee report, September 19, 2007, the complainant filed a formal, internal complaint with regards to the September 12, 2007, decision of the Executive Committee. This complaint alleged that the National President had a “political debt” to another member of the bargaining agent and that was Ms. Demers’ motive for siding with the other member of the bargaining agent.

10 In October 2007, the bargaining agent attempted to obtain an apology from the complainant but this was unsuccessful. On October 22, 2007, the complainant provided a lengthy written appeal to the Board of Directors. Then, on November 26, 2007, the complainant advised the bargaining agent that she had filed a complaint with the Board.

11 It may be useful at this point to comment that most of the documents referred to in this decision have not been provided by either party. For example, I was not provided with a copy of the September 12, 2007, decision of the Executive Committee or the communications related to that decision. Again, this decision is based on a summary of information provided by documents and submissions of the parties.

B. The complaint

12 The complaint filed with the Board is dated November 16, 2007. It was filed under section 190 of the Act and was based on paragraph 190(1)(g), which prohibits unfair labour practices within the meaning of section 185. In her complaint, the complainant stated that the bargaining agent had failed to notify her in writing prior to the bargaining agent’s decision (apparently the decision of September 12, 2007). Further, the bargaining agent had failed to provide evidence that the reputation “of the other side was in any way tarnished” and she raised other matters in her complaint. The corrective action sought by the complainant included the following (reproduced as written):

1. Dismissal of the complaint.

2. Withdrawing of Executive Committee’s decision of Sept. 12, 2007.

3. Public apology by Michele Demers admitting that she and the Executive Committee failed to follow the PIPSC’ By-laws and Policies and the general principles of Natural Justice.

4. Concurrence by Michele Demers that all actions taken by the complainant have been in accordance with the PIPSC’ By-laws and Policies and the general principles of Natural Justice.

13 The bargaining agent provided a reply to the complaint and this is dated December 14, 2007. It questioned whether the complaint was filed under the correct section of the Act. It also questioned whether the Board had jurisdiction to consider what the bargaining agent described as its internal matters.

C. Events following the complaint

14 A number of events followed the complaint of November 16, 2007.

15 On March 3, 2008, the National President of the bargaining agent, Ms. Demers, again wrote to the complainant, setting out a detailed history of the recent events involving the complainant. The letter also requested that the complainant change “the tone and nature of your communications” in order to “foster a more collegial, inclusive and collaborative mode of functioning between yourself and your colleagues.” The complainant’s attitude was characterized as “aggressive and confrontational,” and Ms. Demers was concerned that some bargaining agent wanted to resign because of the complainant’s behaviour. Further, some had already indicated their decisions to resign, and Ms. Demers stated, “I cannot sit idly by and allow such negative attitudes and intimidation of members and volunteers of our union. There is too much at stake for our members, for our staff and for the public interest for this to go on.” Ms. Demers “strongly” suggested that the complainant change her attitude and that she:

… adopt a more positive approach to helping your fellow members. The attack and retaliation mode that you have adopted against our union and our volunteers is counterproductive, extremely harmful and totally unacceptable to the members in your region and to the whole of the Professional Institute.

16 The complainant’s representative wrote to the Board on March 7, 2008, about the March 3, 2008, letter from Ms. Demers. On behalf of the complainant, he described the bargaining agent’s letter as “threatening and harassing.” Further, he stated that the letter should have been sent to him and that the bargaining agent has “no respect for the PSLRB or PSLRA.” The complainant’s representative requested that the Board “make a ruling on Ms. Demers’ conduct. I request formal assurance that this will not happen again by PIPSC.”

17 In another incident, the bargaining agent wrote to the complainant on April 9, 2008. The letter included a copy of a policy “recently adopted by the Board of Directors that concerns members who take proceedings against the Professional Institute to outside bodies.” The Board of Directors approved the policy on March 19, 2008. The April 9, 2008, letter from the bargaining agent also stated as follows:

…

Please note that this policy prescribes that if any member refers a matter, which has been or ought to have been referred to the Institute’s internal procedure, to an outside process or proceeding further defined in the policy under point two of the policy, then that member will automatically be temporarily suspended from exercising the functions and duties of any elected or appointed office or position that they may hold with the Institute. The policy goes on to note that the temporary suspension shall cease once the outside procedure(s) have been finally terminated for any reason.

Please be advised that in conformity with this policy, you are temporarily suspended from the following positions:

Member-at-Large, SP Vancouver Sub-Group President, Vancouver Branch Member-at-Large, BC/Yukon Regional Executive Sub-Group Coordinator, SP Group Executive

Please also be advised that each appropriate lead of the above named constituent bodies has independently and separately been advised of your suspension.

18 The complainant’s representative wrote to the Board on April 11, 2008, to say, among other things, that the decision contained in the April 9, 2008, letter meant that the bargaining agent and the national president have “retaliated against my client for filing her complaint to the PSLRB.” Further, the bargaining agent had “suspended [the complainant] from all her positions without a disciplinary action,” and the actions of the bargaining agent were “illegal and contravene” subparagraph 188(e)(ii) of the Act.

19 At the complainant’s request, the Board held a case management conference call on May 2, 2008. The participants included the complainant, her representative, the General Counsel for the bargaining agent and me. As a result of this conference call, the Board set dates and procedures for these proceedings. Disclosure of documents was discussed and a date set for the bargaining agent to reply to the complainant’s request for documents. Dates were set for written submissions on the issue of the complainant’s application for interim relief. Counsel for the bargaining agent advised that the bargaining agent would write a letter to the complainant to advise her of its view of her current status with respect to running for elected office and attending meetings. A hearing date of June 23, 2008, was also confirmed for the bargaining agent’s preliminary objection to the Board’s jurisdiction over the complaint because, according to the bargaining agent, it deals exclusively with internal bargaining agent matters. That date has now been adjourned by agreement. Finally, dates were discussed, but not decided, for hearing the merits of the complaint.

20 On May 9, 2008, counsel for the bargaining agent provided the written position of the bargaining agent about the complainant’s current status, as he agreed in the conference call of May 2, 2008. It reads, in part, as follows:

…

Your status as a member of the Institute is in no way affected by any decision taken by the Board of Directors. You are entitled to attend any meetings which members are generally able to attend. In addition, you are entitled to run for any office in the Institute in keeping with the normal rules of PIPSC. However, because of the application of the policy dealing with members and complaints to outside bodies, your ability to exercise the functions and duries [sic] of any office to which you might be elected would be temporarily susspended [sic]. The temporary suspension would cease once the outside proceedings have been finally terminated.

…

21 The complainant’s representative advised the Board on June 4, 2008, that the bargaining agent’s annual general meeting would begin on June 5, 2008, and a decision on the complainant’s request for interim relief was requested before that date. The Board requested particulars of the meeting. It commenced on June 5, 2008, with travel by delegates and a Regional Executive meeting. The actual general meeting commenced on June 6, 2008, at 14:00, and continued June 7, 2008, with elections to the Regional Executive taking place that afternoon. Subsequent to the decision of June 6, 20008, in this matter the Board was advised that the complainant attended the June 4, 2008, meeting. She also spoke at the meeting and she was elected to the Regional Council Executive of the bargaining agent. (Subsequent to the June 6, 2008, decision of the Board, without reasons, the respondent advised the Board that the complainant attended the June 4, 2008 meeting.  She also spoke at the meeting and she was elected to the Regional Council Executive of the bargaining agent.)

22 Before the annual general meeting, things had continued to develop with the bargaining agent. The Board of Directors considered the complainant’s appeal, presumably of the September 12, 2007, decision of the Executive Committee, at a meeting on December 7, 2007. On December 12, 2007, the Board of Directors issued a statement to the original recipients of the complainant’s email about the other member of the bargaining agent (who the complainant alleged was owed a “political debt” by the National President of the bargaining agent) and the Board of Directors apologized on behalf of the bargaining agent. That caused the complainant to write to the Board on December 18, 2007, requesting the immediate withdrawal of the directors’ communication. Failure to take that action would result in a complaint to the Board and legal action for slander. A representative of the Board of Directors wrote to the complainant on December 24, 2007, to advise her that the decision of the Board of Directors was final.

23 There were further exchanges between the complainant and the bargaining agent in January and February 2008. On January 9, 2008, the bargaining agent wrote to the complainant about her appeal to the Board of Directors and advised her that the matter was closed. On January 21, 2008, the complainant made an internal complaint against the Board of Directors regarding disciplinary action that the bargaining agent had taken against her and she accused the Board of Directors of slander and defamation. The complainant also filed an internal complaint against the Complaints Committee. Then, on February 3, 2008, the complainant was involved with another member of the bargaining agent in an email exchange on the process that the Board of Directors used for selecting National Committee members. The complainant made allegations against this other member of the bargaining agent, including allegations that he was acting “unlawfully” and “illegitimately forcing the Regional Council to accept [name of other member of the bargaining agent] onto the Executive.”

III. Summary of the arguments

24 In the complainant’s application for interim relief by the complainant there are two issues. First, does the Board have jurisdiction to grant interim relief? Second, if the Board does have jurisdiction, do the circumstances of this case support granting interim relief? The parties are agreed that the test for interim relief involves three issues: consideration of a serious issue to be tried, the existence of irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.

25 The complainant submits in her submission of May 7, 2008, that the policy that resulted in her suspension from her elected positions in the bargaining agent was enacted retroactively, and also that:

The Respondent, Michele Demers is utilizing this new policy in a discriminatory nature since I. Bremsak is the only individual to be suspended for filing a complaint to an outside party. In addition, this is the first time a policy is being applied retroactively.

26 The complainant relies on previous decisions of the Board (cited by her as follows, Lamarche v. Marceau, 2005 PSLRB 153, and Laplante v. Murray et al., 2007 PSLRB 73). With respect to jurisdiction, she relies on section 36 of the Act and submits that that provision clearly provides the authority to make orders requiring compliance with the Act, including interim orders. With respect to the merits of the application for interim relief, she relies on the history of the events between her and the bargaining agent and it is submitted that the burden of proof lies with the bargaining agent.

27 For its part, the bargaining agent submits that the Board has no jurisdiction to order interim relief. Specifically, the bargaining agent states that there is no express provision in the Act that authorizes the Board to grant interim relief. Subsections 192(1) and 40(1) were reviewed, but again, according to the bargaining agent, there is no authority for interim relief in those provisions. A comparison is made with the Canada Labour Code that, pursuant to section 19.1 of that statute, expressly authorizes the Canada Industrial Relations Board to make any interim order that it considers appropriate for the purpose of ensuring the fulfillment of the objectives of the relevant Part of that statute. There is no equivalent provision in the Act, according to the bargaining agent.

28 With respect to the merits, the bargaining agent submits that the evidence does not give rise to a serious issue. Paragraph 188(c) and subsection 188(e)(ii) of the Act require discrimination by a bargaining agent before an application can succeed under those provisions. In this case there is no evidence of discrimination, according to the bargaining agent. Further, the bargaining agent submits that the application of irreparable harm and the balance of convenience tests favour the bargaining agent.

29 In her reply submission of May 29, 2008, the complainant relies on section 192 of the Act. There is “clearly intimidation and coercion” by the bargaining agent to “punish the Complainant” for filing her complaint with the Board, and “[t]o produce a new policy and to make it retroactive also demonstrates that the Respondent has acted in a discriminatory manner.” That policy was specifically designed to remove from the complainant her ability to participate in and to run for an election. According to the complainant, the evidence supports the complaint on the issues of a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.

IV. Reasons

30 This is an application by the complainant for interim relief against the bargaining agent. She seeks a number of orders, including reinstatement into her elected positions. She has identified paragraph 188(c) and subparagraph 188(e)(ii) of the Act as for the basis of her application. I set out those provisions as follows:

   188. No employee organization and no officer or representative of an employee organization or other person acting on behalf of an employee organization shall

…

(c)  take disciplinary action against or impose any form of penalty on an employee by applying the employee organization’s standards of discipline to that employee in a discriminatory manner;

…

(e) discriminate against a person with respect to membership in an employee organization, or intimidate or coerce a person or impose a financial or other penalty on a person, because that person has

…

(ii) made an application or filed a complaint under this Part or presented a grievance under Part 2, or…

31 As stated above, two issues arise from this application for interim relief: whether the Board has authority under the Act to grant interim relief and, if there is such authority, whether the circumstances of this case justify granting that relief. I have decided to proceed on the basis of the merits of the complainant’s application for interim relief. That is, I am not deciding whether the Board has jurisdiction to grant interim relief. Instead, I am assuming that the Board has this authority.

32 The complainant and the bargaining agent both relied on the judgment in RJR- MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, as providing the test to be applied in an application for interim relief. The following are the elements of that test:

1. there must be a serious issue to be tried;

2. the complainant must demonstrate that irreparable harm will result if the relief is not granted; and

3. an assessment of the balance of convenience must favour the complainant before relief will be granted.

33 I note that other approaches are used in jurisdictions where there is authority to grant interim relief. See, for example, the arbitration award decided in British Columbia in Luscar Ltd. v. IUOE, Local 115 (2001), 95 L.A.C. (4th) 283, and the decision under the Canada Labour Code in United Parcel Service v. Teamsters, Local 938 (2002), 109 L.A.C. (4th) 312. There are some differences in detail between the approaches in those awards and the approach in RJR - MacDonald Inc.,but in my view, the general principles are the same. I am proceeding on the basis of the tests in RJR - MacDonald Inc.

34 I note that all three elements of the test in RJR - MacDonald Inc. must be met before interim relief is granted. With respect to the consideration of a serious issue, this must be one that is within the authority of the Board to grant under the Act. Further, I note that the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR - MacDonald Inc. has directed that this is to be determined on the basis of “common sense” and on “an extremely limited review of the case on the merits” and that a “prolonged examination of the merits is generally not necessary or advisable”. That approach is in accord with the expeditious nature of applications for interim relief and with the proceedings in this case.

35 As noted above, paragraph 188(c) of the Act contains a prohibition against disciplinary action by an employee organization where the organization’s standards of discipline are applied in a “discriminatory manner.” In light of this provision, some review of discrimination is necessary in this case. The onus is on the complainant to demonstrate that a serious issue of discrimination exists under paragraph 188(c) as a basis for her application for interim relief. I do not agree with the complainant that the onus is on the bargaining agent, and the decision in Lamarche does not support her submission on that point.

36 The complainant’s initial application of November 16, 2007, does not mention discrimination, nor do subsequent correspondence and submissions from and on behalf of the complainant. For example, the complainant’s submission following the letter of March 3, 2008, from Ms. Demers described that letter as threatening and harassing but there is no reference to discrimination.

37 The first reference to discrimination by or on behalf of the complainant appears to have been made in a May 13, 2008, letter from her representative to the General Counsel for the bargaining agent. The denial of reimbursement of her costs for the complainant to attend meetings of the bargaining agent was raised. Then the following was stated: “Is PIPSC implying that member’s costs are not covered at all by PIPSC while attending meetings or is PIPSC intentionally discriminating against my client and acting against her right as a member?” The letter also stated that in the past, guests have had their costs of attending the meeting covered.

38 As I understand it, the denial of costs for the complainant to attend meetings of the bargaining agent was based on the fact that she was not a delegate to those meetings. To a considerable extent, this matter engages one of the major issues in this complaint, which is whether the bargaining agent properly suspended the complainant from her elected positions. Considered in that light, the payment of costs to attend meetings would likely be a remedy that would follow if the complaint were successful. As for the substance of the complainant’s submission, the meaning of “intentionally discriminatory” is not clear, and the intent may be to emphasize her being singled out as opposed to discrimination in any comparative sense. There is reference to costs being provided to other “guests,” but no particulars are given for those situations. Presumably, guests are persons invited to the meetings, but one of the complainant’s allegations is that she was not invited. Again, that is a remedial issue that may follow from a successful complaint. For those reasons, I am not deciding the issue of the complainant’s entitlement to the reimbursement of costs to attend meetings as a separate matter.

39 The complainant also refers to discrimination in her submission of May 7, 2008. That statement is, again, as follows:

The Respondent, Michele Demers is utilizing this new policy in a discriminatory nature since I. Bremsak is the only individual to be suspended for filing a complaint to an outside party. In addition, this is the first time a policy is being applied retroactively.

40 I accept that the complainant is the only person who has been subjected to the bargaining agent’s policy. However, that is because it is a new policy, and the complainant is the first person to whom it has been applied. That does not amount to discrimination.

41 There is also the complainant’s concern about what she describes as the retroactive application of the policy. As noted above, the Board of Directors approved it on March 19, 2008, and her complaint is dated November 16, 2007. According to the complainant, the policy “was specifically designed to remove the complainant from being able to participate and run an effective campaign” for elected office.

42 I appreciate the complainant’s concern, and it does not appear to be in dispute that the directors of the bargaining agent approved the policy after this complaint was filed. However, other than the timing of the policy, there is no evidence that it was “specifically designed” for the purpose alleged by the complainant. For example, there is no evidence that the intent of the policy was to obstruct the complainant or any evidence at all about the policy’s development. The complainant refers to a previous complaint against the bargaining agent by another person in 2006, and there was no policy to affect the status of that person. However, that simply means that the policy was not in force in 2006. The complainant also relies on various changes that were made to the bargaining agent’s dispute resolution policy, and she submits that those are also discriminatory. I accept that changes were made to the dispute resolution policy. But there was a dispute resolution policy before this complaint, and it has not been demonstrated how changes made subsequent to the complaint are discriminatory or otherwise directed at her.

43 The other aspect of the retroactivity issue is that the complainant questions how it can apply to her when the bargaining agent adopted it after her complaint to the Board. That is a fair question, but again, it has not been demonstrated that the retroactive application of the policy is related to the complainant’s complaint to the Board. Further, it has not been explained why the bargaining agent’s policy cannot be applied retroactively. That is a somewhat technical matter, perhaps involving the construction of the bylaws and other legal aspects of the bargaining agent’s affairs. The policy in dispute may operate retroactively or it may not. As it stands, I have no information about how this technical issue would be resolved.  I do note that the policy itself contains no statement about retroactivity.

44 The complaint in this case is also made under subparagraph 188(e)(ii) of the Act, whichprohibits discrimination against a person because that person has made an application under Part 1 of the Act. The complainant made such an application, and she alleges that her suspension from elected office is a prohibited penalty under that subparagraph. However, the evidence is that the policy was applied against the complainant with the result contemplated by the policy. The simple application of the policy does not in itself amount to discrimination, and again, it is not discriminatory when the first person to come under a new policy is affected by that policy.

45 Subparagraph 188(e)(ii) of the Act also prohibits intimidation or coercion of a person by an employee organization because that person has filed a complaint under Part 1 of the Act. The complainant asserts that there has been intimidation because of the letter of March 3, 2008, from Ms. Demers and the reference in that letter to the complainant being “aggressive and confrontational.” The complainant takes exception to those and other comments and characterizes them as intimidation. The letter runs to four pages, and the first three pages are a chronology of the events giving rise to the letter itself. I note that in this interim application, the complainant has not, for the most part, taken issue with any of the factual statements in the first three pages of the letter. I have reviewed the chronology in the letter, and it is presented in a factual manner.

46 It is the last page of the March 3, 2008, letter that contains the statements that the complainant considers to be intimidation. They are references by Ms. Demers to the complainant being “aggressive,” “confrontational” and “negative,” among other things. I accept that the Demers letter contains forceful and direct language, as do the communications of the complainant and her representative. Again, the letter from Ms. Demers states that the complainant alleged in her internal complaints that Ms. Demers had “intentionally tried to harm me [the complainant] and my unborn child”. In submissions made on behalf of the complainant, there are allegations that representatives of the bargaining agent are “lying” and “perjuring” themselves.

47 There is no question that the relationship between the complainant and Ms. Demers has become bitter and heated, and that is reflected in the correspondence from both individuals. But, based on the information before me, I do not agree that this unfortunate turn of events means that blunt accusations constitute intimidation or coercion as those terms are used in subparagraph 188(e)(ii) of the Act. It should also be said that interim proceedings, such as this one, do not allow for an adequate basis for adjudicating those kinds of factual disputes. That is something for a full hearing, and it may not be able to be adjudicated adequately on an interim basis.

48 The complainant also raises a procedural issue. She submits that the bargaining agent held no hearing before the decisions in dispute were made and that no appeals were available. That apparently is the case, but it would appear to be an internal matter for the bargaining agent and not something in which the Board can intervene. I make that finding in the narrow sense of that particular issue and on an interim basis. The broader issue of the Board’s jurisdiction over internal matters of the bargaining agent in this case will be considered at a hearing of the bargaining agent’s application that the entire complaint is outside the Board’s jurisdiction.

49 A final matter concerning the issue of discrimination arises again from Ms. Demers’ letter of March 3, 2008. According to that letter, the complainant wrote to the bargaining agent on September 14, 2007, stating that it “deliberately created undue stress and anxiety during my last week of pregnancy, knowing it would be difficult for me to respond. I believe that you are intentionally trying to harm me and my unborn child by creating stress.”

50 I note that discrimination in those terms was not specified in the November 2007 complaint or in any of the subsequent submissions or communications from the complainant or on her behalf. Indeed, it was a representative of the bargaining agent that raised the issue of the complainant’s pregnancy, and it is not referred to in the complainant’s submissions. This is obviously a very personal matter and it is not one that can be fairly dealt with by an inference on my part about the scope of the complaint. Therefore, I conclude that the complainant has made no allegation of discrimination on that basis.

51 In light of the above findings, I am unable to find that the complainant has proven that there is a serious issue under paragraph 180(c) and subparagraph 188(e)(ii) of the Act that there has been discrimination in her dealings with the bargaining agent. In light of this finding, it is unnecessary to consider the issues of irreparable harm and balance of convenience.

52 As a final matter, as noted above, this decision about the complainant’s application for interim relief is being made based on a limited review of the merits and evidence in this case. That is the nature of interim proceedings, which do not have the benefit of a full record of evidence. As was stated in RJR - MacDonald Inc., this decision is a preliminary assessment. A full record will include complete evidence from each party and will be tested by, among other things, cross-examination. The conclusions of this decision are made on an interim basis, and a final determination of the complaint will be made after a full hearing and full submissions.

53 For all of the above reasons, the Board makes the following order:

V. Order

54 The complainant’s application for interim relief is denied.

July 4, 2008.

John Steeves,
Board Member