FPSLREB Decisions

Complaint before the Board

1 Peter Gilkinson (“the complainant”) filed a complaint under paragraph 190(1)(g) of the Public Service Labour Relations Act (“the Act”), alleging that the executive of the Audit, Financial and Scientific (AFS) Group applied the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC or “the respondent”) standards of discipline in a discriminatory manner when it took disciplinary action against him for refusing to withdraw a resolution that formalized the right of the Agency Professionals (APPA) representative to be involved in consultation. The alleged discipline was the elimination of the APPA position from the AFS executive committee. It was further alleged that the discipline was discriminatory in that the AFS bylaws were not followed and that the complainant was not given the right to be heard on the matter. The complainant was elected to the APPA position in March 2010.

Preliminary motions

2 Two preliminary matters were to be dealt with before the hearing on the merits began, namely, the complainant’s request for a postponement and the respondent’s request for a copy of the medical certificate submitted by the complainant in support of his request.

3 After having been denied two requests for a postponement on August 1, 2012 based on the complainant’s lack of time to prepare for the hearing scheduled for August 8 to 10, 2012, the complainant presented a medical certificate from a physician (dated August 2, 2012) on August 3, 2012 indicating that he was “unable to work” and that he would be reassessed in two weeks.

4 The respondent was advised of the postponement request and objected to it. To discuss the request, I scheduled a pre-hearing conference call, which the complainant failed to attend. While the respondent was on the phone, waiting for the complainant to join the call, a representative of the Public Service Labour Relations Board (“the Board”) contacted the complainant to determine his intentions. He advised the Board’s representative that he would not attend the pre-hearing conference as he was seeking legal advice that, up to that point, he had been unable to secure. This was the first mention of securing legal representation by the complainant.

5 As a consequence, rather than grant or deny the request without giving the parties the opportunity to address it, I ordered that it would be dealt with as a preliminary matter before the hearing began on the merits. Both parties were advised that they should arrive prepared to proceed on the merits of the complaint in the event that the request for postponement was denied. This was confirmed via email to both parties, as follows:

This is further to the complainant’s request for postponement of the hearing in the above-noted matter.

The request has been submitted to the Board member for decision and a pre-hearing teleconference was called to deal with the complainant’s request. Joining the call were Mr. Welchner, Mr. Ranger and the undersigned. It is noted that the complainant advised the Board by email on August 3, 2012, at or around the time of the start of the teleconference, that he would like to seek legal counsel before proceeding in this matter.

In the absence of the complainant, the conference call did not proceed and the Board member directed me to advise the participants that she will address the complainant’s request in person at the outset of the hearing.

The Board member will hear the parties’ arguments on the issues related to the postponement request for medical reasons, time to seek legal advice and the release of a copy of the complainant’s medical note to the respondent. Please note that parties should be ready to proceed on the merits of this matter in the event the Board member reserves decision.

Accordingly, the hearing scheduled from August 8 to 10, 2012 in Toronto, will proceed as scheduled.

[Emphasis in the original]

6 The complainant did not appear at the hearing but was represented by Paul Gilkinson, who addressed the request on behalf of the complainant. He submitted that, as the respondent had already been granted two postponements without any objection, the complainant should be accorded the same consideration by the respondent. He submitted that the hearing process was very stressful. The stress was exaggerated by the documentary requirements of the process and the legal concepts unknown to someone without a legal background. He also argued that the respondent had put unreasonable demands upon the complainant in an effort to break him. Finally he submitted it was in the interests of his brother’s health that the postponement be granted.

7 The respondent argued that the circumstances around the request raised concerns as to the veracity or extent of the reasons for the complainant’s request. On August 1, 2012, the complainant twice requested a postponement. Both requests were denied. At that point, no mention was made of a medical condition. Two days later, the same request for postponement was made, this time accompanied by a medical certificate dated the day after his initial requests had been denied. The respondent was denied a copy of the certificate by the complainant but was aware of its general contents. Counsel for the respondent argued that the medical certificate was insufficient in that it did not contain vital information such as whether the complainant had been examined, and if so, when, whether any accommodation was possible that would enable the complainant to participate, whether the complainant advised the physician of the hearing, and whether the nature of his illness would affect his ability to participate in the hearing.

8 The respondent argued that the complainant’s request was suspicious, given his two prior requests before the hearing. There was no evidence to support the claim that the complainant could not attend the hearing. The request required convincing medical evidence to support it, and yet the complainant, on notice that the hearing could proceed were the request denied, did not provide it. The complainant was notified of the consequences of a denial of the postponement request and chose to not provide further medical evidence in support of his request. It is up to the Board to determine if the medical evidence is sufficient in the circumstances.

9  The respondent stressed that the complainant’s statements concerning previous postponements granted to the respondent were inaccurate. The respondent had twice turned down earlier proposed hearing dates as it was not available on those dates. No request for postponement was made in either case. Once the hearing was scheduled, the respondent did not request a postponement. It also denied placing any undue or unnecessary demands on the complainant with the objective to break him. There is no evidence of unreasonableness or bad faith in any of the interactions between the complainant and the respondent. The PIPSC asked for documents some time before it asked the Board to issue a disclosure order.

10 The onus is on the complainant to justify his request with proper evidence. According to the respondent, he has not met that onus.

11 The respondent referred me to Re Providence Care, Mental Health Services v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 431 (2011), 204 L.A.C. (4th) 345, in support of its arguments that the onus was on the complainant to justify postponement of this case. The adjudicator in Providence Care found that a medical note stating that the complainant was absent for medical reasons on certain dates was patently deficient and suspicious given the facts surrounding the request. The respondent also cited Balkan Glass & Aluminum Inc., [1996] O.L.R.D. No. 3172 (QL), as an authority for proceeding with the merits and for an adjudicator reserving on an adjournment request pending further medical evidence to support it.

12 The complainant was given the opportunity to rebut the respondent’s submissions. I asked his representative to determine when and if further medical information could be secured that would discharge the onus on the complainant to provide sufficient medical evidence that he was unable to participate in the hearing. The hearing was adjourned to give the complainant’s representative time to obtain that information. I was advised on reconvening 15 minutes later that the information could not be secured before the next Friday afternoon, in essence requiring granting the requested postponement.

13 I adjourned the hearing to consider the merits of the postponement request, which had become an adjournment request. Before doing so, I advised the complainant’s representative that, if I refused the complainant’s request, I would proceed on the merits and that the burden of proof was on the complainant. I then advised him of the evidentiary threshold that the complainant had to meet to substantiate his claim, which was that he had complied with the mandatory provisions of the Act, and showing how the action taken against him was disciplinary and discriminatory, and that he would be required to express the requested remedy. I also explained that evidence was required to meet that threshold. He was advised that I could provide guidance on the process but that it was up to him or the complainant to conduct the case and present the required evidence through witnesses or documents. He was also advised that he would be given the right to cross-examine any witnesses called on behalf of the respondent.

14 During the adjournment, I consulted with the Board’s Registry Operations and confirmed that the complainant was provided with a copy of the self-representation materials. Hard copies were sent to him on December 2, 2010, along with an acknowledgement of the receipt of his complaint. Those materials are also available on the Board’s website. The materials outline the rights and obligations of self-represented parties appearing before the Board. The scheduling of hearings is dealt with in some detail, as follows:

Preparing for the hearing

Introduction

As a rule, the process for a hearing before the Board is the same as that before a court, though somewhat less formal. The parties may file supporting documents as evidence and examine and cross-examine witnesses. Hearings give them an opportunity to present their arguments in order to establish their allegations.

Scheduling the hearing

The Board usually tentatively schedules hearing dates four months in advance. The parties will be contacted to confirm their availability.

Notice of hearing

When the Chairperson refers a complaint to a hearing, a notice of hearing is sent to each person whose name appears on the Board’s list, informing him or her of the date, time and place where the hearing will be held. A notice of hearing will normally be sent out one month prior to the hearing date.

Deferral and withdrawal

A hearing, for exceptional circumstances, may be postponed if either or both parties believe that they are unable to attend. In such a case, a postponement must be requested in writing with the Executive Director, and the reasoning for the request must be provided. The requesting party must send a copy of the request to all persons whose names appear on the Board’s list. Only in exceptional circumstances (e.g. a serious injury on the morning of the hearing) can the request be made with the Board panel.

The opinion of the other party will be obtained before a decision is made whether to postpone the hearing, and all persons whose names appear on the Board’s list will be informed of that decision.

…

15 As indicated in those materials, a notice of hearing was sent to the parties on July 4, 2012. A pre-hearing conference was held on July 26, 2012 to ensure that the parties were ready to proceed. At that conference, the complainant indicated that he would require two summonses for his witnesses. The parties were asked if there was any agreement on facts and documents. At that point, there was none, and the parties were requested to advise the Board by August 3, 2012 whether any would be forthcoming.

16 On August 1, 2012, the complainant officially requested two summonses, one of which was initially denied by the Board but was later issued on further submissions by the complainant. That same day, the complainant submitted what purported to be a draft agreed statement of facts. Both parties requested and were granted disclosure orders on the same day.

17 Throughout the day on August 2, 2012, the complainant communicated with the Board, seeking advice on several matters, including the possibility of an award of costs against him. In addition, a dispute arose between the parties over the attempted delivery of documents by the complainant to the respondent’s co-counsel, who was located in Toronto, as was the complainant.

18 At no time was mention made of the possibility of a request for postponement for medical reasons.

19 On August 3, 2012, the complainant sent an email to the Board, advising that he was unable to attend the hearing due to medical reasons. At lunchtime on August 3, 2012, the complainant faxed a medical note written on a doctor’s prescription pad advising that he would be “unable to work” for two weeks. A series of emails were exchanged between the Board and the complainant to determine his intention. He confirmed that he was requesting a postponement of the hearing scheduled for August 8 to 10, 2012. The Board advised the respondent of the request, which advised that it objected to the request and that it wished to be heard.

20 A pre-hearing conference was called for 15:00 on August 3, 2012, to discuss the postponement and to deal with the delivery of documents issue. The parties were advised via email of the time of the pre-hearing conference and the particulars required to join it. The respondent joined the call as scheduled; the complainant did not. The Board was subsequently advised that the complainant would not join the conference call as scheduled as he had been unsuccessful in securing legal counsel.

21 I also reviewed the Board’s file, which contained a multitude of emails between the Board and the complainant exchanged throughout the period leading up to the hearing. The complainant submitted his first request for postponement to the Board at 10:06 on August 1, 2012. It reads as follows:

I would like to request a rescheduling of the hearing…

My reasons are as follows …

I feel the Agreed Set of Facts was begun too late, it is too rushed and there is not adequate time, given my situation discussed below, to prepare a proper Agreed Set of Facts …

I have a number of problems ….

I teach night school at Sheridan College and was committed to marking 2 sets of exams when I got back. I did this in the evening, as I had to work during the day.

I was in Vancouver for 2 weeks. The first week was work and the second week was an Alaskan cruise…

Recently, I started in a new position as a contract Tax Law instructor at CRA. The position is renewable assignment. Renewal is based on performance and performance is assessed at every session.

We are required to plan a quarter in advance. I requested vacation for August 7^th to 10^th. I was going to prep on the 6^th and 7^th and attend on the 8^th to 10^th. I made my plans on the basis that I thought I had nothing further to do and would simply show up with my document on the 8^th.

I was scheduled to work last week and this week and I need to work.

I am teaching a new course in Halifax after the session. Typically because it is a first course the prep time allocated is inadequate and additional time is required. I do that in the evenings and on weekend unpaid ….

I don’t mind, doing all the work, I just have to have time to do it…

If rescheduled, now that I understand how the system works, I would set up a time with PIPSC, well in advance of the case, book off work and get everything done with at least 3 week to go.

[Sic throughout]

22 The respondent opposed the request for several reasons. The parties were advised at 11:39 on August 1, 2012 that the request for postponement was refused. At 12:45 that day, the complainant again requested a postponement via email to the Board, noting the following:

I cannot put any more unscheduled time into this.

As I have previously stated, as far as I knew, I was showing up next Wednesday with my binders. I was wondering how it work, since there hundreds of pages of documents…

My work schedule was as follows

Week of June 29th	Kitchener – teaching
Week of July 6th	Toronto East – teaching
Week of July 13th	Vancouver – teaching
Week of July 20th	Vancouver – Alaskan Cruise …

An Agreed Set of Facts takes time and as you can see from the above, I had no time. I have to plan my time 3 months in advance and I needed to know to plan for it. I would been happy to take time off if I had known…

In the evening, when I was teaching in Kitchener and Toronto East, I was prepping for the next day. I was literally only 1 day ahead of the students in terms of knowledge.

I had no time to do unplanned activities…

Now at the 11:00 hour, PIPSC wants to do exactly what I suggested a year ago.

I could have accommodated this, as I do work well under a deadline, but I needed to know and I needed to request the time off.

It wouldn’t work if I was working at night and they were working during the day…

It is PIPSC that has delayed the proceeding in the past. After they were granted their second “declined” I said that this is really stretching out and we need to bring it to a head …

It is my understanding that PIPSC uses Air Canada passes and as a result, will suffer no loss due to cancelled flights. There is adequate time to cancel the hotels without charge.

[Sic throughout]

23 Again, the request for postponement was denied, following which the complainant submitted a draft agreed statement of facts that he wrote. In his correspondence with the Board, he stated the following:

I have no more unscheduled time available for this. I am severely behind in my work.

24 The next day, August 2, 2012, the complainant sought a medical certificate excusing him from work. It did not state in any way that he was unable to participate in a legal process or this hearing.

25 Based on those communications, the differing excuses for not attending the pre-hearing conference on August 3, 2012 and the complainant’s behaviour, I concluded that the medical certificate was suspicious. In the absence of evidence to rebut this conclusion, which could be secured in a timely fashion, I denied the postponement request, which had become an adjournment request. I also denied the respondent’s request for a copy of the complainant’s medical certificate as it is sufficient that it was advised that it had been submitted to the Board.

26 At that point, the complainant’s representative was given the option of adjourning for a couple of hours or until the next day, if he wished, to prepare for a hearing on the merits. He specifically rejected the offer. After a brief adjournment, the length of which he determined, he opted to commence the hearing on the merits that same afternoon. I again reminded him of the evidentiary threshold that he was required to meet to establish the case on behalf of the complainant and to meet the complainant’s burden of proof.

27 The complainant contacted the Board on August 10, 2012, after the hearing was complete and both sides had closed their case, requesting that I recuse myself on the basis that I had previously been employed by the Canada Revenue Agency and had been involved in a matter involving one of his key witnesses.  The complainant did not copy the respondent on this request.

Summary of the evidence

28 In his opening statement, the complainant’s representative outlined what he saw as the basic facts. The complainant was elected to the APPA representative position in April 2010. (That conflicts with the documents filed with the Board that indicated the complainant was elected in March 2010 but nothing turns on this). He later submitted a resolution at the annual general meeting (AGM) of the AFS group that the APPA representative be entitled to attend meetings of the AFS executive as the representative of APPA members. The President of the AFS group requested he withdraw his motion and when the complainant did not, the President of the AFS group submitted a resolution at the same meeting to eliminate the APPA representative position. The hearing of the resolution to eliminate the APPA representative position was heard before the complainant’s resolution that, according to the complainant, was intended to promote the transparency of the AFS executive committee.

29 The decision to refer the resolution to eliminate the APPA representative position to the AFS By-Law Committee was overruled by the respondent’s Board of Directors.

30 By eliminating the position, the complainant was eliminated from participating in the AFS executive, which is extreme discipline, according to him. The resolution to eliminate the APPA representative position was put forward only after the complainant refused to withdraw his resolution.

31 The complainant’s representative then closed his case without calling evidence, despite having summoned two witnesses and despite the presence in the hearing room of at least one of those witnesses. I specifically cautioned him that he should seriously reconsider that decision and urged him to call oral evidence. However, he chose to rest his case. I also note that the complainant’s representative chose to not submit any documentary evidence in support of his case, despite having large binders of documents with him in the hearing room.

32 Counsel for the respondent made no opening statement and made a motion for non-suit on the basis that the complainant had led no evidence, meaning that there was no case to be met. In light of that fact, the respondent had nothing to which to respond. In his argument, counsel for the respondent reminded me of my earlier guidance to the complainant’s representative about the onus to be met, which required calling evidence.

33 The complainant’s representative spoke about the motion for non-suit and stated that the evidence was clear. The complainant was elected as the APPA representative, he made a motion at the AGM and his position was eliminated. It speaks for itself.

34 I reserved my decision on the motion and asked counsel for the respondent whether he was ready to open their case and was advised that the respondent would not call evidence.

Summary of the arguments

35 The complainant’s representative submitted that there is significant evidence of discipline. The complainant sought to promote the transparency of the AFS executive, and his position was eliminated.

36 The respondent argued that opening statements are not evidence. The description of the damage caused to the complainant is not evidence. The onus could not shift to the respondent to prove that it did not violate section 190 of the Act when the complainant did not show up. The complainant bore the onus of proving his case; it did not shift to the respondent in his absence.

37 The complainant, by way of rebuttal, stated that the respondent had the ability to call its witness who was in the hearing room and put forward the evidence, which would have helped me make a decision on the merits. It did not. The evidence is that the complainant was in the APPA representative position until the president of the AFS group put forward a motion to eliminate that position.

Reasons

38 Recusal: I will deal first with the recusal request as, were I to grant it, there is no need to provide any further reasons on the merits of this case.

39  In Evidence and Procedure in Canadian Labour Arbitration, at pages 5-3 to 5-6, the authors speak to the neutrality required of an arbitration board:

While there may be some debate concerning the extent to which the nominees to a board of arbitration may properly have a relationship with the parties such as to call into question their impartiality and objectivity, there is no doubt that the person selected to chair the board or act as a single arbitrator, must be neutral. …It is well accepted that the appropriate standard for determining the neutrality of the chair is that of “reasonable apprehension”, “likelihood” or “suspicion of bias”.  The apprehension must be held by “reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question”, by “informed person[s], viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through”.  Moreover, the likelihood of bias must be real and not a matter of “surmise or conjecture”.  Challenges to the neutrality of the chair have been heard in cases where, prior to being appointed to act as a neutral, the chair had been involved in one way or another as a “partisan” in labour relations matters. … [However], if the prior association with a party has been in a context which did not involve the arbitrator in a relationship of adversity with the other party, or if it had terminated some time before the arbitrator’s appointment, no reasonable apprehension of bias will be found.

40 In his communication with the Board, which as previously stated was not copied to the respondent, the complainant bases his recusal request on an alleged prior relationship I had with one of his witnesses.  There is no suggestion in his request that there is a previous relationship with a party, only one of his witnesses.  There is no direct relationship with the witness.  I provided advice related to an employment situation involving the witness.  At the time the witness and I were both employed by Canada Revenue Agency, albeit in different divisions and in different cities.

41 The test for determining whether reasonable cause exists for the apprehension of or a reasonable likelihood of bias was developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369:

…

The proper test to be applied in a matter of this type was correctly expressed by the Court of Appeal.  As already seen by the quotation above, the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically --- and having thought the matter through --- conclude ....”

…

42 The British Columbia Court of Appeal raised the question of the nature of the evidence required to demonstrate an appearance of bias in Adams v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) (1989), 42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 228:

…

… sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, to a reasonable person, there is a sound basis for apprehending that the person against whom it is made will not bring an impartial mind to bear upon the cause … suspicion is not enough….

…

43 The complainant bases his request for recusal on information he has received from other people indicating that there may be a conflict with a witness who was subpoenaed, not on the foundation of personal knowledge I may have of this particular case.  As the complainant did not raise the matter prior to the hearing and did not appear before me, no further information is available to support his recusal request.

44 The basis of the request for recusal is a suspicion unrelated to the complainant or any party to the complaint. It is also based on an employment situation which is unrelated to the factual context before me. On the face of it, there is no connection between the complaint before me and the reasons on which the recusal request is based. 

45 In Nelson v. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2012 PSLRB 65, Vice-Chair Linda Gobeil, at page 4, stated:

I believe that the grievor had to demonstrate beyond mere suspicion that a reasonable and well-informed person could believe that, in all likelihood, I would be biased when handling her grievance and that I would not render a fair decision.

46 Unlike the request before me, the basis for the request in Nelson was a personal relationship between the adjudicator and a senior director of one of the parties to the grievance.  Even then, the grievor’s suspicions were not sufficient to demonstrate that this relationship would bias the adjudicator in the hearing of the grievance. 

47 There is no relationship between the witness and me, nor has there ever been.  In fact, the witness and I have never met or ever communicated with each other.  I provided advice related to an employment situation involving the witness to the witness’s employer.  The employment situation was raised by the witness’s union representative, who I contacted by phone at the request of the employer.  I have never met the union representative to whom I spoke.  In fact, shortly after speaking to the union representative, my involvement ceased as I left on vacation at least eighteen months prior to the matter before me now. 

48 Providing advice to the employer was a regular part of my duties at the time and this was one of hundreds of situations on which I was consulted.  There is not now, nor has there ever been, a relationship between the witness and I that would support my recusal.  His is one of thousands of cases I have dealt with in the course of my labour relations career.  The grievor’s suspicions that some unrelated matter that brought one of his witnesses and I into the same sphere of events at some point in the past is insufficient to demonstrate bias.

49 A judge’s impartiality is presumed (see:  Taylor Ventures Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Taylor, 2005 BCCA 350 at paragraph 7).  That being said, and when faced with a request based on a suspicion of bias and unrelated to a party to the proceedings, I find that there is no basis for the complainant’s allegations of bias.  Like the adjudicator stated in Scharf v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2012 PSLRB 89, quoting paragraph 9 of the Taylor decision, I find comfort in the views of the British Columbia Court of Appeal:

…

Any reasonable, well informed person would accept the judge’s assurance that he would decide the case only on the evidence admitted at the trial.  This duty is so basic to the judicial function that the appellant’s concern amounts to nothing more than groundless suspicion.

50 For these reasons, I find that there is no basis to support the complainant’s request that I recuse myself.

51 Complaint:  To support an allegation that an employee organization violated paragraph 190(1)(g) of the Act, a complainant must prove that he or she presented a grievance or appeal in accordance with any procedure to which he or she had access that has been established by the employee organization, that the grievance or appeal has been dealt with by the employee organization, or that six months have elapsed since the grievance or appeal was filed, and the employee organization has not dealt with it. Any complaint to the Board must be made within 90 days of the decision or the expiry of the 6-month period if the employee organization has provided no decision.

52 The complainant must also then provide evidence of the discipline imposed and that it was unjust or unreasonable. It is not sufficient to simply state that he or she was discriminated against. There must be some proof of negative treatment. Mere allegations do not constitute evidence (see Tshibangu v. Deputy Head (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2011 PSLRB 143).

53 In this case, there is no evidence before me of any nature. The representative for the complainant chose to rest his case without calling witnesses, despite having summoned two, one of whom was present at the hearing and despite me asking him to reconsider that decision. Likewise, the respondent chose not to call any evidence. The onus is on the complainant. I cannot shift the onus to the respondent merely because the complainant’s representative chose to present his case in a certain fashion.

54 Nor can I gather evidence myself or make assumptions of fact, except through evidence properly put before me, as stated as follows at page 9 of National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians v. Baton Broadcasting (1970), 21 L.A.C. 7:

… There is an onus on a party to call the evidence which is necessary in order to establish all the facts required for the successful presentation of that party’s case … Unless facts are agreed upon by the parties or proved in evidence, there is no case before me.

55 The parties alone have the full duty to produce the evidence that will meet the legal requirement of their case. Apart from agreed statements of fact and decisions of other competent tribunals, and possibly in those instances when issue estoppel might apply, all other facts must be proved through documentary evidence or through oral testimony (see United Steelworkers, Local 958 v. Consolidated Canadian Faraday Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 425).

56 Opening statements and arguments by the complainant’s representative are not evidence. Nor are pleadings. When nothing is provided by way of evidence, other than representations by a party’s representative or counsel, a complaint should be dismissed, on the ground that there is no evidence to support it (see Re International Association of Machinists, Lodge 1922 v. Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd. (1963), 14 L.A.C. 219).

57 The complainant failed to provide any evidence or documentary proof to support his allegations. This complaint is dismissed on the grounds that there is no evidence in support of the complainant’s allegations.

58 For all of the above reasons, the Board makes the following order:

Order

59 The request for recusal is denied.

60 The complaint is dismissed.

October 15, 2012.

Margaret T.A. Shannon,
a panel of the Public Service Labour Relations Board