FPSLREB Decisions

I. Matters referred to adjudication

1 The applicant and grievor, Rachel Exeter, applied to the Public Service Labour Relations Board (“the Board”), seeking to have the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) she signed on February 11, 2009 set aside because the deputy head of Statistics Canada (“the employer”) has not complied with its terms and because it was allegedly entered into under duress. During the mediation that led to the settlement of her disputes, Ms. Exeter was represented by counsel. Ms. Exeter has not withdrawn her grievances since the MOA was signed contrary to her undertaking. Ms. Exeter is no longer represented by counsel. Ms. Exeter has also requested my disqualification as an adjudicator to hear and decide her application to set aside the MOA.

2 The following matters have been referred to me as they relate to the validity of the settlement undertaken on February 11, 2009: 566-02-1162 to 1164, 1362 to 1364, 1434, 1482 and 1593. In this decision, for the sake of simplicity, Ms. Exeter’s claims are referred to as a single application. It should be noted that the grievor was initially represented by the Canadian Association of Professional Employees (CAPE) but is no longer.

3 Ms. Exeter’s disputes before the Board that were the subject of the MOA may be summarized as follows:

1. 566-02-1162 - grievance - disciplinary action - being sent home without pay (1.5 days);
2. 566-02-1163 - grievance - disciplinary action - denial of volunteer leave on (February 15, 2006), in violation of past practice and clause 21.16 of her collective agreement;
3. 566-02-1164 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (1 day) that was unjust, vexatious, retaliatory and in violation of clauses 35.05 and 36.01 of her collective agreement;
4. 566-02-1362 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (3 days), alleging a prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race and disability;
5. 566-02-1363 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (1 day), alleging a prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race and disability;
6. 566-02-1364 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (5 days), alleging prohibited discrimination on the ground of race;
7. 566-02-1434 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (7 days) that was in bad faith, harassment and in violation of clauses 35.01 and 40.17 of the collective agreement, alleging prohibited discrimination that was unspecified;
8. 566-02-1482 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (10 days), in violation of clause 35.01 of her collective agreement; and
9. 566-02-1593 - grievance - disguised disciplinary action (termination) and termination for unsatisfactory performance resulting from defects in the performance appraisal process, in violation of clause 16.10 (non-discrimination) of her collective agreement, alleging prohibited discrimination on the ground of physical disability.

4 To assess the application, it is useful to review the relevant exchanges between Ms. Exeter, the employer and the Board since the MOA was signed on February 11, 2009.

5 On May 28, 2009, Ms. Exeter wrote to the Board, asking that I, as the adjudicator who brokered the MOA, “intervene” in the settlement “… in the form of a meeting or another option.” She stated that “[b]eing made to sign a settlement prior to the fulfillment of all issues was unwise,” and that the employer had not been and was still unwilling to address all outstanding issues related to the MOA. Ms. Exeter alleged that the employer had not fulfilled all its obligations under the MOA.

6 On June 19, 2009, the employer responded through its counsel, stating that it had indeed addressed all the issues raised by Ms. Exeter’s counsel after mediation and that it had duly executed its obligations as per the MOA. The employer argued that Ms. Exeter continuously refused to comply with the MOA’s terms and to fulfill her obligations under it.

7 On July 17, 2009, the employer wrote to the Board and submitted that the adjudicator remained seized exclusively with respect to matters pertaining to the implementation of the MOA, as per its paragraph 22.

8 On July 29, 2009, Ms. Exeter responded by outlining what she alleged were breaches of the MOA and agreed that, as the adjudicator, I remained seized of the issues that she listed.

9 On October 29, 2009, at my request, the Board wrote to the parties, informing them that a hearing would be held for the purpose of determining the following three issues: whether the MOA is final and binding on Ms. Exeter and the employer; as the case may be, whether the employer or Ms. Exeter was in non-compliance with the MOA; and, as the case may be, what order would be appropriate in the circumstances.

10 On February 2, 2010, I directed that the hearing be postponed pending the outcome of the Amos matter, then before the Federal Court of Appeal.

11 On February 3, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal issued Amos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 38. The parties were advised of the decision, and the grievor was provided with a copy.

12 On May 20, 2011, I scheduled a teleconference with Ms. Exeter and the employer for June 6, 2011, to further discuss the issues that would form the basis of a hearing and to obtain the parties’ availability for a one-day hearing.

13 On May 26, 2011, Ms. Exeter wrote to the Board, requesting that, before determining whether the MOA had been complied with, the adjudicator void the MOA, as it had been signed “… under intimidation, duress, undue influence, medical and physical incapacities, coercion, anguish and fear and it is unconscionable.” Ms. Exeter asked that the adjudicator deal with her request.

14 In response to her letter of May 26, 2011, the Board wrote to Ms. Exeter on June 2, 2011, advising her that the adjudicator could not unilaterally invalidate a MOA at a party’s request and that arguments from both parties were needed before that decision could be made; consequently, her request would be dealt with during the prehearing conference call scheduled for June 6, 2011.

15 On June 13, 2011, Ms. Exeter wrote to the Board, seeking the following “clarification” on two issues: whether I would be rendering a decision on the validity of the MOA based on her claim of signing it under intimidation, duress, undue influence, medical and physical incapacity, and coercion, and that it was unconscionable, and whether she could be advised on how to challenge the MOA if the Board ruled that it did not have jurisdiction.

16 On June 16,^, 2011, at my request, the Board wrote to the parties with the following directions:

Adjudicator Pineau has given the following instructions.

With respect to the first question raised in Ms. Exeter’s letter of June 13, 2011, a hearing will be scheduled to deal with the sole issue of Ms. Exeter’s allegation that she signed the MOA of February 12, 2009, under duress. In this regard, Ms. Exeter has the burden of proof.

In order to provide a greater focus to the hearing, Ms. Exeter is asked to provide employer’s counsel, Adrian Bieniasiewicz, and the Board with a copy of all the documents she intends to tender in evidence by no later than July 15, 2011, as well as a will-say for each witness she intends to call summarizing their evidence and the relevance of that evidence. Similarly, employer’s counsel is asked to provide Ms. Exeter and the Board with a copy of all documents it intends to tender in evidence as well as will-says for each of its witnesses, by no later than August 12, 2011.

The Board declines to give Ms. Exeter any advice concerning the second question raised in the letter of June 13, 2011. Ms. Exeter may want to seek legal advice on such an issue.

[Emphasis in the original]

17 On June 22, 2011, the employer wrote to the Board, stating that Ms. Exeter continued to be in breach of the terms and conditions of the MOA, causing the employer to incur substantial legal expenses. The employer asked that the adjudicator intervene and provided dates on which it was unavailable for a hearing.

18 On July 5, 2011, the Board reminded the parties about providing their availability for hearing dates and the adjudicator’s request for documents and will‑says.

19 On July 13, 2011, Ms. Exeter wrote to the Chairperson of the Board, asking that another adjudicator be appointed to rule on the MOA’s validity, alleging that the adjudicator had a conflict of interest because she was “directly affected by the outcome.” Ms. Exeter stated that the employer’s allegations of non-compliance with the MOA and the incurrence of substantial expenses were “absurd” and were attributable to the “immoral behaviour” of certain of its representatives.

20 On July 19, 2011, the Chairperson denied Ms. Exeter’s request that the matters be assigned to another adjudicator and stated that the directions of the adjudicator already seized with these matters still stood. Ms. Exeter was advised that, in the absence of a complete reply to the directions, the matter of compliance with the terms of the MOA would be decided by the adjudicator without a hearing and according to the material already on file.

21 In the absence of Ms. Exeter’s compliance with the directions of the adjudicator within the allotted time frames, the Board advised the parties that it would decide the matters without a hearing, according to the material already on file.

22 On August 5, 2011, Ms. Exeter applied to the Chairperson, requesting my disqualification as the adjudicator to decide her application and requesting the appointment of another adjudicator to decide the issue of the employer’s non‑compliance with the terms of the MOA.

23 On August 17, 2011, Ms. Exeter filed a “Notice of Motion” under section 36 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) for an order a) to prevent me from scheduling, hearing or making any order because of malfeasance and b) to appoint an independent adjudicator to look into the validity of the MOA, and c) any order that the Board deemed just. That “Notice of Motion” has been dismissed by the Board in decision 2012 PSLRB 24, leaving with me the decision regarding my disqualification. Annexed to the Notice of Motion were an affidavit signed by Ms. Exeter, her written representations, a copy of the MOA, a copy of a medical certificate dated July 14, 2011, and excerpts from the PSLRA, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights.

24 The employer replied on September 29, 2011, submitting that Ms. Exeter’s motion was trivial, frivolous, vexatious and in bad faith and that it should be dismissed. The employer argued that nothing prevented me from making an order with respect to the MOA as I was not a party to the proceedings and had no interest in the outcome of the order with respect to Ms. Exeter’s breach of the MOA and its validity. The employer submitted that subsection 224(2) of the PSLRA is not relevant or applicable in the circumstances. It submitted that Ms. Exeter’s allegation that she signed the MOA under duress was unsubstantiated and that it was contradicted by the observations of a witness. It filed an affidavit by a witness contradicting Ms. Exeter’s assertions. The employer submitted that the grievor was accompanied by counsel throughout the mediation process, received a cheque on March 6, 2009 for $128 971.00, as provided for at paragraph 12 of the MOA, and cashed it on March 13, 2009. The employer further submitted that it was not until May 26, 2011 that Ms. Exeter raised for the first time that the MOA had been signed under duress and undue influence, while she was suffering medical and physical incapacities, coercion, anguish and fear. The employer submitted that the motion was without merit and that it should be dismissed.

II. Analysis

25 From Ms. Exeter’s numerous submissions, I have identified the following two main issues:

1. Apprehension of bias: as the adjudicator who mediated the MOA, is there an apprehension of bias that I will not give Ms. Exeter a fair hearing?
2. Whether the MOA should be voided: should the MOA be set aside because it was signed under duress, including medical issues that were present at the time of signing and because the employer has not complied with its terms?

A. Apprehension of bias

26 Ms. Exeter alleges that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias should I continue as a decision maker with respect to her grievances and complaint because of the following:

• she has been deprived of a fair hearing;
• the nature of the hearing that was to take place changed;
• I have a direct interest in connection with the grievances referred to adjudication, contrary to subsection 224(2) of the PSLRA; and
• an independent adjudicator who has had no prior involvement should be appointed.

27 What constitutes a reasonable apprehension of bias has been the subject of several court decisions. In the seminal decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, Justice de Granpré, dissenting on the merits, crafted at pages 394-395 the following definition of what constitutes the apprehension of bias that still endures:

…

… the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information… that test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically - and having thought the matter through - conclude.”

I can see no real difference between the expressions found in the decided cases, be they ‘reasonable apprehension of bias’, ‘reasonable suspension of bias’ or ‘real likelihood of bias’. The grounds for this apprehension must, however, be substantial and I entirely agree with the Federal Court of Appeal which refused to accept the suggestion that the test be related to the “very sensitive or scrupulous conscience”.

…

This excerpt suggests that the test of what constitutes a reasonable apprehension of bias is dependent on the facts of the case as well as the circumstances and the proceedings taken as a whole.

28 In R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined the following considerations as relevant to who constitutes an unbiased decision maker and what he or she should consider:

1. a well-informed person who has knowledge of all the relevant circumstances (page 531);
2. a person able to carry out an open-minded, carefully considered and dispassionately deliberate investigation of the complicated reality of each case (page 506); and
3. the question of whether there is reasonable apprehension of bias must be analyzed with a complex and contextualized understanding of the issues of the case (page 509).

29 Ms. Exeter has apparently taken the position that I, as the original adjudicator, have a definitive opinion on the matters before me that would prevent her from being successful on the merits of her application. The fact that the adjudicator assisted the parties in settling their disputes does not necessarily equate with being biased. An adjudicator can hear parties’ evidence and submissions and issue a decision based on the information before him or her without being influenced by any previous discussions with the parties. Subsection 226(2) of the PSLRA provides that an adjudicator may assist the parties in resolving a dispute without prejudice to his or her power to continue the adjudication with respect to unresolved issues. Accordingly, the continuing involvement of the adjudicator in itself does not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias unless there is cogent evidence of the contrary.

30 I note that, in her correspondence of July 29, 2009, Ms. Exeter agreed that the adjudicator should remain seized. Only after the prehearing conferenced of June 6, 2011, the prehearing instructions issued on June 16, 2011 and my refusal to unilaterally invalidate the MOA did she write to the Chairperson on July 13, 2011, requesting that I be disqualified. Ms. Exeter did not respond to my directions to provide prehearing information by August 12, 2011, but instead filed a Notice of Motion under section 36 of the PSLRA on August 17, 2011 requesting my disqualification.

31 That sequence of events does not justify that I should disqualify myself. Ms. Exeter has not been deprived of a hearing; she has simply decided not to comply with prehearing instructions that were made clear to her, despite reminders. Her conduct indicates to me a lack of interest in a hearing. The adjudicator is master of her own procedure, subject to the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness, as provided in subsection 226(1) of the PSLRA. The parties do not dictate how a hearing will proceed. The adjudicator is responsible for ensuring that the adjudicative process runs smoothly and this is precisely what the pre-hearing disclosure instructions were designed to address.

32 In this case, I have the knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, and I am able to carefully and dispassionately consider the issues in the matters raised by Ms. Exeter. I have no interest in the outcome of any of these matters.

33 Ms. Exeter alleged that the nature of the hearing that was to take place has changed. That is incorrect. Ms. Exeter alleged for the first time on May 26, 2011 that she had signed the MOA under duress. To respond to that allegation, I agreed to hold a one-day hearing. To ensure the efficiency of the hearing and to allow the employer to respond to the grievor’s new allegation, I ordered the parties to exchange documents and witness will-says before the hearing. Ms. Exeter did not comply with the directions within the scheduled timelines. Instead, she filed a Notice of Motion for my disqualification. Accordingly, a hearing date was not set. On August 15, 2011, the parties were advised by the Board that the matters had been referred to the adjudicator for disposition.

34 For these reasons, I find that Ms. Exeter has not provided cogent reasons or evidence to support her application for my disqualification. Accordingly, her application is denied.

B. Whether the MOA should be voided

35 Ms. Exeter applied to have the MOA set aside because it was signed under duress, including medical issues that were present at the time of signing and because the employer has not complied with its terms.

36 I have considered the documents that Ms. Exeter filed as part of her Notice of Motion, even though they are not what was requested as part of the prehearing instructions and even though the allegations are intermingled with her arguments about my disqualification.

37 I will summarize the relevant parts of Ms. Exeter’s affidavit as follows. She and her counsel attended a meeting on February 11, 2009 at 14:00, to discuss a settlement. Ms. Exeter says that she was unprepared for such a meeting. Her counsel’s input was minimal, except for Workplace Safety and Insurance Board claims that Ms. Exeter was being asked “to give up.” Around 19:00, Ms. Exeter was feeling unwell, had a headache, was feeling nauseated and did not have her prescription medicine with her. Talks continued. Ms. Exeter claims that she refused the employer’s proposals several times in the course of the evening and that she asked for an adjournment of the hearing that was scheduled to resume the following day. In the absence of a settlement, the adjudicator refused to postpone the hearing. Ms. Exeter stated that she was pressured into signing because of statements made by the adjudicator in her mediation role. Ms. Exeter states that she was medically unfit to make a decision, distraught and mentally incapacitated. The MOA was signed after midnight that day. The following morning, Ms. Exeter contacted her counsel to inform her of the pressure that was put on her to sign and asked what steps to take to have the MOA voided. Her counsel told her that there was nothing that she could do because it was out of her hands. As a result, Ms. Exeter claims that she was forced to sign the MOA “… under intimidation, duress, undue influence, medical and physical incapacities, coercion, anguish and fear and it is unconscionable.”

38 On March 13, 2009, Ms. Exeter cashed a cheque for $128,971, negotiated as paragraph 12 of the MOA. She communicated with the Board on May 28, 2009 to express her dissatisfaction with the MOA. There are no allegations in that letter that the MOA was signed under duress. Ms. Exeter’s allegations were that the employer did not provide her with tax forms completed as she would have liked and that she had not received training manuals that the employer was to remit to her.

39 At the prehearing conference of June 6, 2011, Ms. Exeter declared that she had been very disappointed by what little remained of the financial settlement once income taxes had been deducted and that she had paid her counsel an amount exceeding what she had originally agreed to.

40 The medical certificate provided by Ms. Exeter in support of her medical condition is dated July 14, 2011. It states that a medical condition has been ongoing for several years, that she was last assessed in June 2011 and that she had been referred to other health specialists. This certificate, dated some 29 months after the MOA was concluded, cannot stand as clear and convincing evidence of Ms. Exeter’s condition as it stood on February 11, 2009. I consider that this evidence does not support the allegation that Ms. Exeter signed the MOA under duress. She has not presented or alluded to any credible and independent evidence to support her allegation of having signed the MOA under duress.

41 It is also worth emphasizing that throughout the mediation process, Ms. Exeter was represented by counsel. Paragraph 20 of the MOA clearly states that Ms. Exeter was represented by counsel and that her agreement is irrevocable:

20. The Grievor understands the irrevocability of this agreement and her resignation and has had legal representation throughout the settlement process leading to the signing of this Agreement.

[Emphasis added]

42 Ms. Exeter now disavows the role of her counsel in achieving a resolution of her disputes with the employer. Whatever issues Ms. Exeter’s may have with the quality of legal representation during the mediation process, relief does not lie before me.

43 For these reasons, I dismiss the part of the application requesting that the MOA be voided on the basis that Ms. Exeter signed it under duress. I find that the MOA is final and binding on Ms. Exeter and her employer.

C. Withdrawal of Ms. Exeter’s grievances

44 I will now deal with the issue of the consequences that arise from Ms. Exeter not having withdrawn her grievances.

45 Amos examined the scope of an adjudicator’s jurisdiction under the PSLRA over disputes relating to settlement agreements entered into by parties in respect of matters that can be referred to adjudication. The issue in Amos can be stated as follows: what is the forum for redress when a party has settled a grievance over which an adjudicator has jurisdiction and subsequently alleges that the other party failed to honour the settlement agreement? In Amos, the Federal Court of Appeal held that an adjudicator can determine whether a party complied with the terms of the settlement agreement and, if necessary, the appropriate remedy. The Federal Court of Appeal agreed with the adjudicator’s finding that he had jurisdiction to consider an allegation of non-compliance with a final and binding settlement if the MOA related to a grievance that fell under subsection 209(1) of the PSLRA.

46 In this case, Ms. Exeter’s complaints about the employer’s non-compliance with the MOA set out in her letter of the May 28, 2009 to the employer concern the manner in which the Canada Revenue Agency form T4A that followed the MOA was completed and include an allegation that the employer failed to return to her the training manuals requested as part of the MOA.

47 Section 209 of the PSLRA provides that an employee may refer only the following issues to adjudication:

209. (1) An employee may refer to adjudication an individual grievance that has been presented up to and including the final level in the grievance process and that has not been dealt with to the employee’s satisfaction if the grievance is related to

(a) the interpretation or application in respect of the employee of a provision of a collective agreement or an arbitral award;

(b) a disciplinary action resulting in termination, demotion, suspension or financial penalty;

(c) in the case of an employee in the core public administration,

(i) demotion or termination under paragraph 12(1)(d) of the Financial Administration Act for unsatisfactory performance or under paragraph 12(1)(e) of that Act for any other reason that does not relate to a breach of discipline or misconduct, or

(ii) deployment under the Public Service Employment Act without the employee’s consent where consent is required …

…

48 Obviously, Ms. Exeter’s disciplinary grievances do come within the parameters of subsection 209(1) of the PSLRA, and consequently, an adjudicator does have jurisdiction to provide an appropriate redress. Although it is possible for parties to come to a settlement on any number of issues, including those that are not adjudicable, once the MOA relates to a grievance that can be referred to adjudication, the adjudicator can determine whether a party has failed to comply with the MOA and what remedy, if any, is appropriate in the circumstances.

49 Paragraphs 1, 3 and 5 of the MOA deal with the withdrawal of Ms. Exeter’s grievances before the Board as a condition of settlement. They also refer to a complaint before the Board of which I am not seized. Paragraph 2 deals with complaints before other administrative tribunals of which I am not seized; all those complaints were not considered as part of this decision. At the date of writing this decision, Ms. Exeter had not withdrawn her grievances. That issue needs to be dealt with. Paragraphs 1, 3 and 5 of the MOA read as follows:

1. The Grievor has filed grievances with the Statistics Canada (the “Employer”) bearing Public Service Labour Relations Board (the “Board”) file numbers 566-02-1162 to 566-02-1164, 566-02-1362 to 1364, 566-02-1432, 566-02-1482, 566-02-1593 and 561-355.

…

3. All the foregoing grievances or complaints identified in paragraph 1 [and 2] above and any other grievances, complaints or claims the Grievor has which known or unknown to the Parties, shall be identified collectively herein as the “grievances”.

…

5. Subject to the fulfillment of the terms of this Memorandum of Agreement, the aforementioned grievances and complaints are hereby withdrawn. The Grievor shall advise the Board in writing of her withdrawal of said grievances shortly hereafter.

50 To allow the adjudicator to fulfill its mandate as provided in the Preamble of the PSLRA of providing for an efficient resolution of matters arising in respect of the terms and conditions of employment and the finality of decisions as provided in section 233 of the PSLRA, the adjudicator must be able to determine when a matter has been finally resolved by the parties.

51 The conditions of settlement make it clear that the grievances were being withdrawn as a condition of settlement. There is no reservation of withdrawing her grievances on the basis of the execution of the employer’s obligations. In view of my conclusions stated earlier in this decision, I find that the terms of the MOA, as they affect the grievances, have been met by the employer based on the fact that Ms. Exeter accepted and cashed the financial settlement stated at paragraph 12 of the MOA. However, Ms. Exeter never informed the Board that she was withdrawing her grievances. Therefore, I find that it is she who has failed to comply with the MOA. Therefore, I order all the following active files to be closed by the Registrar of the Board:

1. 566-02-1162 - grievance - disciplinary action - being sent home without pay (1.5 days): the matter is dismissed.
2. 566-02-1163 - grievance - disciplinary action - denial of volunteer leave (February 15, 2006), in violation of past practice and clause 21.16 of the collective agreement: the matter is dismissed.
3. 566-02-1164 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (1 day) that was unjust, vexatious, retaliatory and in violation of clauses 35.05 and 36.01 of the collective agreement: the matter is dismissed.
4. 566-02-1362 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (3 days), alleging a prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race and disability: the matter is dismissed.
5. 566-02-1363 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (1 day), alleging a prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race and disability: the matter is dismissed.
6. 566-02-1364 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (5 days), alleging prohibited discrimination on the ground of race: the matter is dismissed.
7. 566-02-1434 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (7 days) that was in bad faith, harassment and in violation of clauses 35.01 and 40.17 of the collective agreement, alleging prohibited discrimination that was unspecified: the matter is dismissed.
8. 566-02-1482 - grievance - disciplinary action - suspension (10 days), in violation of clause 35.01 of the collective agreement: the matter is dismissed; and
9. 566-02-1593 - grievance - disguised disciplinary action (termination) and termination for unsatisfactory performance resulting from defects in the performance appraisal process, in violation of clause 16.10 (non-discrimination) of the collective agreement, alleging prohibited discrimination on the ground of physical disability: the matter is dismissed.

52 For all of the above reasons, I make the following order:

III. Order

53 The request for the adjudicator’s disqualification is dismissed.

54 I declare that the settlement agreement is final and binding on Ms. Exeter and the employer.

55 The following matters are dismissed and the files are ordered closed: 566‑02‑1162, 1163, 1164, 1362, 1363, 1364, 1434, 1482 and 1593.

February 24, 2012.

Michele A. Pineau,
adjudicator