FPSLREB Decisions

I. Individual grievance referred to adjudication

1 On June 10, 2006, Fred Milligan, a border services officer (BSO), filed a grievance, complaining that Mark Strasser, Chief of Operations at the Rainbow Bridge in Niagara Falls, Ontario, had required him “… to go and get new patches put on [my] shirts on [my] own time.” He alleged that that requirement constituted “intimidation” and that it was contrary to the collective agreement, “… which states that [he] shall be paid for work performed.” As corrective action, he claimed “… the minimum of 3.0 hours for dropping off [his] shirts and a minimum of 3.0 hours to pick those shirts up on [his] own time.” He also asked to be paid mileage “…for dropping off and to pick the shirts up” (Exhibit U1). The applicable collective agreement is between the Treasury Board and the Public Service Alliance of Canada (“the union”) for all employees in the Program and Administrative Services Group, with an expiry date of June 20, 2007 (“the collective agreement”).

2 On June 30, 2006 another BSO, Clément Trudeau, filed a grievance to the same effect. He stated that he had been told on June 2 “…to bring [his] old shirts to the tailor to have new patches sewn on.” He had asked “…to go on company time but was told to go on [his] own time.” He put in a claim for having to go “on [his] own time,” which his superintendent denied. As corrective action, he requested that he “…be paid the minimum of 3.0 hours O.T. [sic] for dropping off [his] shirts plus mileage” (Exhibit U1).

3 Both grievances were denied by the Canada Border Services Agency (“the employer” or “CBSA”) on the grounds that employees were expected to have the new “flashes” affixed to their uniforms on their own time.

4 The grievances came before me in Niagara Falls on February 3, 2012. The parties adduced an agreed statement of facts (Exhibit U1), which I will set out later. I also heard from two witnesses, Jason McMichael, First National Vice-President of the union, and a BSO at the Port of Sarnia, Ontario, on behalf of the grievors, and Mr. Strasser on behalf of the employer.

II. Summary of the evidence

A. Agreed statement of facts

5 In 2006, when the grievances were filed, Mr. Milligan and Mr. Trudeau (“the grievors”) were indeterminate BSOs with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in its Southern Ontario Region (formerly its Niagara/Fort Erie Region).

6 The relevant collective agreement is the Program and Administrative Services (PA) agreement between the Treasury Board and the certified bargaining agent, the Public Service Alliance of Canada, signed March 14, 2005.

7 On December 12, 2003, the CBSA was created from the amalgamation of three key border functions: customs, immigration and food inspection. At that time, the officers from those three different organizations wore different uniforms. Via the amalgamation, a unique CBSA corporate identity was developed. By 2006, all CBSA officers were to be outfitted with identical uniforms.

8 In April 2006, CBSA officers in the former Niagara/Fort Erie Region, including the grievors, were provided with new CBSA flashes for their uniform shirts or with new shirts. The new flashes had to be sewn onto the uniform shirts. All employees were asked to have at least two shirts ready with the new CBSA flashes by May 19, 2006, in anticipation of the national rollout of the new “CBSA Corporate Identity Program.”

9 Officers were advised that the flashes had to be sewn onto the uniform shirts by an approved tailor. An ‘approved tailor’ was one who had bid on the work, and who had received the right from the Employer to bill it directly for the cost of sewing on the patch. Employees were requested to deliver their shirts to one of the approved tailors and to pick them up once the swap of flashes was complete. The employer expected that any arrangements for delivering and picking up shirts to or from the tailors were to be completed during employees’ non-work hours.

10 In spring 2006, uniformed employees in the employer’s Southern Ontario Region were advised that, on June 1, 2006, all CBSA officers were required to wear the new navy blue uniform with the new shoulder flashes.

11 From June 1 to June 4, 2006, the grievors were not scheduled to work.

12 On June 2, 2006, Mr. Milligan spoke with Mr. Strasser by telephone. Mr. Milligan advised Mr. Strasser that he expected to be paid overtime for the time spent travelling to and from the tailor on his own time, as per the collective agreement. Mr. Strasser disagreed with Mr. Milligan’s interpretation of the collective agreement and stated that overtime would not be paid.

13 On June 5, 2006, Mr. Milligan reported to work wearing a uniform shirt bearing the obsolete flashes. Paul Morrison, Superintendent, advised Mr. Milligan in writing that he “…will not work until this situation is rectified and you are in uniform in the prescribed manner (new patch). This will be a ‘no work, no pay’ situation until compliance.”

14 Mr. Milligan requested six hours of overtime for June 2 and June 4, 2006, to deliver and pick up his uniform shirts at the tailor on his days of rest. Mr. Trudeau requested three hours of overtime for June 2, 2006, for dropping off his uniform shirts at the tailor on his day of rest. Both grievors requested that their mileage be paid between their homes and the tailor’s shop. The employer denied each request for overtime and mileage.

B. For the grievors

15 Mr. McMichael testified that a BSO uniform is an important part of the employer’s “brand recognition.” It is vital to the recognition of the BSOs as the “front line of defence” and ensures that the public understand the BSO’s role of enforcing Canada’s border laws. The BSOs, at least those on front-line duty, have to wear their uniforms. Mr. McMichael stated that it was “an element of the job and was required by the employer.” Any employee who arrived at work without his or her uniform would be given a chance to comply with the uniform requirement, failing which he or she could be subject to discipline.

16 Mr. McMichael testified that the provision, use and care of uniforms were covered under the “Uniforms Directive” (“the Directive”, Exhibit U2). That directive was deemed part of the collective agreement (Exhibit U2, page 1). Uniforms are supplied by the employer. Clause 7.7 of the Directive provides as follows:

7.7 When, as a condition of employment, the employee receives any item of clothing as an individual issue, that employee will be expected to wear and maintain it in a clean, pressed and repaired condition, in accordance with departmental directives and in accordance with care labels permanently attached to each garment.

17 Clause 13.3 of the Directive provides that “[n]o allowances shall be paid for repair, cleaning, pressing and laundering…” Mr. McMichael testified that his understanding of the employer’s policy was that time needed for “minor alterations” to uniforms had to be spent on employees’ own time, “but in practice time has been afforded to employees” for such things as shortening pants or the taking-in of shirts.

18 Mr. McMichael testified that employees were notified in April 2006 that the new CBSA branding would go into effect on June 1, 2006. Employees were provided with four new CBSA shoulder flashes. They were told to take their shirts and flashes to one of a list of approved tailors, who would then sew the flashes onto the shirts. The expense of the tailoring would be borne by the employer; see Exhibit U1, Appendix B.

19 Mr. McMichael received the flashes. He asked for overtime to be authorized under the collective agreement in his words “for me to have the flashes sewn on my uniform.” In his opinion, the request was warranted because the flashes were “an integral part of the uniform, so it wasn’t just a minor alteration-it was part of the employer’s branding-and because it was integral to the uniform it should be considered part of the job,” and so he was entitled to pay. He testified that his initial request was denied. He went to his director, who told him that if he arrived at work without the flashes after the June 1 rollout, he would be subject to discipline. Mr. McMichael testified that he told his director that he “didn’t feel the employer could compel me to do work on my own time without paying [him]…it couldn’t compel [him] to volunteer [his] own time.” He told his director that he would not comply unless his time was paid. The discussion took place during mid-shift. Two hours later, his director called him back, handed him the keys to a CBSA vehicle, and told him to take an hour to get the flashes put on. Mr. McMichael took the keys, drove the vehicle home to get his shirts, and then dropped by the tailor to drop them off. About a week later, he again used a CBSA vehicle to pick up the shirts from the tailor.

20 Mr. McMichael testified that it was possible to travel to and from the tailor “inside of an hour” if it were done at the beginning or end of a shift. However, if it were done during an employee’s day of rest (that is, a day the employee was not scheduled for work) he or she was entitled under the overtime provisions of the collective agreement to a minimum of three hours’ overtime pay.

C. For the employer

21 Mr. Strasser testified on behalf of the employer. He did not dispute the importance of the uniform to the CBSA’s image or to the ability of BSOs to perform their duties. He agreed in cross-examination that, if an employee showed up for work without the proper uniform (or the proper shoulder flashes), he or she would not be allowed to work and would receive no pay.

22 Mr. Strasser also received the Directive and the shoulder flashes. After work, he dropped his shirts and flashes off with a tailor who was about five minutes from the Rainbow Bridge. He spent about five minutes there. He picked the shirts and uniform up several days later, again spending no more than five minutes in the shop. No money changed hands since the tailor had an account with the employer. Mr. Strasser had only to provide his name to pick up the shirts and uniform. None of this was done on work time, and he did not claim overtime.

23 Mr. Strasser agreed in cross-examination that some CBSA employees lived more than 45 minutes by car away from work. However, he noted that one of the tailors who had been designated by the employer to affix the shoulder flashes was only two minutes from the bridge. He objected to the suggestion that the employer could have delegated the task of taking everyone’s shirts and flashes to a tailor on the grounds that such a task was not part of anyone’s job function or description.

D. The collective agreement

24 The relevant provisions of the collective agreement are as follows:

Article 2 Interpretation and Definitions

“day of rest” … means a day other than a holiday on which that employee is not ordinarily required to perform the duties of his or her position other than by reason of the employee being on leave or absent from duty without permission.

“overtime” … means
(a) in the case of a full-time employee, authorized work in excess of the employee’s scheduled hours of work;

…

Article 28 Overtime

28.01 Compensation under this Article shall not be paid for overtime worked by an employee at courses, training sessions, conferences and seminars unless the employee is required to attend by the Employer.

…

28.04 General

(a)      An employee is entitled to overtime compensation under clauses 28.06 and 28.07 for each completed period of fifteen (15) minutes of overtime worked by him or her:

1. when the overtime work is authorized in advance by the Employer or is in accordance with standard operating instructions,
   
   and
2. when the employee does not control the duration of the overtime work.

…

28.07 Overtime Compensation on a day of rest

Subject to paragraph 28.04(a):

(c) when an employee is required to report for work and reports on a day of rest, the employee shall be paid the greater of:

1. compensation equivalent to three (3) hours’ pay at the applicable overtime rate for each reporting to a maximum of eight (8) hours’ compensation in an eight (8) hour period,
   
   or
2. compensation at the applicable overtime rate.

…

28.10 Transportation Expenses

(a) When an employee is required to report for work… under the conditions described in paragraphs … 28.07(c), and is required to use transportation services other than normal public transportation services, the employee shall be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred as follows:

(i) mileage allowance at the rate normally paid to an employee when authorized by the Employer to use his or her automobile when the employee travels by means of his or her own automobile …

(b) Other than when required by the Employer to use a vehicle of the Employer for transportation to a work location other than the employee’s normal place of work, time spent by the employee reporting to work or returning to the employee’s residence shall not constitute time worked.

III. Summary of the arguments

A. For the grievors

25 The union’s representative submitted that the issues were simple, as follows:

1. Were the employees required on pain of discipline to travel to and from the tailor to have the new shoulder flashes attached to their uniforms?
2. If so, was such activity “work” within the meaning of the collective agreement?
3. If so, what overtime and mileage were the grievors entitled to.

26 The union’s representative submitted that in effect the employer clearly had ordered the grievors to take their uniforms to the tailor. The uniforms were an integral part of the employer’s public branding. They were also integral to the grievors’ ability to discharge their duties and responsibilities for the employer. For example, a BSO’s ability to interface with the public and to ask questions, make decisions, impose taxes or custom duties, or detain people was dependent to some degree on his or her ability to present as an authorized representative of the power and authority of the Canadian state. That benefits the employer and furthers its objectives. That being the case, any time spent by an employee to ensure that the uniform that he or she wears meets the employer’s objectives must be “work,” and hence, he or she must be entitled to compensation under the collective agreement.

27 The union’s representative referred to Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 4^th ed. at para 8:2130, where it is observed as follows:

… arbitrators have frequently adopted a wider, more comprehensive meaning [of the phrase ‘time worked’] and depending upon the precise language of the agreement, have held that ‘work’ may embrace other periods such as time spent ‘on call,’ on training courses, at health and safety meetings, travelling to a work site out of normal hours, or off-duty hours in circumstances when the employees were under the control of the company (for example, when they were confined to the company’s premises), even though little or no productive effort is actually exerted.

She also relied on Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Office & Professional Employees’ International Union, Local 378 (2002), 106 L.A.C. (4th) 97, in which it was observed at page 104 that arbitrators “have generally accepted the proposition that, where an employer makes a claim on an employee’s time, the employee is entitled to compensation in the absence of some specific collective agreement provision to the contrary … ”: see also Chicorelli v. Treasury Board (National Defence), PSSRB File No. 166-02-23844 (19940114) to similar effect.

28 The union’s representative submitted that arbitrators and adjudicators have often allowed claims for travel time in which employees were required to attend training courses at places other than their usual places of business; see, for example, County of Oxford v. CUPE, Local Sub‑Unit 1146 (2003), 117 L.A.C. (4^th) 215; Chicorelli; and Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (time spent writing assignments outside of required course work). She submitted that this case is analogous to those cases, since the employer in effect directed the grievors to attend one of the designated tailors to have the shoulder flashes affixed to a uniform that was an integral part of the employer’s business.

29 The union’s representative submitted that the fact that the task being performed was slight or that it might not be “work” in any conventional sense did not mean that it could not be “work” for the purposes of the collective agreement, and quoted the following: “… ‘worked’ may include a period in which no work is actually performed but in which the employee remains under the employer’s direction and control and/or in which the employee’s responsibilities to the employer continue…” from Town of Midland v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 328 (1987), 31 L.A.C. (3d) 251.

30 Finally, the union representative submitted that, if I agreed that the task in question was “work” within the meaning of the collective agreement but that I was not satisfied that it took three hours to perform, I could award a lesser amount of time.

B. For the employer

31 The employer’s representative submitted that the issues were simple as follows:

1. did what the grievors do in driving to the tailor amount to “work;”
2. if it did, were they entitled to overtime under the terms of the Collective Agreement and, if so,
3. were they entitled to mileage under the Collective Agreement.

32 With respect to the first point, the employer’s representative submitted that “overtime” under article 2 of the collective agreement meant “authorized work.” But what is “work”? The employer’s representative submitted that “work” means “[p]hysical and mental exertion to attain an end, esp. as controlled by and for the benefit of an employer; labor,” from Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition. In this case, little or no “physical and mental exertion” was involved in dropping the uniforms off at a tailor. Hence, it was not “work” and could not be considered “authorized work.”

33 The employer’s representative submitted that the fact that the grievors were required to do something to their uniforms to enable them to turn up for work correctly attired did not automatically entitle them to remuneration for that task. Employees have to eat and sleep to ready themselves for work; they have to travel to their places of employment every day. Such activities, while vital to ensuring that employees are ready and able to commence work for their employer at the appointed time, do not constitute “work” that an employer is obligated to pay for; see, for example, Grégoire et al. v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2009 PSLRB 146, Stafford v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2011 PSLRB 123. She also relied on Canada Post Corp. v. CUPW, [1999] C.L.A.D. No. 9 (QL), at para 5, in which a letter carrier was denied a grievance requesting payment for “… alterations to his uniform, which he should have done long before this time.”

34 Turning to the collective agreement and the second issue, the employer’s representative submitted that, even if the task in question constituted “work,” it still had to satisfy a number of conditions before it could be considered “overtime” within the meaning of clause 28.04(a). Those conditions are as follows:

1. it had to take at least 15 minutes;
2. it had to be “authorized in advance;” and
3. the employee could “not control the duration of the overtime work”

35 The employer’s representative submitted that none of those conditions was satisfied. Dropping the uniforms off and picking them up, on the evidence, took less than five minutes. The fact that it might take longer to get to the tailor was a travel time issue, and could not be included in the calculation of how much “overtime” was required to perform the actual task. Nor had the act of dropping the uniforms off or picking them up been “authorized” in the sense of being directed by the employer. And finally, the length of time was clearly within the grievors’ control, since they could control when they went to the tailor (whether on a workday or a day of rest) and how long it would take to get to the tailor and to return.

36 With respect to the claim for mileage, the employer’s representative submitted that a claim under clause 28.10 of the collective agreement was possible only for employees who had been “required to report for work.” The task at issue was not “work.” The grievors had not been “required” to visit the tailor. Hence, the claims must fail.

IV. Reply

A. For the grievors

37 The union’s representative emphasized the fact that an employee could not report to work without the proper uniform. Hence, the task of getting the uniform “in shape” for work was integral to the work, duties and responsibilities of employees. By requiring employees to ensure that the new flashes were affixed (failing which the employee would not be permitted to work), the employer was in effect requiring the grievors to work. That being the case, the grivors ought to be compensated.

V. Analysis

38 The basic entitlement to overtime compensation is set out in clause 28.04 of the collective agreement, which I will repeat here for ease of reference:

28.04 General

(a)      An employee is entitled to overtime compensation under clauses 28.06 and 28.07 for each completed period of fifteen (15) minutes of overtime worked by him or her:

(i)       when the overtime work is authorized in advance by the Employer or is in accordance with standard operating instructions,

and

(ii)      when the employee does not control the duration of the overtime work.

39           The grievors’ argument in support of their claims for overtime was in essence as follows:

1. wearing a proper uniform was an integral part of the work that they did as BSOs;
2. it was so integral that if they showed up for work without a proper uniform they would not be allowed to work; they might be disciplined; and they certainly would not be paid;
3. that being the case any physical or mental effort they spent to ensure that the uniform was in proper shape–such as by making arrangements with a tailor to have new shoulder flashes affixed to uniform shirts–was “work” that the employer was requiring them to do; and
4. if they could not make those arrangements during their normally scheduled hours of work such work would constitute “overtime”–that is, “authorized work in excess of the employee’s scheduled hours of work;”
5. in this case the grievors performed such work on a day of rest;
6. thereby entitling them to compensation calculated pursuant to clause 28.07(c).

40 I am satisfied on the evidence that the “work” in question - the act of leaving the mode of transport, entering the tailor’s shop and dropping off the uniform shirts and flashes – would take no more than five minutes. Given Mr. Strasser’s evidence, which was not challenged, it would not take any member of the bargaining unit longer than five minutes to perform that task, regardless of where they lived in relation to the work site. The fact that multiple trips might be necessary (to drop off and pick up the shirts) does not alter that conclusion. The reference in clause 28.04(a) is for “each completed period” and periods cannot be “bundled” to create a block of time greater than 15 minutes: Stafford v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2011 PSLRB 123.

41 It is clear that the task that is the subject of these grievances took place outside of - or “in excess of” - the grievors’ scheduled hours of work. But was it “work”?

42 “Work” is not defined by the collective agreement, which means that I must determine the intent and understanding of the parties with respect to their use of the word “work.” In doing so, I am obligated to determine the true intent of the parties when they entered into the collective agreement. To do that, I must take into account the ordinary meanings of the words they used. I must also take into account the rest of the collective agreement, for the overall agreement forms the context in which the words used are to be interpreted; see Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 (2002), NBCA 30, at para 10 and 11; and Cooper and Wamboldt v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2009 PSLRB 160, at para 32 to 34.

43 I have read with interest all the authorities and cases relied upon by the parties’ representatives. However, arbitral jurisprudence and arbitral awards turn on the wording of the particular collective agreement before the arbitrator or adjudicator. Decisions involving differently-worded agreements can be helpful, but they cannot be determinative.

44 In effect, the union’s position is that the parties must have intended and understood a task involving the care, maintenance and upkeep of a uniform to be included within the scope of the meaning of the word “work.” The parties agreed in the Directive that wearing a uniform was a necessary condition of working as a BSO. Employees would not be permitted to perform their duties and responsibilities without their uniforms. That being the case, the maintenance of such uniforms must also be “work.”

45 In my opinion, the word “work” as it is used in the collective agreement cannot be interpreted to include time taken to drop off uniform shirts at a tailor.

46 It has often been observed that the line between personal time and work time, of which only the latter is compensable by an employer, is sometimes difficult to draw. However, as a general rule, the mere fact that an employee must do certain things to be able to perform the duties that the employer hired him or her to do does not in and of itself make such things “work.” To be able to work, an employee must eat, sleep, dress in clean clothes, maintain personal hygiene and travel to the employer’s designated workplace. All those things are necessary preconditions to an employee’s ability to arrive at the work site ready to work, but they are not in common parlance or understanding “work” for which the employee is entitled to be compensated. They do not fall within the normal scope of a work description. They are personal activities conducted on personal time.

47 The union’s representative sought to distinguish those activities from the task at issue on the grounds that eating, sleeping and dressing were all things that an employee has to do regardless of whether he or she works. Wearing a uniform is unique. It is not something that, like eating or getting dressed in “normal” clothes, would be done regardless of whether an individual had to go to work.

48 However, the issue is not the activity itself but rather the time taken to perform that activity. The time taken to put on and to keep in good repair clothes that could be worn at work or at play is, conceptually, no different from the time taken to put on or repair a uniform that can be worn only at work. Both require an employee to expend time and some physical effort. But if the time taken to dress in (or repair and maintain) “normal” clothes is not considered to be “work” within normal parlance I fail to see why the time taken to do the same with respect to a uniform should be treated any differently.

49 Support for that conclusion can be found in the evidence of the union’s witness that cleaning a BSO’s uniform is the employee’s responsibility. The fact that the parties have conducted themselves on the basis that the act of cleaning a uniform - which involves the expenditure of some physical and mental effort by an employee - is not “work” is some evidence that, when drafting and agreeing to the collective agreement, they did not consider “work” as including time spent making sure that a uniform is in good repair and up to date.

50 Accordingly, I am not persuaded that, as a matter of construction, the parties intended and understood the word “work” in the collective agreement to include time spent by employees on the care and maintenance (including patch upgrades) of their uniforms outside their scheduled hours of work.

51 But even if, for the sake of argument, these tasks were “work” within the meaning of the definition of “overtime,” the union still had to establish an entitlement under clause 28.04(a) of the collective agreement. An employee is entitled to overtime only for the following reasons:

1. “… each completed period of fifteen (15) minutes of overtime worked by him or her,”
2. when the work is authorized in advance, and
3. “when the employee does not control the duration of the overtime work.”

52 The second condition need not take much time. Clearly, the task was not authorized in advance, inasmuch as the employer expressly refused to authorize the grievors for overtime beforehand. However, if the task was indeed “work” within the meaning of the collective agreement and the employer required the grievors to do it, then, in my opinion, the condition would be satisfied.

53 However, in my opinion, the first and third conditions are barriers to the grievor’s claims.

54 The first condition is a barrier to the “work” of taking the uniform shirts into the tailor, which takes no more than five minutes. In other words, that task does not consist of a “completed period of fifteen 15 minutes.” It fails to satisfy that condition and hence fails to trigger any entitlement under clause 28.04(a) of the collective agreement. I am supported in this interpretation by Stafford at para 59, in which the adjudicator reached the same conclusion for a similarly worded overtime provision. See also Gregoire at para 70 to 84, to the same effect.

55 It may be argued that the task of driving to and from the tailor’s shop, if it is considered “work,” ought to be included in the calculation. In this case the evidence was that there was a tailor 2 minutes from the work site. If that is added to the time spent in the shop (5 minutes) one arrives at 7 minutes one way, or 14 minutes both ways—which is still less than 15 minutes. For the sake of argument one may acknowledge that at different times (or depending on local traffic conditions) the total return trip might take more than 15 minutes. But since such totals would be arrived at by ‘bundling’ the individual times, which is not permitted under the Collective Agreement, the 15-minute threshold required under the Collective Agreement cannot be met. However, for the sake of the argument one may acknowledge that at different sites (or depending on local traffic conditions) the total return trip might take more than 15 minutes.

56 But assuming further, again for the sake of argument, that the times taken did not exceed the 15-minute threshold, that would still leave the third condition. That would still leave the third condition - that “… the employee does not control the duration of the overtime work.” The existence of such a condition is not surprising. The direction of the workplace - of the activities and operations of employees - is generally a management prerogative. Overtime is expensive. It can wreak havoc with departmental budgets. Management needs to be able to control overtime to control costs. It is management’s right to decide whether or not certain work is to be done and, if so, at what cost. Hence, it is not surprising that the parties would agree that the employer was obligated to pay only for work the duration of which it and not the employees could control and direct.

57 However, in this case, the grievors controlled the duration of the overtime work that they claimed. The evidence was that at least one of the tailors was within 5 minutes of the work site. But the grievors chose not to drive to that tailor before or after work (or during their lunch breaks), as did Mr. Strasser. Instead, they chose to drive to the tailor on their days of rest. In doing so, they, and not the employer, controlled and determined the duration of the overtime that they claimed, and by that action barred any entitlement they might otherwise have had under clause 28.04(a) of the collective.

58 If the claim for overtime fails, by virtue of that fact, the claim for travel time or expenses associated with that time must also fail.

59 For all of the above reasons, I make the following order:

VI. Order

60 The grievances are dismissed.

June 29, 2012.

Augustus Richardson,
adjudicator