FPSLREB Decisions

I. Background

1 Thu-Cùc Lâm (“the grievor”) was dismissed from her position with the federal public service on July 12, 2006. As the adjudicator, I ruled that it was a wrongful dismissal. However, I refused to order her reinstatement for the reasons given in my decision (see Lâm v. Deputy Head (Public Health Agency of Canada), 2008 PSLRB 61). The grievor applied for judicial review of my decision on the ground that I had not allowed her to present her arguments on the issue of reinstatement.

2 The Federal Court allowed the application for judicial review in part (see Lâm v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 913) and ordered that a hearing be scheduled to hear the parties on the issue of the appropriate remedy. The grievor appealed that decision. The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the Federal Court’s decision and ordered that the case be referred back to me to decide the issue of the appropriate remedy (see Lâm v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FCA 222).

3 Accordingly, I held a hearing on the issue of the appropriate remedy. Given the testimonies and all the circumstances, I decided that reinstating the grievor was not viable in this case and that her reinstatement had no reasonable chance of success (see Lâm v. Deputy Head (Public Health Agency of Canada), 2011 PSLRB 137). Therefore, I denied the grievor’s request for reinstatement in her position, remained seized of the case to determine an appropriate remedy and gave the parties 30 days following the rendering of my decision to come to an agreement on the amount of compensation.

4 Despite two extensions of the deadline and a mediation session, the parties were unable to agree on an appropriate remedy. Thus, a hearing was held, specifically to address the issue of the appropriate remedy to compensate the grievor for the loss of her employment. The parties presented their arguments without testimony other than an explanation by the expert who prepared the actuarial assessment discussed later. This decision deals only with the appropriate remedy for this case.

II. Grievor’s requested remedy

5 The grievor began working for the Public Health Agency of Canada (“the employer”) on April 14, 1998 as a program consultant (PM‑04) and reached the top of the salary range for her classification. She was dismissed on July 12, 2006. She had eight years and three months of seniority on the day on which she was dismissed. She was earning a salary of $61 047 plus benefits equal to 15% of her income. She paid $3288 per year toward the Public Service Pension Plan. She was 59 years old when she was dismissed. After her dismissal, she decided to accept early retirement from the public service, under which she receives a monthly income that is indexed each year. She can pay to receive certain benefits that are similar to those that she received as a public service employee.

6 The grievor requests a two-part remedy consisting of the present value of the losses she suffered, which she estimates at $279 236, and the present value of her future losses, which she estimates at $278 215. The present value of the losses she suffered is based on the revenues lost from July 13, 2006, the day after her dismissal, to March 21, 2012. The present value of her future losses is based on the gross salary that she would have received had she not been dismissed, net of pension contributions and payments.

7 In support of her request, the grievor introduced a detailed actuarial assessment of her loss of earnings that presented many different scenarios (“the assessment”). The assessment was filed with the consent of the parties. The employer did not challenge the amounts, but did dispute the report’s relevance to deciding the appropriate amount. According to the grievor’s scenarios, she would have retired on one of the following dates:

• July 12, 2007, at the age of 60.39, with 9 years and 37.5 days of continuous service;
• July 12, 2008, at the age of 61.39, with 10 years and 37.5 days of continuous service;
• July 12, 2009, at the age of 62.39, with 11 years and 37.5 days of continuous service;
• July 12, 2010, at the age of 63.39, with 12 years and 37.5 days of continuous service;
• July 12, 2011, at the age of 64.39, with 13 years and 37.5 days of continuous service;
• December 3, 2011, at the age of 64.79, with 13 years and 180.5 days of continuous service;
• July 12, 2012, at the age of 65.39, with 14 years and 37.5 days of continuous service;
• December 3, 2012, at the age of 65.79, with 14 years and 180.5 days of continuous service;
• July 12, 2013, at the age of 66.39, with 15 years and 37.5 days of continuous service; or
• December 3, 2013, at the age of 66.79, with 15 years and 180.5 days of continuous service.

8 The grievor maintains that she is entitled to a full and complete remedy as if she had been reinstated — that is, the full salary that she would have received between July 12, 2006 and December 3, 2013. In other words, she requests that she be paid the compensation that she would have received until the age of her retirement. Other than the assessment, the grievor did not testify as to the exact date on which she planned to retire. She simply presented the scenarios listed earlier in the hope of a conclusion that would provide her the maximum benefit, should I decide to uphold the last of the indicated retirement dates.

9 The grievor argues that the exceptional prejudice that she suffered from not being reinstated arises from the psychological consequences of having lost face within her cultural community along with having abandoned her future projects and having lost all hope of finishing her career in the public service. Not being reinstated is a great personal and professional loss; she should not also have to suffer financial consequences.

10 The grievor argues that a unionized employee’s situation must be considered differently from that of a private-sector employee. As a unionized employee, she invested considerably in her career; she had job security and expected to finish her career in the federal public service.

11 The grievor asserts that I have a choice as to how to calculate her loss and compensate her for it. I could grant a remedy to cover all her losses, as did the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario in Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 0004, 2011 ONSC 487. I could also grant a two-year remedy extending to the date of the adjudication decision, as did the arbitrator in Integra v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 426 (2012), 215 L.A.C. (4th) 398. Finally, I could grant a remedy in the middle ground between those two decisions, based on the arbitrator’s conclusions in Hay River Health and Social Services Authority v. Public Service Alliance of Canada (2010), 201 L.A.C. (4th) 345. The grievor also points out that she did not receive severance pay of one week for every year of service, due to her dismissal.

12 In support of her position, the grievor also cites Sabourin v. House of Commons, 2006 PSLRB 84; Canada (Attorney General) v. Robitaille, 2011 FC 1218; Robitaille v. Deputy Head (Department of Transport), 2010 PSLRB 70; Canvil v. I.A.M.A.W., Lodge 1547 (Stone) (2006), 152 L.A.C. (4th) 378; and Riverside Health Care Facilities Inc. v. C.U.P.E., Local 65 (2009), 184 L.A.C. (4th) 180.

III. Employer’s response

13 The employer responds that the grievor had eight years and three months of service in the public service when she was dismissed. It was decided that the dismissal was wrongful but that reinstatement was not viable. The only point to be decided is the amount of compensation.

14 The employer argues that the courts have developed parameters for calculating the notice period for terminations without proper and sufficient cause based on the employee’s age, years of service, position held and qualifications. Compensation in lieu of reinstatement must be reasonable. According to the jurisprudence, a reasonable range would be 18 to 24 months. Compensation of 24 months is granted only in exceptional circumstances, which are not present in this case. Eight years of service in a position with no management responsibility does not warrant exorbitant compensation.

15 In support of its position on reasonable limits and on the principles of calculating an appropriate remedy, the employer cites Waterman v. IBM Canada Ltd., 2010 BCSC 376; Atkey v. Valley Reefer Services, a Division of Kenbrent Holdings Ltd., [1994] C.L.A.D. No. 1234 (QL); Ansari v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, [1986] B.C.J. No. 3005 (QL); Anonsen v. Treasury Board (Transport Canada), PSSRB File No. 166-02-17193 (19871222); Hartley v. Treasury Board (Solicitor General Canada - Correctional Service), PSSRB File No. 166-02-17326 (19880308); Gordon v. Gabriel Dumont Institute of Native Studies and Applied Research, Inc., [1996] S.J. No. 327 (QL); Garner v. Barton of Canada (1985) Ltd., [1997] B.C.J. No. 2580 (QL); Currie v. Matrix Environmental Solutions Ltd., 2007 SKQB 245; Edwards v. Irwin, [1993] O.J. No. 450 (QL); Johnstone v. Harlequin Enterprises Ltd., [1991] O.J. No. 401 (QL); Johnson v. Top-Co LP, 2009 ABQB 731; and Cantelon v. Dominion Life Assurance Co., [1980] B.C.J. No. 413 (QL).

16 The employer also cites Harris, Wrongful Dismissal, Vol. 2 (Carswell) 2011, at 4-119, 4-155 and later pages, in which are listed notice periods granted by the courts for the dismissals of administrators, coordinators and first-line managers. Those positions are comparable to that of the grievor.

17 The employer argues that adjudicators generally base themselves on common law principles and that they do not make a distinction as to what is reasonable for a unionized employee. The employer also maintains that the remedy should not include future losses. It points out that the decisions that the grievor cited are about long years of service, while she had only eight years of service at the moment of her termination.

18 The employer claims that the grievor is not entitled to a remedy extending to the date of my decision to not reinstate her. The employer should not be penalized by requests for judicial review, which are beyond its control. A remedy equal to one year of salary is a reasonable criterion that corresponds to the jurisprudence.

IV. Grievor’s reply

19 The grievor replies that unionized and private-sector employees differ fundamentally. In the private sector, an employer can terminate employment at any time provided that it gives a reasonable notice period, based on criteria established by jurisprudence.

20 According to the grievor, job security distinguishes the public sector from the private sector. To terminate her employment, the employer had to provide proper and sufficient cause and had to apply the appropriate rules of discipline.

21 According to the grievor, the case law cited by the employer refers to cases of disciplinary dismissal on probation that are irrelevant since this case deals with a compensation scheme established under the (now former) Public Service Staff Relations Act. The grievor argues that enough adjudicators have supported a distinct compensation scheme for unionized employees for that distinction to apply to this case.

22 The grievor claims that she should not have to suffer from the delay caused by the applications for judicial review since she is the most vulnerable. In her opinion, the employer should suffer the consequences.

23 The grievor argues that, since she was soon to retire and will no longer be in a position to rebuild her career, I must consider the impact of her loss of earnings on her long-term pension benefits. She states that it is entirely unfair that she should face both a loss of career and financial loss and asks me to consider that factor when assessing the remedy.

V. Decision

24 Following my decision to not reinstate the grievor in her position, the parties were unable to agree on the issue of an appropriate remedy as they could not agree on the compensation scheme that should apply to a wrongfully dismissed unionized employee.

25 According to the grievor, a distinct scheme exists for unionized employees that provides full compensation, as if the employee had worked until his or her retirement date, or a lump sum that compensates for the impact that the loss of earnings would have on pension income. Her assessment of her losses reflects that approach.

26 For its part, the employer claims that no distinction exists between a unionized and a non-unionized employee. The principles established by the jurisprudence apply equally without distinction, with only the following four factors: the employee’s age, years of service, position held and qualifications. The consistent jurisprudence has established that compensation varying between 18 and 24 months is reasonable, with 24 months of compensation granted only in exceptional circumstances.

27 In the case law submitted for my review, I consider the remedial concepts articulated by Arbitrator Sims in Hay River Health and Social Services Authority to be the most relevant to this case. Adjudicator Sims conducts a thorough analysis of the arbitral jurisprudence in support of the idea of a distinction between a unionized and a non-unionized compensation scheme when assessing damages following a wrongful dismissal. He points out that not every adjudicator agrees with the principles he states and that, in the end, they often turn to the more familiar common law rules to determine the appropriate remedy. Although I do not agree with all his ideas, the following analysis of his ideas is relevant to my determination in this case.

28 The justification for considering a distinct compensation scheme for unionized employees lies in the loss of benefits granted by a collective agreement. With few exceptions, an employee covered by a collective agreement cannot be dismissed without proper and sufficient cause, whereas a private-sector employee can be dismissed provided he or she receives sufficient notice. Furthermore, the common law does not generally consider the benefits that are specific to collective agreements, which include the following: the right to be reinstated in the event of a wrongful dismissal, representing greater job security; the role of seniority in professional development; annual leave; benefits; severance pay; and the right to a pension, if applicable.

29 Adjudicators who support the idea of a distinct scheme for unionized employees take the position that the remedy must be assessed according to the value of lost employment prospects at the time of dismissal rather than the notion of reasonable notice for loss of employment. However, they do not all agree on the obligation to mitigate damages. Some adjudicators adhere to the obligation to mitigate damages as described in common law, while others conclude that the idea of a remedy based on the value of lost employment prospects at the time of dismissal necessarily excludes the obligation to mitigate damages.

30 Some courts have acknowledged the notion of a distinct compensation scheme for unionized employees, notably in Rankin v. National Harbours Board (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 631, modified on appeal in Rankin v. National Harbours Board (1981), 127 D.L.R. (3d) 714, Cohnstaedt v. University of Regina, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 451, and Freeman v. BC Tel, [1997] CanLII 2191 (B.C.S.C.).

31 In Rankin, the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered a decision by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Edwards v. Society of Graphical and Allied Trades, [1970] 3 All E.R. 689 (C.A.), which examined the issue of calculating a remedy but also provided a realistic perspective on how to assess damages. Lord Denning observes that a grievor has the right to be reinstated in the best position possible had there been no termination of employment, while considering contingencies and the obligation to mitigate damages. Lord Denning points out that the decision maker’s role is to assess the loss while considering all the circumstances and not to perform a scientific, mathematic or actuarial calculation.

32 With respect to the principles applied by common law courts, Waterman states that the appropriate remedy for a wrongful dismissal is the right to reasonable notice. Waterman states that no precise list establishes reasonable notice but that the decision maker will usually consider the nature of the job, the years of service, the employee’s age and the possibility of obtaining a similar job, given the employee’s experience. Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 140 (Ontario S.C.), Ansari, and more recently Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, specify that, in general, the maximum notice period considered reasonable varies between 18 and 24 months.

33 Ansari also raises the following principles, which are that the notice period does not correspond to the period required to find new employment and is not intended to compensate the employee until retirement age, since such conditions are beyond the employer’s control.

34 The following are the notice periods decided in the case law cited by the parties:

DECISION	POSITION	AGE	YEARS OF SERVICE	COMPENSATION
Integra (Laroque)	Client care attendant	n/a	2	The period between the termination date and the date on which the adjudicator rendered a decision, plus an obligation to mitigate damages.
Canvil (Stone)	Heavy equipment operator	49	31	6 years + interest; no obligation to mitigate damages.
Hay River (Dalton)	Health professional	n/a	6.5	$44 180.80 + interest; no obligation to mitigate damages.
Waterman	>Computer technician	65	40	20 months
Ansari	Conservation engineer	54	19 years and 4 months	20 months
Atkey	Terminal manager	58	3	8 months
Anonsen	Commercial pilot	61	45-year career but was on probation	6 months
Hartley	Correctional officer	n/a	probation	3 months
Gordon	Administrative coordinator	48	10 years	9 months
Garner	Administrative assistant	n/a	14 years	12 months
Currie	Manager	59	4	5 months + annual leave compensation
Edwards	Manager	50	6	131⁄2 months
Johnstone	Production Manager	57	25	13 months
Johnson	Manager	53	34	20 months, reduced by the court to 14 months since damages were not mitigated.
Cantelon	Manager	60	10	12 months

35 Given the above-cited cases and my analysis of them, I conclude that the remedy in this case is more or less the same whether I adopt the principles advanced by Adjudicator Sims or the principles advanced by common law courts. If I adopt Adjudicator Sims’ reasoning, the requested remedy will necessarily be discounted by certain contingencies. However, if I adopt the common law courts’ reasoning, I must make an assessment that falls within the framework of reasonable notice. In this case, either one leads to a similar conclusion with respect to the amount to be paid to the grievor.

36 My reasoning, which is to apply a distinct scheme to a unionized employee dismissed without proper and sufficient cause and not reinstated, is based on the fact that this employee’s loss is different from that of a non-unionized employee. A non-unionized employee is compensated for a period deemed necessary, based on certain criteria, to find other employment, since specific performance is not available to that employee. A unionized employee expects to be rightfully reinstated if he or she is successful. The difference in status between the two employees lies in the hope of being reinstated, which has unique consequences for the unionized employee.

37 A unionized employee who accepts another job generally will not find himself or herself working at the same level or receiving the same benefits as under his or her collective agreement at the time of dismissal. Those benefits include professional advancement, increasing annual leave depending on years of service, accumulating sick leave and possibly pension entitlement, all of which I refer to as the employee’s “employment capital.” If the employee accepts a new unionized position, the unionized employee must start at the bottom of the salary scale and rebuild his or her employment capital. The value of that employment capital is the greatest distinction between a unionized and a non-unionized employee.

38 Furthermore, the employment capital of a unionized employee is subject to the same weighting factors as a non-unionized employee, namely, opportunities for advancement, loss of employment due to economic or technological reasons, which occurs now and then in the public service, a decision to change jobs or retire, compromised health, unforeseeable family circumstances, etc. To that list of contingencies I add the employee’s employment record, which contributes to career longevity. A unionized employee has no guarantee of long-term job security, and certain contingencies must be considered when calculating a reasonable sum. Incidentally, common law courts apply similar contingencies in their calculations of entitlement to a reasonable notice.

39 Those considerations lead me to the calculation of a reasonable remedy based on the premise of loss at the time of dismissal, taking into consideration the contingencies referred to by Judge Denning in Edwards.

40 Applying the concept of the value of lost employment prospects at the time of dismissal, the grievor’s employment capital when she was dismissed corresponds to the period between her dismissal and her retirement. The usual retirement age for a federal employee is 65. Consequently, the grievor’s retirement date should be assumed to be her 65th birthday, in February 2012.

41 The grievor’s employment capital must be mitigated using the contingencies, which could result in early termination of employment, as Adjudicator Sims decided in Hay River. I adopt Adjudicator Sims’ explanation of how contingencies mitigate the full value of collective agreement benefits as follows:

…

My conclusion is that the loss of fixed term employment framework is more appropriate and adaptable to situations at hand than the common law damage approach. A position covered by a collective agreement is not a fixed term or lifetime position, but is subject to many of the same contingencies.

Applying the loss of a fixed term job approach to damages does not imply that they are unlimited. The Court decisions quoted above suggest the types of contingency that need to be assessed. These include such matters as plant closing, bankruptcy, technological change, chance of layoff, chance of illness, quitting for other work and so on. A unionized job is not a guaranteed job, even with seniority and just cause protections. These factors in many cases will reduce considerably the horizon of damages down from any notion of a life time job. However, the appropriate discount depends on the individual circumstances. Similarly, the likelihood of future employment elsewhere needs to be factored in, and if the individual is skilled and employable this too will significantly reduce the level of damage. That too however is dependent on the overall circumstances. Applying this approach allows the flexibility to tailor the estimate of damage to the reasons for the refusal or inability to reinstate; the particular nature of the exception circumstances that allow that step despite the lack of just cause.

…

42 That said, the case law cited by both the grievor and the employer is fact specific, since each dismissal was based on specific facts and the decision maker’s assessment of the evidence. In my assessment of the grievor’s case, I have decided that the concept of employment capital is the most appropriate means of assessing a unionized position. Nonetheless, I agree with the above excerpt in that a unionized position is not a guaranteed lifetime job and that it is appropriate to apply certain contingencies when considering any unforeseeable circumstances that might arise in any job. When applying these contingencies, I have considered the grievor’s age, education, employment possibilities and employment record, her employer’s status on the labour market, and life’s uncertainties. I will now detail my assessment of these contingencies as they apply to the grievor.

43 The grievor is not at the start of her career. Had she had continued to work for the public service, she would have retired in 6.5 years. According to the evidence at the hearing concerning her dismissal, the grievor is very well educated and was working on a doctorate unrelated to her program officer duties. She worked at length in the private sector, including the banking sector, before accepting a position with the public service. Therefore, the grievor does not lack the resources required to find other employment, even if I consider her age. The grievor could also decide to change jobs before retiring.

44 Although the public service is a stable working environment, it is foreseeable that the grievor could lose her job in those 6.5 years due to economic or technological reasons, as happens from time to time.

45 Furthermore, the grievor could also decide to retire early for personal reasons. Other circumstances that may motivate her to retire early include compromised health or unforeseeable family circumstances beyond her control.

46 Moreover, I find that the grievor’s past disciplinary record and the reasons she was not reinstated (see Lâm v. Deputy Head (Public Health Agency of Canada), 2011 PSLRB 137) weigh quite heavily on the likelihood of her remaining with the employer until retirement and that these factors considerably undermine her chances of advancement.

47 To my knowledge, the case law of the Public Service Labour Relations Board has never before considered the weight to be given to the contingencies that I described earlier. As I already explained in my analysis of Edwards, this is not a scientific exercise but the exercise of my discretion to fashion a fair remedy.

48 Those considerations lead me to the following calculation. Given that the grievor was close to retirement age when she was dismissed and that she intended to finish her career with the public service, I assess the grievor’s employment capital to be 6.5 years, or 78 months. However, I find that that employment capital must be discounted by 25% based on the contingencies described earlier, which are risk factors related to employment loss: a decision to change jobs, a decision to retire early, job loss due to economic or technological reasons, compromised health, or unforeseeable family circumstances.

49 I will now consider the grievor’s extensive disciplinary record. I find that this factor is the most likely to compromise her chances of maintaining long-term employment with the employer, given the nature of the discipline involved. Before the events leading to her dismissal, the grievor compiled a disciplinary record that included the following:

1. on August 13, 2003, an initial warning was issued about the grievor’s conduct;
2. on September 22, 2003, a second warning was issued, along with a letter of reprimand for insubordination;
3. on September 24, 2003, she received a 2-day suspension for insubordination;
4. on February 3, 2004, she received a 10-day suspension for having a disrespectful attitude toward her manager and for refusing to comply with regional management client policies; and
5. on October 28, 2004, she received a 20-day suspension for questioning management decisions and for displaying disrespectful conduct toward her coworkers and management.

50 A grievance was filed about the 2-, 10- and 20-day suspensions. Adjudicator Tessier rendered a decision on July 9, 2007 (2007 PSLRB 69) in which the disciplinary measures were upheld in full, and consequently, they were still on her record at the time of her dismissal. In line with the principle of progressive discipline, and independent of the wrongful dismissal, the grievor was at risk of being dismissed if another disciplinary incident occurred. Had she been reinstated, her record would have remained active, and she would have continued to be at risk of dismissal for another disciplinary incident.

51 Consequently, in addition to the 25% reduction mentioned earlier, I find that the grievor’s employment capital should be further discounted by 50% due to her extensive disciplinary record. Therefore, I conclude that her employment capital of 6.5 years should be discounted by 75%. Accordingly, the appropriate compensation amounts to 19.5 months of the grievor’s gross salary, calculated according to the salary scale set out in the collective agreement effective on her dismissal date.

52 Since the remedy being applied to the grievor is based on the value of her loss of employment and not on the common law principle of reasonable notice to seek other employment, I find that the obligation to mitigate damages is not consistent with that principle, and I do not so order.

53 According to the actuarial assessment, the grievor took early retirement beginning the day after her dismissal. Consequently, she has been entitled to retiree benefits since that date. I find that, although those benefits might not be identical to what she received as an employee, they still represent sufficient compensation for incurred expenses. Incidentally, the grievor did not argue that the retirement benefits she receives are insufficient. Since I have found no cause to mitigate damages and since the grievor has been receiving benefits from the same employer since her retirement date, no compensation is owed in this regard.

54 A remedy of 19.5 months falls within the range that a civil court would grant to a non-unionized employee under the same circumstances, given the grievor’s age and salary level as a program consultant (PM-04).

55 Given the principles that I adopted to assess the remedy applicable to the grievor, I find that the request to award compensation with respect to future losses is moot. I dismiss any weighting process due to the date of the adjudicator’s decision, since hearing dates depend on the availabilities of counsel and the adjudicator. The time required to draft a decision depends on the complexity of the case and the adjudicator’s schedule. The parties also have no control over scheduling or the judicial review decision. I also dismiss any weighting of a loss of career since that was taken into consideration in the assessment of the employment capital upon which the remedy was calculated.

56 The grievor did not present any arguments that would justify her receiving severance pay. Therefore, I do not grant such a remedy. Although interest was awarded in some of the cases that she cited, she did not specifically request it. Hence, there is no cause to award it.

57 The grievor stated that it was unfair for her to suffer both a loss of career and financial loss at the same time. I disagree with that position. In this case, she did not have a clean disciplinary record, which seriously compromised her chances of ongoing employment. Incidentally, it is the single most important factor that contributed to reducing the value of her employment capital. In Hay River, Adjudicator Sims reduced the employment capital by 75%, even though the employee had no disciplinary record, based on weighting factors comparable to those of the grievor.

58 For all of the above reasons, I make the following order:

VI. Order

59 As a remedy, the grievor is entitled to an amount equal to 19.5 months of gross salary, less applicable deductions, calculated as of July 13, 2006.

60 The remedy will be paid in accordance with the directions given by the grievor’s counsel to minimize the financial impact on the grievor.

61 I will remain seized of this case for a period of 30 days should the parties not agree to the remedy amount.

September 14, 2012.

Michele A. Pineau,
adjudicator