FPSLREB Decisions

Decision Information

Summary:

Acting pay - Jurisdiction - Pecuniary penalty - Administrative measure - Admissible evidence - employer terminated grievor's acting position on strength of statements to the effect that grievor was consuming alcohol on the job - grievor filed a grievance alleging harassment and seeking, among other things, reinstatement in his position and reimbursement of his acting pay - firstly, employer filed an objection to adjudicator's jurisdiction to hear the grievance on grounds that grievor's removal from his acting position constituted an administrative action pursuant to the Public Service Employment Act and related regulations - grievance could therefore not be referred to adjudication pursuant to s. 92 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act - secondly, employer filed an objection on grounds that the harassment policy invoked by grievor was not an integral part of collective agreement and therefore could not be the subject of a referral pursuant to s. 92 - thirdly, employer filed an objection to adjudicator's jurisdiction based on Burchill case on grounds that grievor made no claim in his grievance that the action constituted "disciplinary action resulting in a pecuniary penalty" - grievor filed an objection to the admission in evidence of testimony of persons summoned to appear by the employer on grounds that their testimony constituted hearsay - adjudicator adjourned for further consideration of all objections - regarding employer's first objection, she ruled that employer had argued that the action was administrative in order to deny grievor recourse against the imposed action because there was no evidence against him - action was therefore disciplinary - as for employer's second and third objections, adjudicator found that employer had not been caught off-guard - on the main issue, adjudicator found there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by grievor - given the lack of evidence that the acting position would have been extended beyond period of grievor's incumbency, adjudicator did not reinstate him in his acting position, but instead awarded him the pay and benefits to which he would have been entitled had he completed the acting period. Grievance allowed. Case cited: Burchill v. Attorney General of Canada, [1981] 1 C.F. 109.

Decision Content

File: 166-2-26613 Public Service Staff Before the Public Service Relations Act Staff Relations Board BETWEEN GÉRALD THIBAULT Grievor and TREASURY BOARD (Solicitor General of Canada - Correctional Service)

Employer Before: Marguerite-Marie Galipeau, Board Member For the Grievor: Alfred La Bissonnière, Public Service Alliance of Canada For the Employer: Marie-Claude Couture, Counsel Heard at Montreal, Quebec May 31, 1996.

Decision Page 1 DECISION This decision follows upon the adjudication of a grievance filed by Gérald Thibault (CX-02), a member of the CX Group bargaining unit. Mr. Thibault works in the Department of the Solicitor General, at the La Macaza penitentiary.

Gérald Thibault’s grievance reads as follows: On October 5, 1994, my employer informed me that the acting position of CX3 I had occupied since February 1994 at La Macaza was to be terminated the same day, and that, as a result, I was to return to my CX2 duties as of the following morning. The reason cited by my employer was as follows:

It had been told I was bringing alcohol into the penitentiary and consuming it during working hours. This was ridiculous, false and unfounded.

By this unjustified act and these insulting remarks, my employer engaged in a form of harassment as defined by the CXC’s harassment policy; “Any reprehensible remark, act or display that humiliates, disparages or embarrasses an employee, whether this occurs just once or on a continuous basis, constitutes harassment.”

The remedial action requested is as follows: (Translation) That my employer take into account the investigation report filed subsequent to my harassment complaint of October 5, 1994, and:

a) that I receive a verbal and written apology, and that this be recorded in my personal file;

b) that I be reinstated as an acting CX3; c) that the salary for that position lost since October 5, 1994 be accordance with the collective agreement;

d) that I be reimbursed for the statutory holiday of October 10, 1994, which I was scheduled to work as a CX3 (see Appendix B);

Public Service Staff Relations Board

paid retroactively, in

Decision Page 2 e) that I be reimbursed for the sick days I had to take as a result of the serious emotional stress I experienced following these events (Appendix C);

f) that I be present and accompanied by my union representative at all levels of the grievance hearing;

AND that, if the case goes to adjudication, all witnesses be called to appear before the adjudicator; and

furthermore, that this grievance be submitted regardless of any other proceedings that may be undertaken.

The referral to adjudication (Form 14) and a letter dated July 5, 1995 from Thomas Dinan, Acting Director, Collective Bargaining Branch, Public Service Alliance of Canada indicate that the grievance dealt with a “financial penalty” as well as the interpretation and implementation of sections M-16 (Elimination of Discrimination) and M-27 (Pay Administration) of the master agreement concluded between Treasury Board and the Public Service Alliance of Canada (Exhibit E-1).

On May 6, 1996, counsel for the Employer sent the Board a letter in which the Employer raised two preliminary objections. First, the Employer maintained that the grievance was not adjudicable because it dealt with a decision to terminate Gérald Thibault’s acting appointment. According to the Employer, this was not disciplinary action, but rather a decision made in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act and the Public Service Employment Regulations. Consequently, the grievance could not be referred to adjudication under the terms of paragraph 92(1)(b) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act.

Second, the Employer also maintained that the grievance could not be referred to adjudication under the terms of paragraph 92(1)(b) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act because the harassment policies adopted by Treasury Board and the Correctional Service had not been integrated into the collective agreement (Exhibit E-1) cited by Gérald Thibault.

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 3 At the hearing, the Employer supported these objections with the following arguments.

The harassment policies adopted by Treasury Board and the Department in question have not been integrated into the collective agreement (Exhibit E-1). They are not mentioned in section 37.03 of the said agreement (Exhibit E-1). The role of the adjudicator is to interpret the provisions of the collective agreement. The adjudicator may not base his or her decisions on a policy that is not part of the collective agreement (The Attorney General of Canada v. Pierre André Lachapelle and The Public Service Staff Relations Board and Jean-Paul Baril, [1979] 1 F.C. 377, pp. 380-81).

Furthermore, Gérald Thibault cited section M-16 of the collective agreement (Exhibit E-1) only once the case had been referred to adjudication: he did not mention this section in his grievance. It is too late to bring this section into play. The Employer did not deal with the applicability of section M-16 at the various levels of the grievance procedure because this section was not mentioned in the grievance. Allowing Gérald Thibault to use it now that the case has gone to adjudication would amount to permitting him to amend his grievance. James Francis Burchill v. the Attorney General of Canada, [1981] 1 F.C. 109 is clear in this regard: during adjudication, a complainant may not submit a new or different grievance, or change that grievance. Moreover, none of the definitions of discrimination set forth in section M-16 exists in this case. Lastly, in matters of discrimination, section M-38.02 operates to oblige a grievor to seek redress before the Canadian Commission on Human Rights or the Public Service Commission of Canada.

To these arguments Gérald Thibault’s representative replied that, despite the fact that section M-16 was mentioned in the referral-to-adjudication form, his client was not basing his position on that section. Rather, he maintained that the termination of the acting appointment, given the circumstances in question, constituted disciplinary action resulting in a financial penalty under the terms of paragraph 92(1)(b) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. The Employer terminated Gérald Thibault’s acting appointment because the latter was suspected of bringing alcohol into the penitentiary and consuming it there. The decision was therefore disciplinary in nature.

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision The decision in Joseph Valadares Files 166-2-19596 and 19597) applies to the circumstances of the present case.

In reply, counsel for the Employer added the following. The grievance cites “harassment” only. Gérald Thibault does not claim “disciplinary action” was taken; neither does he claim there was any bad faith on the part of the Employer, or that the latter concealed the reason for its decision. The detail of grievance does not indicate that disciplinary action resulting in a financial penalty was taken, nor does it state that the decision was made under paragraphs 11(2)(f) and (g) of the Financial Administration Act. In keeping with the Burchill (supra) and Baril (supra) decisions, it is too late in the adjudication process to claim that this case involved disciplinary action resulting in a financial penalty.

In addition, the decision to remove Gérald Thibault from the acting position he occupied was an administrative decision made under the terms of the Public Service Employment Act. According to paragraph 24(1)(a) of the Interpretation Act, the power to appoint a “public officer” includes the authority to terminate an acting appointment. Appointment and staffing issues cannot be referred to adjudication.

Certain conduct on the part of an employee may result in a variety of decisions by the Employer. Gérald Thibault was removed from his position for bringing alcohol into the penitentiary. It is not up to an adjudicator to decide if that reason was valid (The Attorney General of Canada v. Judith Penner, [1989] 3 F.C. 429).

If a decision is valid and made in good faith, it cannot be revised by an adjudicator (Roland Jacmain and the Attorney General of Canada and the Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 15). “Good faith” means there were valid reasons for terminating Gérald Thibault’s acting appointment. “Good faith” is the opposite of “bad faith”. The latter exists when the true reason for a decision is concealed. If an employee is aware of the grounds that underlay a decision, he cannot claim bad faith.

Gérald Thibault’s representative replied as follows. Public Service Staff Relations Board

Page 4 and Treasury Board (Board

Decision Page 5 The Penner case (supra) differs from the one before us in that the former involved a termination of employment during a probationary period under former section 28 of the Public Service Employment Act. In the case at hand, the Employer’s decision was aimed at imposing a disciplinary penalty on Gérald Thibault. This penalty was expressed through the removal of Mr. Thibault from his acting position. As a result, Gérald Thibault lost his reputation and a certain amount of compensation. He was punished on the basis of an accusation that was not only anonymous, but false.

Counsel for the Employer added the following. Even if Gérald Thibault’s grievance has merit, the decision in question did not necessarily constitute disciplinary action. Any remedy that might exist is perhaps civil in nature, or to be sought at the Federal Court level.

I reserved judgment on the Employer’s preliminary objections, and heard the substantive evidence.

EVIDENCE The Employer produced two witnesses. Further to their testimony, the grievor’s representative indicated that he had no evidence to present.

Following is a summary of the testimony I heard. Robert Poirier At the time the aforementioned events took place, Robert Poirier was unit manager (AS05) of La Macaza’s B unit. He headed up the operations bureau for correctional supervisors (CX-03), who work various shifts: six supervisors reported to him.

During the day that is, from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. the warden is in charge of the penitentiary. During the other shifts, a correctional supervisor (CX-03) is responsible. The six correctional supervisors are rotated: there are 21 shifts, with the warden assuming responsibility for the five day shifts, and the correctional supervisors taking over for the other 16.

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 6 At the time in question, Gérald Thibault was acting correctional supervisor (CX-03) in the A unit (Exhibit E-2).

Gérald Thibault had acquired considerable experience in several penitentiaries. Robert Poirier participated in the decision to appoint him acting correctional supervisor (CX-03). Factors contributing to that decision were Mr. Thibault’s experience, management capabilities, and decision-making skills. Gérald Thibault held three successive acting appointments (Exhibit E-3): from February 14 to June 30, 1994, from June 30 to September 30, 1994, and from September 30 to December 31, 1994.

Gérald Thibault was removed from his acting position in early October 1994 because he was suspected of having consumed alcohol during working hours.

Gérald Thibault’s representative challenged Robert Poirier’s evidence on the grounds that it was hearsay and that, as the witness refused to identify his sources, the latter could not be cross-examined to verify their credibility. Gérald Thibault’s representative insisted that the witness name his sources so the latter could be called to testify and he could question them. The Employer’s witness, Robert Poirier, as well as counsel for the Employer, replied that the eyewitnesses whose existence was alleged by Robert Poirier would not testify or sign any statement, because, according to Robert Poirier, they were afraid of reprisals.

I reserved judgment on these objections, and allowed Robert Poirier to complete his testimony. Having heard what he wished to say, however, I concluded that the objections of Gérald Thibault’s representative were valid, and gave no credence to the following part of Robert Poirier’s testimony. Indeed, it is with considerable hesitation that I relate that testimony, as it is nothing but gossip.

According to Robert Poirier, in July 1994 an “employee” had told him that Gérald Thibault was consuming alcohol during his shift. Subsequently, “other people” said it was “possible” that Gérald Thibault had consumed alcohol at work.

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 7 During a daily meeting at the end of August 1994 attended by the warden, associate warden, and institutional preventive security officer, Robert Poirier conveyed these rumors to warden Maurice Jacques, who asked him to determine if they were based on fact.

Robert Poirier met with three people to whom, at their request, he promised confidentiality. One individual employed at La Macaza apparently said he had seen Gérald Thibault in uniform at the “Airport Bar” at about 1:15 a.m. on the night of July 8 and 9, 1994, and that the latter was talking to a waiter who put four bottles of beer in a bag and gave the bag to Gérald Thibault, who then left the bar. On a different occasion, another person posted at the penitentiary gate said he saw Gérald Thibault leave the work place, saying he had to go to the grocery store. A third person apparently told Robert Poirier that when Gérald Thibault held the position of correctional officer (CX-02), he would put alcohol in people’s coffee, and in fact had put some in his.

On the basis of these statements, it was decided to terminate Gérald Thibault’s acting appointment.

Gérald Thibault’s representative said he would not cross-examine Robert Poirier.

Alain Jacques Alain Jacques has been associate warden at La Macaza since July 1994. Robert Poirier told him about the rumors concerning Gérald Thibault. Alain Jacques, the warden, and the institutional preventive security officer all took these rumors seriously.

Alain Jacques spoke to an “employee” who had been at the Airport Bar on his day off. This individual apparently had seen Gérald Thibault purchase four beers and then leave in a Department vehicle. Another person told Alain Jacques that, when Gérald Thibault was a correctional officer (CX-02), he had put alcohol in his coffee.

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 8 Alain Jacques stated that, if these two people had been willing to testify, “the disciplinary process would have been launched”, and “disciplinary action would have been taken.”

According to Alain Jacques, the two individuals in question said they were afraid of testifying. No reasons were given for these fears.

Alain Jacques emphasized that the correctional supervisor is in charge of the penitentiary, and that, during his shift, serious incidents such as murder and hostage-taking may occur. As a result, these employees must be completely trustworthy. Accordingly, he decided to remove Gérald Thibault from his acting position.

On October 5, 1994, the day that Gérald Thibault was removed from his acting position (Exhibit E-4), Alain Jacques met with Gérald Thibault. The latter was told why he was being removed from his position. Gérald Thibault was surprised; he did not understand. He wanted to know who Alain Jacques’ sources were, but the latter said he could not reveal them. Alain Jacques did not ask Gérald Thibault if it was true he had consumed alcohol at work. And, while Alain Jacques realized that it was perhaps illogical not to have obtained the employee’s version of the events in question, he stated that the decision to remove Gérald Thibault from his position had been made before the meeting of October 5, 1994, during which the latter was informed of that decision.

Gérald Thibault has 24 years of service and has never once been the subject of disciplinary measures.

ARGUMENTS The arguments of counsel for the Employer may be summarized as follows.

The decision to terminate Gérald Thibault’s acting appointment was an administrative decision that can be examined only by the Federal Court as part of a judicial review. It was not disciplinary action, and, furthermore, the decision in the Burchill (supra) case prevents the grievance from being amended.

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 9 The position occupied by Gérald Thibault was one of trust. Management lost confidence in Mr. Thibault subsequent to obtaining specific, objective information provided in good faith by individuals whose credibility could not be questioned. These people had no reason to pass on this information unless it was based on fact.

The security of the penitentiary was in jeopardy, and a decision had to be made.

There is undisputed evidence that this decision was valid and made in good faith. It is not bad faith to wish to protect witnesses who are afraid. Rather, bad faith would be to camouflage the true reasons for the decision. The manager chose to believe the version of the people who came to him: is that bad faith?

If it is determined that the action was in fact disciplinary in nature, then it is true there was not enough evidence to justify it. That being said, however, the evidence shows that the decision was made in good faith under the terms of the Public Service Employment Act.

The arguments of Gérald Thibault’s representative may be summarized as follows.

Under the circumstances, was it good faith to accuse Gérald Thibault of having consumed alcohol on hearsay evidence? Steps could have been taken to establish the truth of that evidence. The individuals who reported Gérald Thibault may have been involved. We cannot say, because we do not know who they are. Gérald Thibault has had a clean record for 24 years. The Employer should have conducted an investigation questioned the waiter at the Airport Bar, for example.

This case is based solely on the word of informants. The Employer, by its attitude, encouraged those informants. This constitutes bad faith. Someone’s reputation was tarnished on the basis of “pseudo-evidence”. It takes years to establish credibility and a reputation. Gérald Thibault spent 24 years of his life doing just that. Then, from one day to the next, he was told he was no longer trustworthy.

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 10 Gérald Thibault was not questioned about the alleged facts; no one tried to obtain his version of the matter. At the hearing, the Employer did not present any witnesses who could testify to Gérald Thibault’s alleged actions. This is an untenable situation. The Employer made a mistake and should assume responsibility for the consequences.

“Bad faith” should not be given such a limited definition as that proposed by the Employer.

By way of redress, Gérald Thibault is asking that an apology be made, and that he be reinstated. He also wishes to be reimbursed for the salary he lost following the decision to remove him from his acting position.

In rebuttal, counsel for the Employer added the following. The hearsay evidence submitted before the undersigned adjudicator went undisputed, as Gérald Thibault did not testify. Encouraging informants is not equivalent to bad faith. Informants are sometimes necessary in the administration of justice. Certain types of conduct may give rise to both disciplinary action and administrative decisions.

If the grievance is allowed and the Employer is obliged to reimburse Gérald Thibault, the amount of that reimbursement should be limited to the loss in the difference of salary (between a CX-02 and a CX-03) for the period from October 5 to December 31, 1994. It cannot be assumed that the acting appointment would have been renewed.

REASONS FOR DECISION As I stated at the beginning of this decision, the Employer claimed that the grievance was not adjudicable because it alleges harassment on the part of the Employer, and the collective agreement does not comprise the Employer’s policies on harassment. Gérald Thibault’s representative, on the other hand, said his client was not pleading the collective agreement provisions. Consequently, I need not interpret the collective agreement, as the grievor is no longer basing his grievance on these provisions thereof.

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 11 Gérald Thibault’s position is that he was subjected to disciplinary action resulting in a financial penalty, and that he is entitled, under the terms of paragraph 92(1)(b) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, to have that decision examined by an adjudicator. Here again, the Employer opposed the adjudicability of the grievance, this time arguing that the decision was not disciplinary action resulting in a financial penalty within the meaning of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, but rather the removal of Gérald Thibault from an interim appointment under the terms of the Public Service Employment Act. I must dispose of this matter prior to addressing this grievance on its merits, if necessary.

An additional objection was made to the effect that the grievance does not mention the words “disciplinary measure resulting in a financial penalty”, and that, as a result, the grievor cannot claim before the undersigned adjudicator that the decision in question was a “disciplinary measure resulting in a financial penalty” unless he is allowed to amend his grievance during adjudication, which would be prohibited according to Burchill (supra) and Baril (supra).

My remarks concerning this last objection are as follows. The grievor clearly states in his grievance that he is opposing the Employer’s decision of October 5, 1994 to remove him from his acting position. Furthermore, a reading of the remedial action requested clearly shows that the grievor wishes to return to the position he occupied before that decision was made, and to be reimbursed for the attendant losses in salary. The Employer’s response to the grievance leaves no doubt that the latter understands perfectly well what decision is in dispute and what redress is being sought. Moreover, the Employer’s response at the first level of the grievance procedure demonstrates clearly that the Employer justified its decision by citing (alcohol- related) misconduct on the part of the grievor. I, therefore, feel it is not without reason that the grievor believed himself to be the subject of disciplinary action, even though he did not use the term “disciplinary measure” in his grievance. It is also manifest that the Employer has neither been taken off guard nor suffered any prejudice because of the fact that the grievor neglected to use the phrase “disciplinary measure resulting in a

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 12 financial penalty” found in paragraph 92(1)(a) of the Act. The grievance is sufficiently clear for the Employer to understand that the grievor is contesting the merits of the decision and the veracity of the grounds cited by the Employer. Furthermore, the evidence presented by the Employer during adjudication confirmed that at no time has the latter been in the dark as to the decision being disputed or the redress being sought. Neither did the Employer present any evidence that the omission of the magic words “disciplinary measure resulting in a financial penalty” from the grievance had caused it any prejudice. In addition, the Employer knew from the notice of referral to adjudication that the employee would plead that the decision constituted disciplinary action. Between referral to adjudication and the date of the hearing, there was time for the Employer to prepare its case accordingly. Lastly, regardless of the term applied to the Employer’s decision, the consequence was the same: the Employer knew that the employee wished to have the decision overturned, and to be reimbursed for the losses he had incurred.

Given the Employer’s objection, in hindsight it would probably have been preferable for the grievor to qualify the decision with the words “disciplinary measure resulting in a financial penalty” in the detail of grievance. However, I do not believe this omission is fatal.

What matters, in actual fact, is that form not prevail over substance. When drafting a grievance and preparing to challenge a decision made by their employer, employees do not generally have the help of a legal expert to tell them exactly which terms to use.

To take this situation into account, the Board adopted section 10 of the Regulations and Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Staff Relations Board (1993), which reads as follows:

10. “No proceeding under these Regulations is invalid by reason only of a defect in form or technical irregularity.”

The Board also adopted subsection 71(5), which states: 71. (5) .”A grievance of an employee is not invalid by reason only that it is not presented in

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision the form approved Section 70”

Insofar as the employer has not been taken off guard or suffered any prejudice from the fact that the wording of a grievance may leave something to be desired, it seems to me that a Board adjudicator should not prevent a grievor from going to adjudication on the sole basis of a poorly worded grievance. A certain amount of latitude seems justified. We should remember that, more often than not, it is only after the last level of a grievance procedure that a grievor has access to a legal advisor or a union representative specializing in grievance adjudication.

I feel that, by demanding that a grievor demonstrate as much precision as someone on trial represented by counsel, the Board and its adjudicators would be losing sight of their raison d’être which is to facilitate recourse to an impartial third party and encourage the expeditious and definitive settlement of labour disputes between grievors and employers.

Lastly, I also feel there is a distinction to be made between the case before us and Burchill (supra). Furthermore, the decision in the latter was rendered over fifteen years ago. The strict application proposed could be too restrictive in certain circumstances; at an opportune time, the Federal Court might wish to reconsider this matter (i.e., the degree of precision required of a grievor in drawing up a grievance).

This brings me to the Employer’s main objection: that is, that the decision to terminate Gérald Thibault’s disciplinary action, but rather an “administrative decision” made in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act.

First, it may be assumed that I have jurisdiction, at the very least, to inquire as to the facts likely to confirm or deny that jurisdiction. This I did by asking the parties to present the facts as well as the merits of this case.

Second, the burden of proof as to my jurisdiction fell to the grievor. Furthermore, if I eventually concluded that disciplinary action was indeed involved, the Employer would have the burden of proof to show that this measure was justified. In order to avoid dividing the hearing for this case, I Public Service Staff Relations Board

Page 13 by the Board under

acting appointment was not

Decision Page 14 reserved judgment on the objection as to my jurisdiction. It was during deliberation that I determined whether the parties had discharged their respective burdens of proof.

At the hearing, I asked the Employer to submit its evidence first, which it agreed to do. Following that evidence, the grievor’s representative indicated he would not be presenting any evidence.

Consequently, I had to make my decision by relying solely on the Employer’s evidence, while keeping in mind that the burden of proof, as to my jurisdiction, fell to the grievor.

Objection as to Jurisdiction It should be noted that the evidence was limited to the testimony of unit manager Robert Poirier and associate warden Alain Jacques, both of whom affirmed that they had spoken to other individuals, whom they did not name during their testimony. Allegations had apparently been made by these persons concerning the use of alcohol by Gérald Thibault. Counsel for the Employer indicated that the individuals in question would not be identified, and that the eyewitnesses to the incidents allegedly involving Gérald Thibault would not testify. In short, witnesses for the Employer alleged that Gérald Thibault had been removed from his acting position because of claimed misconduct involving alcohol, but could not produce any evidence thereof.

I do not know the identity of these individuals. I do not even know if they actually exist, as they did not come forward to corroborate the statements of Robert Poirier and Alain Jacques and attest to their truthfulness. I do not know if the people to whom Robert Poirier spoke are the same as those questioned by Alain Jacques. Neither do I know the specific nature of the actions of which Gérald Thibault was accused. Was he blamed for going to a bar? If so, was it during working hours or his spare time? Was he blamed for going to a grocery store? If so, when? And why? Was he blamed for putting alcohol in the coffee of a co-worker when he was in his substantive position? If so, when, and who was that co-worker? Furthermore, it was impossible for Gérald Thibault’s representative to determine the quality of the evidence against his client, as the individuals who according to the Employer had

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 15 accused Gérald Thibault did not come forward to testify. As a result, the grievor’s representative was prevented from verifying the authenticity of the description given by the Employer of its own decision.

There is a total lack of evidence regarding the acts Gérald Thibault is supposed to have committed. This is the most pernicious form of hearsay, because the Employer not only failed to produce the so-called eyewitnesses, but refused to identify them.

On the above grounds alone, the Employer asked me to believe its statement that the decision to remove Gérald Thibault from his acting position was an administrative decision made in good faith, and not camouflaged disciplinary action. In other words, the Employer wanted me to accept its description of the decision without proving the facts that would make it possible to support that description.

As good faith must be presumed, at the beginning I assumed the Employer acted in good faith. Furthermore, at the beginning, it was up to the grievor to demonstrate that this presumption was unwarranted.

However, it was the Employer who, with its evidence, convinced me of its own bad faith, thus relieving the grievor of the obligation to prove bad faith himself. The Employer concealed from Gérald Thibault the true nature of the charges against him, as well as the identity of his accusers. Subsequently, the Employer also failed to specify the exact nature of the accusations against Gérald Thibault before the undersigned adjudicator, refusing to reveal the identity of the latter’s accusers, who did not testify. In such a context matters become increasingly arbitrary, and this arbitrariness amounts to bad faith.

I therefore conclude that Gérald Thibault has indeed been the subject of disciplinary action, which his Employer chose to describe as an “administrative decision made under the terms of the Public Service Employment Act” in the hope of preventing this decision from being brought before an adjudicator and possibly reversed (as, given the total lack of evidence against Gérald Thibault, would indeed occur if the Employer had acknowledged that the decision constituted disciplinary action). By claiming the decision was an “administrative decision made in accordance with the Public Service Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 16 Employment Act”, the Employer used an administrative pretext to justify his decision and avoid the awkward situation caused by a lack of evidence.

Alain Jacques’ testimony tends to confirm this conclusion: the latter stated that, if the individuals he refused to identify had been willing to testify, “disciplinary measures would have been taken”.

Thus, in order to remedy the deficiencies in its evidence, the Employer chose to deal severely with Gérald Thibault, by means of a decision termed an “administrative decision made under the terms of the Public Service Employment Act”, and to remove him from his acting position.

Where the shoe pinches, I think, is that the sincerity of this decision is lacking; the Employer’s description thereof seems like an attempt to prevent it from being critically examined by an impartial third party in this case, an adjudicator.

In so doing, the Employer tried to deprive the employee of his right under the Public Service Staff Relations Act to file a grievance against disciplinary action and have this grievance referred to adjudication. It is my opinion that the legislator’s intention in enacting section 92 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act was to allow employees to protect themselves against unjustified disciplinary measures, whether taken openly or under the guise of terms such as “administrative measures”. In both cases, it falls to the adjudicator to determine the true nature of the decision. It is not unreasonable to think that the protection granted by the legislator extends to cases in which an employer has used subterfuge, or those in which the latter, for reasons known only to itself, is not frank about the disciplinary nature of a decision.

It should be noted that grievors who, for a given period of time, occupy an acting position have the same rights concerning disciplinary measures as their co-workers who occupy a substantive position. If the process used by the Employer in this case were legitimized, it would follow that wherever an employer suspected misconduct and wished to deal severely with an employee in the absence of evidence, it could do so with impunity by removing that employee from his acting position, without having to explain its decision before an adjudicator. If that same employee had remained in his or her Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 17 substantive position, however, the employer would have had to justify any such action with evidence. In short, certain employees would be more vulnerable than others where disciplinary action was concerned, merely by the fact of having agreed to assume acting duties, and their rights to defend themselves against unjustified disciplinary measures would be dependent upon the description chosen by the employer to justify his decision.

Despite numerous efforts in the past to strictly demarcate the scope of the Public Service Staff Relations Act from that of the Public Service Employment Act, there remains a grey area in which certain decisions which, although apparently covered by the terms of one, cannot stand up to careful scrutiny, and thus come instead under the scope of the other. I believe that the case before us falls into that grey area, and that the particular circumstances in question make the decision disciplinary in nature that is, a measure aimed at penalizing misconduct ascribed, rightly or wrongly, to an employee.

The Employer attempted to convince me that its intention was not to penalize misconduct on the part of the employee (as defined in the Public Service Staff Relations Act), but rather to ensure the “security of the penitentiary” by removing Gérald Thibault from his interim position (under the terms of the Public Service Employment Act). As I cannot read the Employer’s mind in order to verify such a claim, I am left only with the evidence or lack thereof to evaluate that intention. The reason stated by the Employer was not confirmed by any evidence whatsoever, as there was no proof that, through his conduct, Gérald Thibault had at any time jeopardized the security of the penitentiary.

I have, therefore, concluded that the decision to remove Gérald Thibault from his acting position reflected a disciplinary decision rather than a true administrative decision made under the terms of the Public Service Employment Act to terminate interim duties, or of the Interpretation Act mentioned in passing by counsel for the Employer. As disciplinary action is involved, I consequently have jurisdiction in this case.

This being said as to the merits, there is no evidence whatsoever that Gérald Thibault was guilty of any misconduct. Furthermore, the employer

Public Service Staff Relations Board

Decision Page 18 acknowledged that, if I concluded that the decision did constitute disciplinary action, there was not sufficient evidence to justify that measure.

Consequently, the decision of the Employer is reversed. However, Gérald Thibault is not hereby reassigned to his former acting position, as the period for which he had been appointed thereto has elapsed, and there is no evidence that it would have been renewed. Finally, the Employer is hereby ordered to refund Gérald Thibault the compensation and other benefits to which he would have been entitled had he completed the period during which he occupied the acting position in question.

Marguerite-Marie Galipeau, Board Member

OTTAWA, September 9, 1996 Certified true translation

Serge Lareau

Public Service Staff Relations Board

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.