Date: 20210322

File: 566-02-13609

 

Citation: 2021 FPSLREB 30

Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act

Before a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board

Between

 

Luiza Cruceru

Grievor

 

and

 

TREASURY BOARD

(Department of Justice)

 

Employer

Indexed as

Cruceru v. Treasury Board (Department of Justice)

In the matter of an individual grievance referred to adjudication

Before: Dan Butler, a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board

For the Grievor: Christopher Rootham, counsel

For the Employer: Adam Feldman, counsel

Heard by videoconference,

November 30, 2020.

REASONS FOR DECISION

I. Individual grievance referred to adjudication

[1] Luiza Cruceru (“the grievor”) took leave without pay from her legal counsel position at Justice Canada (“the Department”) from March 30, 2015, to September 27, 2015. As a result, the Department revised her pay-increment date from May 10, 2015, to November 9, 2015, once she returned to work.

[2] The grievor challenged her revised pay-increment date in a grievance filed on December 3, 2015. She alleged that the Department’s action violated “article 21.06 and any other applicable articles” of the collective agreement for the Law Practitioner (LP) Group. She contended that the Department failed “... to take into account the relevant portion of [her] first three months of leave without pay for pay increment purposes in relation to the 2014-2015 evaluation period in accordance with article 21.06.”

[3] The collective agreement in effect at the time for the LP Group between the Treasury Board (“the employer”) and the Association of Justice Counsel (“the bargaining agent” or AJC), expired on May 9, 2014 (“the collective agreement”).

[4] As corrective action, the grievor sought the following measures:

1. That my pay increment date be corrected in order to reflect May 10^th for the purposes of the 2014-2015 and future evaluation periods subject to any new appointment in the future;

2. That the applicable portion of my first 3 months of leave without pay (i.e. 1 day) be considered for pay increment purposes for the 2014-2015 evaluation period;

3. That my pay increment be paid retroactively to my actual return date of September 28^th, 2015;

4. Such other remedy that an adjudicator may consider consider appropriate under the circumstances.

[5] Unsuccessful in the internal grievance procedure, the grievor referred the matter for adjudication to the (then) Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board (PSLREB) on January 10, 2017, with the requisite support of her bargaining agent.

[6] On June 19, 2017, An Act to amend the Public Service Labour Relations Act, the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and other Acts and to provide for certain other measures (S.C. 2017, c. 9) received Royal Assent, changing the name of the PSLREB and the titles of the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and the Public Service Labour Relations Act to, respectively, the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (“the Board”), the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act, and the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act.

[7] For the reasons outlined in this decision, the grievance is dismissed.

II. Agreed statement of facts

[8] The parties submitted an agreed statement of facts, the substantive paragraphs of which read as follows (with tab references to appended documents removed):

...

4. The Grievor, Luiza Cruceru, is a lawyer employed by the Employer with the in the Department of Justice. Ms. Cruceru was hired by the Employer on February 3, 2009. During the period relevant to this grievance, she was employed at the LP-2 group and level (also referred to as LA-02 in certain collective agreements) at pay increment 6 (of 8). Ms. Cruceru began this pay increment period on May 10, 2014 and it was to last twelve (12) months. Ms. Cruceru is in the bargaining unit represented by the Association of Justice Counsel.

5. For the period between March 30, 2015 and September 25, 2015, Ms. Cruceru was on an approved Leave of Absence Without Pay while she served as the visiting professional to the Presidency of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. This period of leave was characterized as Leave Without Pay for Other Reasons of a period less than one year... Ms. Cruceru returned to work for the Employer on Monday September 28, 2015.

6. On October 26, 2015, Ms. Cruceru contacted the compensation unit for the Department of Justice because her rate of pay had not been increased on May 10, 2015. This led to a series of e-mails between Ms. Cruceru and Deborah Pombert, Compensation Advisor with the Department of Justice....

7. As explained in those e-mails, Ms. Cruceru was given a pay increment date of November 9, 2015. The last e-mail in that chain ... explains the rationale as follows:

After further clarification from Corporate Compensation, it has been confirmed in reference to article 21.06 of the collective agreement, you revised increment date is November 9, 2015. Your leave with pay was from March 30 to May 9, 2015 (increment date from PREA 2014/2015 effective May 10, 2015). AS you were on leave without pay during that time, those 6 weeks are added to your return to work date of September 28, 2015 and therefore revising your increment date from May 10, 2015 to November 9, 2015.

8. Ms. Cruceru grieved the decision concerning her pay increment date on December 3, 2015. The Employer dismissed her grievance at final level on December 9, 2016....

...

[Sic throughout]

[9] The agreed statement of facts also reports relevant provisions of the collective agreement (Exhibit JT-1, tab M) as well as several provisions of an internal employer document. I cite the following provisions of the collective agreement at the outset, given that the interpretation of their interaction comprises the heart of the dispute:

...

21.06 Except as otherwise specified in this Agreement, where leave without pay for a period in excess of three (3) months is granted to a lawyer, the total period of leave granted shall be deducted from “continuous employment” for the purpose of calculating severance pay and from “service” for the purpose of calculating vacation leave; time spent on such leave which is for a period of more than three (3) months shall not be counted for pay increment purposes.

...

Appendix “A”

...

Pay Notes

...

Lock Step Pay Range for LA-DEV, LA-1, LA-2A and LA-2B

(10) Effective May 10, 2013, pay increments for lawyers at the LA-DEV, LA-1, LA-2A and LA-2B levels will be to the next higher rate on the applicable lock step pay range that comes into effect on May 10, 2013.

(11) A lawyer whose performance is assessed as “Unsatisfactory” is not eligible for a pay increment.

...

Pay Increment Administration for LA-DEV, LA-1, LA-2A and LA-2B

(13) The pay increment period is twelve (12) months for lawyers at the LA-DEV, LA-2A and LA-2B levels and six (6) months for lawyers paid on the LA-1 scale.

...

III. Summary of the evidence

[10] The bargaining agent elected not to present testimonial evidence.

[11] The employer’s sole witness was Annick Bigras, whom it has employed since October 2020 as a corporate manager in its compensation unit. Ms. Bigras outlined that she has worked in compensation administration in the public service for 13 years in several departments. During that period, she interpreted the provisions of many different collective agreements “almost every day”.

[12] Referring specifically to clause 26.01 of the collective agreement, Ms. Bigras testified that to her knowledge, the same provision is a feature of every collective agreement. It operates to exclude from the calculation of pay-increment periods time spent on leave without pay when that leave exceeds three months. The clause permits exceptions. She cited maternity leave without pay and parental leave without pay as situations in which time spent on leave without pay in excess of three months is not excluded from the calculation of pay-increment periods.

[13] The witness identified Pay Note 13 of the collective agreement as the provision that establishes a standard pay-increment period of 12 months for employees at the grievor’s LP-2 classification level. (The pay note references classification level LA-2A, which is the equivalent of LP-2.)

[14] Ms. Bigras outlined that when an employee takes leave without pay, she verifies whether the leave exceeds three months and, if so, whether the type of leave is an exception. When the period of leave without pay is an exception, she proceeds to recalculate the date on which a pay increment takes effect. Ms. Bigras stated that the same calculation occurs under all collective agreements and that the interpretation supporting that calculation has been applied consistently during the 13 years that she has worked in compensation in the public service.

[15] Ms. Bigras referred to a letter dated March 20, 2015, sent to the grievor by Deborah Pombert, a compensation and benefits advisor in the Department (Exhibit JT-1, tab A). The letter outlines the grievor’s “options and responsibilities concerning [her] benefits and deductions” during the leave without pay on which she was to embark as of March 30, 2015. The witness confirmed that the letter was typical and was sent by departments in all cases of leave without pay of less than one year. The approach to the calculation of pay-increment periods while on leave without pay is described as follows: “Periods of leave without pay of more than three months will be deducted for the purposes of determining your next increment date” [emphasis in the original].

[16] Ms. Bigras testified that the approach outlined in the statement is harmonious with clause 21.06 of the collective agreement.

[17] When she was asked whether employees respond to such letters, Ms. Bigras indicated that they might raise questions or concerns with a compensation advisor. In some situations, an employee might find the impact of provisions, such as the requirement for double contributions under certain benefit plans, too onerous and decide not to proceed on leave without pay. That said, Ms. Bigras could not recall any situation in which an employee declined to proceed on leave because of the treatment of pay increments.

[18] Counsel for the employer referred the witness to the following example, presented in an internal Treasury Board document (“the Pay Administration Guide”), as presented in the agreed statement of facts:

Example 2: Leave without pay for the care of immediate family

This refers to a full-time indeterminate employee who receives a pay increment in a represented CS-02 position, which is effective on Tuesday, August 13, 2002.

Since the pay increment period for the CS-02 is 12 months and the increment date is the anniversary date, the employee’s next pay increment is effective on Wednesday, August 13, 2003.

The employee begins a period of leave without pay for the care of their immediate family, which is effective from Monday, July 14, 2003, to Thursday, July 15, 2004, inclusive, a period of one (1) year and two (2) calendar days. Article 17.09(e) of the CS collective Agreement, which is signed on June 3, 2003, states that regardless of the length of the period of leave without pay, time spent on such leave shall not be counted for pay increment purposes.

The employee’s next pay increment date will be postponed until such time as the employee has been remunerated for a total of 12 months.

[19] Ms. Bigras confirmed that the example applies to other leave-without-pay situations and that the treatment for pay-increment purposes outlined in the example does not differ from what transpired in the grievor’s case.

[20] Ms. Bigras was also referred to excerpts from the Public Service Terms and Conditions of Employment Regulations (PSTCERs; Exhibit JT-1, tab O). She indicated that compensation advisors might refer to the PSTCERs when a collective agreement is unclear or when amplification is required. They could also refer to the employer’s Directive on Terms and Conditions of Employment (“the Directive”) (Exhibit JT-1, tab N) for the same purpose.

[21] Returning to the collective agreement in this case, the witness indicated that Pay Note 10 applied in the first instance in the grievor’s case to establish the pay-increment date of May 14, 2014, with her next increment due on May 10, 2015. A fixed increment date is not found in other collective agreements.

[22] Given that the grievor went on leave without pay for more than three months, clause 21.06 of the collective agreement required recalculating the increment date. Ms. Bigras stated that in the grievor’s case, she would add six months to May 10, 2015, resulting in the new increment date of November 9, 2015.

[23] In cross-examination, Ms. Bigras confirmed that she had not been involved in the grievor’s case and that she worked at Transport Canada during the relevant period. She also confirmed that she was not involved in negotiations for the collective agreement in this case or for any other collective agreement.

[24] The witness confirmed that the PSTCERs were replaced by the Directive on April 1, 2014, and that the two documents were not the same.

[25] Ms. Bigras was unable to verify that excerpts from the PSTCERs (Exhibit JT-1, tab O) were part of the Pay Administration Guide. Nonetheless, she could confirm that the content cited is still used, even though the provisions date to 2004. According to the witness, the rules have never changed, and they do not change when a new collective agreement is negotiated. The employer does not negotiate the rules with bargaining agents.

[26] Referring to the example based on the Computer Systems (CS) Group collective agreement (see paragraph 18 of this decision), the grievor asked whether Ms. Bigras referred to clause 17.09 of that agreement when she prepared her evidence. The witness responded in the negative. Pointing out that clause 17.09 refers only to leave without pay for the care of the immediate family, the grievor asked the witness whether the example could still be used in the grievor’s case. After several statements were made suggesting that there were commonalities with respect to the treatment of leave without pay periods of greater than three months, Ms. Bigras qualified her response by accepting that she would not refer to the CS collective agreement as a comparison.

[27] In an email to the grievor on October 28, 2015 (Exhibit JT-1, tab D), Ms. Pombert described the approach used to calculate the grievor’s new pay-increment date as follows:

...

Your leave without pay from March 30, 2015 to September 27, 2015 was for more than three months for personal needs. This leave impacts your increment date. The effective date of your increment is normally May 10. Your leave without pay from March 30 to May 9, 2015 is 6 weeks. This 6 weeks is added to your return to work date of September 28, 2015. Your new increment date is November 9, 2015.

...

[28] The witness characterized Ms. Pombert’s approach as another way to calculate the grievor’s new increment date with the same result as follows from her own approach (see paragraph 22 of this decision). Ms. Pombert calculated the number of days from March 30, 2015, the date on which the grievor commenced leave, to May 10, 2015, her increment date, and added that number of days to the date the grievor returned to work, September 28, 2015. Ms. Bigras calculated the total days spent on leave without pay and added that total to May 19, 2015. She clarified that the reference in the email to leave without pay for personal needs was incorrect. The grievor took leave without pay for personal reasons (see clause 19.19(c) of the collective agreement).

IV. Summary of the arguments

[29] Both parties submitted books of authorities in support of their arguments. At the hearing, counsel for the grievor referred to all eight cases cited by the grievor, arguing for each decision the elements that the Board should consider in reaching its decision. While I have reviewed all the cases, I will refer only to limited aspects of those decisions that I consider more relevant in the following summary of her argument.

[30] The employer’s book of authorities offers four references, one of which also forms part of the grievor’s book. In oral argument, the employer did not refer specifically to two of the decisions, C.E.P., Local 777 v. Imperial Oil Strathcona Refinery, 2004CarswellAlta 1855; and Ontario (Hydro-Electric Power Commission) v. C.U.P.E. Local 1000, 1973 CarswellOnt 1532. I have read and considered them, but absent direct submissions from the employer on what I should draw from them, they do not appear in the summary of the employer’s argument.

A. For the grievor

[31] The crux of the matter before the Board is the interaction of the collective agreement pay notes and clause 21.06. Which provisions apply? Which provisions take priority?

[32] The grievor submitted that the pay notes apply and that their operation requires that the six months she spent on leave without pay count for pay-increment purposes. In the alternative, she maintained that her increment date should have been extended by only three rather than six months.

[33] The assessment required in this case focuses primarily on the text of the collective agreement, consistent with the Board’s case law. While context has sometimes mattered in the Board’s analyses, it has always placed greater emphasis on the text than have other arbitrators; see Association of Justice Counsel v. Treasury Board, 2015 PSLREB 78 (“AJC 2015”) at para. 21; and Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Treasury Board, 2019 FPSLREB 7 (“PIPSC 2019”) at para. 109.

[34] The text in this case is unambiguous.

[35] Decisions of the Board have consistently found that pay increments are automatic unless a collective agreement provision expressly ousts time from the calculation of the pay-increment period.

[36] In Association of Justice Counsel v. Treasury Board, 2012 PSLRB 32 (“AJC 2012”) at para. 37, the Board described a pay increment as a “quasi-automatic progression” and reconfirmed that depiction in AJC 2015, at para. 100. The latter decision, at paragraph 108, also found that the pay-increment sections of Appendix A of the LP Group collective agreement were clear and unambiguous, as maintained by the grievor.

[37] At paragraph 110 of AJC 2015, later cited in PIPSC 2019, at para. 114, the Board referenced the only restriction on pay-increment progression (found in Pay Note 11) as follows: “Simply put ... all lawyers are entitled to their pay increment, on an annual basis, to the next higher rate in the lock step range unless they have received an ‘Unsatisfactory’ performance assessment.”

[38] In Ottawa-Carleton (Regional Municipality) v. Ottawa-Carleton Public Employees’ Union, Local 503 (1992), 30 L.A.C. (4^th) 257 (“Ottawa-Carleton”) at paras. 14 and 15, the private arbitration panel confirmed a presumptive entitlement to a pay increment subject only to the employer’s discretion to withhold one in certain circumstances.

[39] The Board turned its attention to the question of exclusions from automatic pay-increment progression in PIPSC 2019, at para. 115. It cited an example from one collective agreement of the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC), in which the parties restricted pay increments and then found that in other collective agreements, the employer could not impose additional restrictions by way of a directive. The Board wrote as follows:

... The employer could have negotiated further restrictions on pay increments tied to performance in all the collective agreements it entered into with the PIPSC ... As such, the employer did not retain the right to do so and is restricted from implementing it by way of the Directive.

[40] In Armstrong v. Treasury Board (Transport Canada), PSSRB File No. 166-02-18289 (19890613), 1989 CarswellNat 2027, at para. 70, the (then) Public Service Staff Relations Board found that the grievor was entitled to a pay increment during a leave of absence.

[41] The rule that pay increments are quasi-automatic, subject only to express exclusions in the collective agreement, is an application of the more general principle that clear language is required to oust a collective agreement benefit; see Calgary Regional Health Authority v. U.N.A., Local 121-R (2000), 93 L.A.C. (4^th) 427 (“United Nurses”) at para. 23.

[42] The grievor reviewed the wording of the collective agreement in historical context. Before April 1, 2002, lawyers at Justice Canada were not unionized, but a smaller group of lawyers in other departments belonged to a bargaining unit represented by PIPSC. Once Justice lawyers acquired the right to unionize, the AJC applied for certification. The subsequent certification order in 2006 merged the previously represented lawyers and the unrepresented Justice lawyers into one bargaining unit, accredited to the AJC. Those two components had different pay regimes. The collective agreement for PIPSC lawyers had provided a lock step increment system. Justice lawyers progressed through pay ranges, based on performance.

[43] The first collective agreement negotiated by the AJC after certification, signed on July 27, 2010, transitioned PIPSC lawyers out of the lock step system effective November 1, 2009; see AJC 2012, at para. 36. For the period from 2006 to that date, the lock step system was maintained, which required specific transitional pay notes; see AJC 2012, at 11 and 12. The AJC’s first collective agreement included clause 21.06.

[44] On March 12, 2013, the parties signed a new collective agreement, their second, the interpretation of which is at issue in this decision. Under its provisions, employees at classification levels LA-1, LA-2A, and LA-2B (i.e., LP-1, LP-2, and LP-3) moved back to a lock step system. At higher classification levels, in-range performance-based increments continued.

[45] From 2009 to 2013, clause 21.06 had no application because no employees were paid under a lock step system. With lock step pay ranges restored in the new collective agreement effective in 2013, clause 21.06 applied again.

[46] The grievor noted that clauses 15.02 and 15.03 contain the imperative words “is entitled” and “shall be paid”, as follows:

15.02 A lawyer is entitled to be paid for services rendered at:

(a) the pay specified in Appendix “A” for the classification of the position to which he is appointed, if the classification coincides with that prescribed in his certificate of appointment, or

(b) the pay specified in Appendix “A” for the classification prescribed in his certificate of appointment, if that classification and the classification of the position to which he is appointed do not coincide.

15.03 Rates of Pay

(a) The rates of pay set forth in Appendix “A” shall become effective on the dates specified.

...

[47] The imperative words confirm the quasi-automatic status of the pay increments.

[48] Pay Note 10 (see paragraph 9 of this decision) also includes the imperative words, “will be to the next higher rate”.

[49] In Pay Note 11 (see paragraph 9 of this decision), the parties focussed carefully on when a lawyer should be deprived of a pay increment — when performance “is assessed as ‘Unsatisfactory’”.

[50] Clause 21.06 (see paragraph 9 of this decision) deducts periods of leave without pay greater of than three months “[e]xcept as otherwise specified”. Pay Note 10, which does not identify exceptions, must take precedence over clause 21.06. It specifies quasi-automatic progression through the lock step pay ranges, thus ending the inquiry.

[51] The grievor referred to the example of clause 19.11(e) of the collective agreement (“Leave Without Pay for Personal Needs”) under which periods of leave in excess of three months do not count for pay-increment purposes. The exclusion wording replicates the wording found in clause 21.06.

[52] There is a rule against redundancy in collective agreement provisions. The employer interprets clause 21.06 as applying to all forms of leave without pay, but that interpretation renders clause 19.11(e) redundant. Under the grievor’s reading of the collective agreement, giving precedence to Pay Note 10, clause 19.11(e) is not redundant. The same point applies with respect to clause 19.12(b) (“Leave Without Pay for Relocation of Spouse”).

[53] The grievor submitted that the Pay Administration Guide cannot be used to help interpret the collective agreement. The Directive, on the other hand, is a valid interpretative tool because it is incorporated into the collective agreement by clause 15.01; see paragraph 11 of Broekaert v. Treasury Board (Correctional Service of Canada), 2005 PSLRB 90, which finds that a clause identical to clause 15.01 incorporates by reference the provisions of the (then) PSTCERs, which the Directive replaced.

[54] Klock v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2009 PSLRB 99 at para. 23, confirms that other types of internal employer documents, such as pay bulletins, are “... nothing more than the interpretation of one party to the collective agreement ... and [do] not have more weight than the interpretation given by the other party.”

[55] The grievor referred to s. 2.5.9 of the Directive, which reads as follows:

2.5.9 Pay increments during period of leave without pay

a. Subsections 5.1 to 5.7 apply to every person who has been granted leave without pay except when the relevant collective agreement or terms and conditions of employment provide that time spent on a particular type of leave without pay does not count for pay increment purposes.

b. When a person has been granted a leave of absence without pay that does not count for pay increment purposes, a pay increment becomes due to that person on the new pay increment date calculated from the date on which the pay increment last became due less the period of leave without pay.

[56] The grievor contended that section 2.5.9 is unhelpful to both parties.

[57] The grievor closed her argument by positing in the alternative that there are two parts to clause 21.06, separated by a semi-colon (“;”), which must be separately applied. The second part, after the semi-colon, limits the exclusion in calculating pay-increment periods to time in excess of three months. Therefore, should the Board not accept her principal argument, nonetheless, it should order that the first three months of her leave without pay be counted for pay-increment purposes and that her pay-increment date be recalculated accordingly.

B. For the employer

[58] The employer maintained that the rule stated in clause 21.06 of the collective agreement applies to leave without pay taken under clause 19.19, which reads as follows:

19.19 Other Leave With or Without Pay

At its discretion, the Employer may grant:

(a) leave with pay when circumstances not directly attributable to the lawyer prevent his or her reporting for duty;

(b) leave with or without pay for purposes other than those specified in this Agreement ....

[59] There is no dispute that a specific clause trumps a general clause. Clause 19.19 is not specific about pay increments. Therefore, clause 21.06 supersedes. Ms. Bigras’ testimony confirmed the precedence of clause 21.06 and its application to the grievor’s leave without pay under clause 19.19.

[60] Clause 21.06 must be interpreted harmoniously with the scheme of the collective agreement; see Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 5^th ed., (“Brown and Beatty”), at 4:2120. The words “[e]xcept as otherwise specified” in clause 21.06 direct attention to other provisions of the collective agreement dealing with, for example, maternity leave without pay (clause 19.03(g)), parental leave without pay (clause 19.06(g)), and leave without pay for personal needs (clause 19.11(e)), in which the exception is expressly stated. Those provisions operate harmoniously with clause 21.06.

[61] The grievor’s argument does not support a harmonious interpretation of the collective agreement. Her submission that the Appendix A pay notes take precedence over clause 21.06 would have the absurd effect of rendering clause 21.06 superfluous. Clause 21.06 comprises a general rule, which applies to all periods of leave without pay of over three months, unless otherwise specifically excepted. The form of leave without pay taken by the grievor is not one of the exceptions.

[62] The AJC cases cited by the grievor to support the proposition that pay increments are quasi-automatic were taken out of context. They address circumstances in which periods of leave count for pay-increment purposes. In contrast, clause 21.06, as applied in this case, concerns a leave period of more than three months, which does not count.

[63] There is nothing automatic about the treatment of leave without pay taken under clause 19.19. The opposite is perhaps true because manual adjustments are required to calculate the impact of leave on pay increments.

[64] The employer noted that at the time, the grievor did not dispute the interpretation of the operation of pay increments in Ms. Pombert’s letter dated March 20, 2015.

[65] The employer maintained that the authorities offered by the grievor do not find that employees are entitled to pay increments despite missing time. In the circumstances addressed in those decisions, there was no dispute that leave taken counted for pay-increment purposes. As for United Nurses and Ottawa-Carleton, neither decision is about leave.

[66] The employer maintained that the operation of clause 21.06 requires that the grievor’s increment date be extended by all six months of leave without pay, not just three months, as she submitted in the alternative. Clause 21.06 must be read with the collective agreement taken as a whole. The words “such leave” in clause 21.06 appear elsewhere in the collective agreement and refer to periods of leave in their entirety.

[67] Brown and Beatty states that when the same words are used more than once, they are presumed to have the same meaning (see paragraph 4:2120).

[68] The employer referenced clause 19.11(b) (Leave Without Pay for Personal Needs) as another provision that addresses leave periods in excess of three months. Clause 19.11(e) refers to leave taken under clause 19.11(b) and requires that it not be counted for pay-increment purposes.

C. The grievor’s rebuttal

[69] The employer argued that the introductory phrase in clause 21.06, “[e]xcept as otherwise specified in this Agreement”, means only that it applies in some parts of the collective agreement but not all. The grievor maintained that the pay notes are part of “this Agreement” and therefore can be included in the exclusionary introduction in clause 21.06. The parties could have provided for the exceptional treatment of leave without pay in the pay notes but did not.

[70] The meaning given to clause 21.06, which has remained static, depends on the wording of the pay notes, which has changed over time and could change again. If so, clause 21.06 could apply differently. For example, the parties could agree on permissive rather than mandatory language in the pay notes, which would lead to a different application of clause 21.06.

[71] The grievor disputed the employer’s submission that the authorities that she argued to support the “quasi-automatic” nature of pay increments do not involve disputes over leave counting for pay increments. AJC 2012, to be sure, is about the entitlement to performance pay while on maternity and parental leave, but it does address, as obiter, the quasi-automatic nature of pay increments. In AJC 2015, the description of pay increments as automatic is not obiter. The whole point of the case is to determine whether an employee is entitled to a pay increment while on maternity and parental leave despite the fact that performance could not be assessed during the leave period. In one of the policy grievances examined in PIPSC 2019, the issue is whether pay increments contemplated by the collective agreement could be withheld by the provisions of a performance management directive. In answering that question, the Board had to assess the quasi-automatic nature of pay increments.

[72] The employer’s submission that the grievor did not dispute the interpretation of the operation of pay increments in Ms. Pombert’s letter dated March 20, 2015, is irrelevant. As long as her grievance was timely, nothing can be inferred by her not reacting to the letter. Moreover, as a grievance involving the interpretation or application of a provision of the collective agreement, the bargaining agent’s position, rather than the grievor’s views, is relevant.

[73] To the point that the wording of clause 21.06 is common across the public service, the grievor noted Ms. Bigras’ admission that the pay notes in the collective agreement differ from those in other collective agreements.

[74] Following the grievor’s reply, the employer requested a brief opportunity to make a further submission about provisions in other specific collective agreements, such as that of the Program and Administrative Services (PA) Group. I observed that I understood Ms. Bigras’ testimony to indicate that the wording of clause 21.06 appears across collective agreements and that it has been consistently administered in the fashion she outlined. In my view, specific examples from other collective agreements, or the full text of an agreement such as the one cited in the Pay Administration Guide (see paragraph 18 of this decision), would not provide additional assistance. On that basis, I closed the argument phase of the hearing.

V. Reasons

[75] The grievor bore the burden of proving a violation of the collective agreement, on the balance of probabilities.

[76] In her grievance filed on December 3, 2015, the grievor alleges that the Department failed “... to take into account the relevant portion of [her] first three months of leave without pay for pay increment purposes in relation to the 2014-2015 evaluation period in accordance with article 21.06.” She follows through with that allegation by asking as corrective action that “... the applicable portion of my first 3 months of leave without pay (i.e., 1 day) be considered for pay increment purposes ...”. Those two elements of the grievance would appear at odds with her principal argument at the hearing that all six months of her leave should count for pay-increment purposes, although they are consistent with the position she argued in the alternative. However, she also asks for a correction to her pay-increment date to May 10, 2015, and that the May 10 increment date continue to be recognized in the future. That request would seem to conform more with her main argument that the full period of leave must count for pay-increment purposes.

[77] Should I make anything of this possible contradiction? On balance, I have decided not to draw any adverse inference. The grievor’s principal argument, requiring that all six months of leave count for pay-increment purposes, can at least be linked to the wording of the grievance requiring that her May 10 increment date be maintained. Perhaps more to the point, at the hearing, the employer did not argue that any element of the wording of the grievance, or how it was presented in the internal grievance procedure, prevented the grievor from taking the position at adjudication that all six months of leave should count for pay-increment purposes.

[78] The evidence before the Board is relatively succinct. It consists of the agreed statement of facts, a number of documents jointly submitted by the parties (Exhibit JT-1, tabs A, D, M, N, O, and P), and the oral evidence of Ms. Bigras.

[79] The basic facts of the case disclosed by the evidence are undisputed. The grievor took leave without pay under clause 19.19 of the collective agreement (“Other Leave With or Without Pay”) for the period from March 30, 2015, to September 25, 2015. Because the leave period was greater than three months, the employer changed the grievor’s increment date from May 10, 2015, to November 9, 2015, citing the authority of clause 21.06.

[80] Ms. Bigras’ testimony provides context for the employer’s action. She outlined that its application of clause 21.06 in the grievor’s case conformed with the consistent interpretation given to analogous provisions found in collective agreements across the public service. She explained how she would have calculated the new pay increment date as well as the method actually used by Ms. Pombert, a compensation administrator in the Department. Both approaches yielded the same result.

[81] Ms. Bigras’ evidence provides helpful clarification of the employer’s approach but, in my view, clearly does not determine the matter. To be sure, the case before the Board is largely not about the testimonial evidence.

[82] Nonetheless, in light of Ms. Bigras’ testimony, I am mindful that a ruling by the Board endorsing the grievor’s interpretation of the relevant provisions of the collective agreement could well have wider ramifications if the rule stated by clause 21.06 is, in fact, a typical collective agreement provision, as she maintained. However, I need not make a finding about the typicality of clause 21.06. Even were I to, there is nothing to say in the absence of supportive case law that a consistent approach taken in the past to interpreting analogous clauses in other collective agreements proves the correctness of that application. It is always possible that, even if unlikely, a consistent approach has been consistently wrong.

[83] The grievor urged me to emulate what she characterized as the primary focus in the Board’s case law on the text of a collective agreement, as opposed to the greater emphasis allegedly given to context by other, external arbitrators. As she acknowledged, nonetheless, context does inform the Board’s decisions. But I agree, in the circumstances of this case, to focus almost exclusively on the express wording of the collective agreement to determine whether it has been properly interpreted and applied.

[84] As outlined in authoritative sources such as Brown and Beatty, at paragraph 4:2100, and as recognized throughout the Board’s case law, canons of interpretation such as the following guide this analysis: (1) the parties are assumed to have meant what they said, (2) the meaning and intent of the collective agreement is to be sought in its express provisions, (3) the words of a collective agreement must be given their grammatical and ordinary sense, (4) they must read in their entire context, in harmony with the scheme of the collective agreement, and (5) when the same words reappear, they are to be given the same interpretation.

[85] The root of the dispute before the Board is a fundamental difference between the parties in interpreting the interaction of the following provisions:

...

21.06 Except as otherwise specified in this Agreement, where leave without pay for a period in excess of three (3) months is granted to a lawyer, the total period of leave granted shall be deducted from “continuous employment” for the purpose of calculating severance pay and from “service” for the purpose of calculating vacation leave; time spent on such leave which is for a period of more than three (3) months shall not be counted for pay increment purposes.

...

Appendix “A”

...

Pay Notes

...

Lock Step Pay Range for LA-DEV, LA-1, LA-2A and LA-2B

(10) Effective May 10, 2013, pay increments for lawyers at the LA-DEV, LA-1, LA-2A and LA-2B levels will be to the next higher rate on the applicable lock step pay range that comes into effect on May 10, 2013.

...

(13) The pay increment period is twelve (12) months for lawyers at the LA-DEV, LA-2A and LA-2B levels and six (6) months for lawyers paid on the LA-1 scale.

...

[86] Neither party contended that the wording of any of those provisions is unclear or ambiguous.

[87] There is no argument that a performance factor relevant to Pay Note 11 (reported in the agreed statement of facts) enters into the required analysis in this case.

[88] The grievor argued that the language of Pay Note 10 effectively trumps clause 21.06. Absent any wording in Pay Note 10 that expressly excepts situations in which an employee takes leave without pay (for whatever period), movement to the next higher rate in a lock step pay range is automatic. Under Pay Note 13, a pay-increment period of 12 months is mandatory for an employee classified at the grievor’s LA-2A (i.e., LP-2) group and level. The imperative nature of the wording in both pay notes, taken with the absence of exclusionary language in Pay Note 10, serves to supersede the application of clause 21.06.

[89] The employer maintained that the pay notes cannot take precedence over clause 21.06 and instead that all the provisions must be read harmoniously within the scheme of the collective agreement. That scheme includes, in clause 21.06, a general rule that applies to all periods of leave without pay of over three months unless otherwise specifically excepted. The form of leave without pay taken by the grievor is not one of the exceptions.

[90] Do the authorities cited in oral argument help resolve the parties’ interpretative dispute?

[91] AJC 2012 does not. While it does include obiter to the effect that a pay increment is “quasi-automatic”, this observation is found in a discussion of the difference between a lock step pay system and a pay system featuring in-range progression based on performance. The subject of AJC 2012 is the operation of the performance pay plan under Appendix “B” of the LP Group collective agreement for employees on maternity leave or parental leave. The grievance alleged that the employer’s administration of the performance pay plan in certain departments and agencies for those employees constituted prohibited discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6).

[92] The essential argument advanced by the bargaining agent in AJC 2015 was that the employer’s denial of a lock step pay increase for an employee on maternity or parental leave due to an “Unable to Assess” performance rating breached the collective agreement. The grievor submitted that the only restriction in the collective agreement to a lock step increase occurs when an employee receives an “Unsatisfactory” rating (Pay Note 11). Given that AJC 2015 does assess the treatment of employees under the lock step pay system, it has general relevance, primarily in confirming the “quasi-automatic” nature of lock step increments. However, the specific tension resolved in AJC 2015 by the Board’s ruling in favour of the bargaining agent does not have relevance. The analysis counterposes the operation of a four-category performance assessment regime (“Exceeds”, “Fully Meets”, “Unsatisfactory”, and “Unable to Assess”) and Pay Note 11, which addresses only one of the ratings (“Unsatisfactory”). The resolution of that tension does not assist in this case before the Board. Notably, the Board’s reasons in AJC 2015 do not entertain the interpretation of clause 21.06 or its interaction with pay notes.

[93] The first of two policy grievances considered in PIPSC 2019 challenged a provision of a directive withholding pay increments for poor performance as violating a number of collective agreements between the bargaining agent and the employer. The Board’s ruling allowing the first policy grievance found that the employer could have negotiated restrictions on pay increments tied to performance in all the PIPSC collective agreements, but it did not. Therefore, the employer was restricted from implementing restrictions by way of a directive. Once more, nothing in PIPSC 2019 depends on the interpretation of a clause analogous to clause 21.06 of the collective agreement; nor does the decision concern the interaction of that type of provision and the operation of pay notes.

[94] The grievor cited three other decisions of former Boards: Armstrong (from 1989), Broekaert (from 2005), and Klock (from 2009). With respect, I find that none of them has more than very passing relevance. In fairness, she referred to each only in support of ancillary points of argument, not with respect to interpreting the express wording of clause 21.06 or of the pay notes. Armstrong primarily concerned the validity of a resignation and, secondarily, the entitlement to a pay increment once that resignation was found invalid. Broekaert determined that granting pay adjustments for periods in which the grievors were casual employees fell outside the Board’s jurisdiction. The Board accepted jurisdiction to consider the calculation of salary increments once they became employees under the collective agreement, establishing that an increment period of 12 months applied to part-time employees. The initiating issue in Klock was a decision by the employer not to grant a 5-day retirement leave request. As noted by the grievor, paragraph 23 of the decision discounts the application of certain employer documents and authorities in determining the matter.

[95] Ottawa-Carleton confirms a presumptive entitlement to a pay increment subject only to the employer’s discretion to withhold one in certain circumstances. United Nurses articulates the general principle that clear language is required to oust a collective agreement benefit. Both findings are, I believe, uncontroversial.

[96] I return to the express wording of the collective agreement.

[97] The grievor applied for, and proceeded on, leave for six months under clause 19.19(b) of the collective agreement, which reads as follows:

19.19 Other Leave With or Without Pay

At its discretion, the Employer may grant:

...

(b) leave with or without pay for purposes other than those specified in this Agreement ....

[98] There is no contest that clause 19.19(b) was the appropriate leave provision in the circumstances. For this analysis, the important point is that there is no reference in clause 19.19(b) to pay increments. There is no statement to the effect that all or part of the leave shall be counted for pay-increment purposes or, to be sure, any distinction between leave periods of different lengths as contained in clause 21.06. To that extent, clause 19.19(b) must be distinguished from several leave-without-pay provisions in the collective agreement to which the opening words of clause 21.06 — “Except as otherwise specified” — apply. Clause 19.06 (“Parental Leave Without Pay”) is one such example, reading in part as follows:

19.06 Parental Leave Without Pay

(a) Where a lawyer has or will have the actual care and custody of a new-born [sic] child (including the new-born [sic] child of a common-law partner), the lawyer shall, upon request, be granted parental leave without pay for a single period of up to thirty-seven (37) consecutive weeks in the fifty-two (52) week period beginning on the day on which the child is born or the day on which the child comes into the lawyer’s care.

...

(g) Leave granted under this clause shall count for the calculation of “continuous employment” for the purpose of calculating severance pay and “service” for the purpose of calculating vacation leave. Time spent on such leave shall count for pay increment purposes.

[99] The grievor’s principal argument rests effectively on the proposition that Pay Note 10 could have included express wording providing exceptional treatment of time spent on leave without pay. That it contains no such wording, in the grievor’s submission, indicates that the parties intended that it take precedence over clause 21.06. (The grievor did not explicitly argue the same point with respect to Pay Note 13, although it seems that the same logic might apply.)

[100] Pay Note 10, once more, reads as follows:

Lock Step Pay Range for LA-DEV, LA-1, LA-2A and LA-2B

(10) Effective May 10, 2013, pay increments for lawyers at the LA-DEV, LA-1, LA-2A and LA-2B levels will be to the next higher rate on the applicable lock step pay range that comes into effect on May 10, 2013.

[101] The principal purpose of Pay Note 10 is to facilitate the operation of the new lock step pay ranges for the LA-DEV, LA-1, LA-2A, and LA-2B classification levels that came into effect on May 10, 2013, on the implementation of the second collective agreement negotiated by the parties. Pay Note 10 marks the departure from the previous rule described in Pay Note 8 as follows:

In-Range Pay Movement

(8) Prior to May 10, 2013, in-range pay movement for lawyers at all levels other than LA-DEV will be governed by the relevant performance pay regimes.

[102] Pay Note 10 specifies that on and after May 10, 2013, a pay-increment entitlement for the grievor’s position at the LA-2A classification level (i.e., LP-2) is “... to the next higher rate on the applicable lock step pay range ...”, replacing in-range progression based on performance. (As stated earlier in this decision, Pay Note 11 exempts from that entitlement an employee whose performance is rated “Unsatisfactory”.) Pay Note 10 says nothing about pay-increment periods.

[103] Pay Note 13 adds express language defining when the entitlement to a pay increment occurs after May 10, 2013, as follows: “(13) The pay increment period is twelve (12) months for lawyers at the LA-DEV, LA-2A and LA-2B levels and six (6) months for lawyers paid on the LA-1 scale.”

[104] The operation of Pay Note 13, in conjunction with Pay Note 10, served to set May 10, 2014, as the grievor’s first pay-increment date under the new lock step system. Had she not proceeded on leave without pay on March 30, 2015, it is clear that her next pay increment would have become due on May 10, 2015.

[105] In my opinion, what Pay Notes 10 and 13 do not say may be instructive. Pay Note 10 does not include a qualifying phrase such as, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement”, which would clearly indicate the parties’ intent that it overcome the operation of clause 21.06. Pay Note 13 does not use a descriptor such as “consecutive” in setting out a pay-increment period of 12 months. Furthermore, the joint operation of the wording in Pay Notes 10 and 13 does not preclude the possibility that an employee’s pay-increment date can change, given, for example, the operation of other pay-administration rules imported into the collective agreement by virtue of clause 15.01, which reads as follows: “15.01 Except as provided in clauses 15.02 to 15.08 inclusive, the terms and conditions governing the application of pay to lawyers are not affected by this Agreement.”

[106] The Directive (Exhibit JT-1, tab N), which the grievor characterized as a valid interpretative tool because it is incorporated into the collective agreement by clause 15.01, contains a number of rules that operate to change pay-increment dates on, for example, promotion or demotion. The Directive also includes the following provision:

2.5.9 Pay increments during period of leave without pay

...

b. When a person has been granted a leave of absence without pay that does not count for pay increment purposes, a pay increment becomes due to that person on the new pay increment date calculated from the date on which the pay increment last became due less the period of leave without pay.

[107] I note that the parties’ agreed statement of facts cites what I believe are provisions of the Pay Administration Guide referencing sections of the PSTCERs with somewhat different wording, although to the same effect. However, the Directive (Exhibit JT-1, tab N) states explicitly that it replaced the PSTCERs effective April 1, 2014. Thus, the wording of the PSTCERs has no bearing on this analysis.

[108] I find the wording “less the period of leave without pay” in section 2.5.9(b) of the Directive somewhat awkward. Nonetheless, it is clear under that section that a period of leave without pay that does not count for increment purposes changes an employee’s pay-increment date.

[109] The grievor contended that the Directive does not assist either party. As for section 2.5.9(b) of the Directive, I might accept that point if Pay Note 10 or any other provision of the collective agreement explicitly stipulated that pay-increment dates do not change when an employee proceeds on leave without pay, but that is not the case. Pay Note 10 does not say that May 10 is immutable, only that the new lock step increment ranges came into effect on May 10, 2013. Clause 21.06 does not use the phrase “new pay-increment date”, but the rule that it establishes has the effect of requiring a new pay-increment date. By providing that there are periods of leave without pay that “... shall not be counted for pay increment purposes”, clause 21.06 contemplates that a new pay-increment date will be determined in harmony with what section 2.5.9(b) of the Directive requires.

[110] All this returns me once more to the grievor’s central proposition that Pay Note 10 takes precedence over clause 21.06 and that as such, the 12-month pay-increment period specified in Pay Note 13 is “quasi-automatic” and applies without exception, save for the situation of an “Unsatisfactory” performance rating covered by Pay Note 11.

[111] Contrary to the thrust of the grievor’s argument, I have not found explicit wording in Pay Note 10 that would convince me that the parties intended it to apply despite clause 21.06. I have also not found any explicit wording in the pay notes to the effect either that the 12 months that comprise the increment period must be consecutive or that an employee’s pay-increment date cannot change. On balance, then, I believe that I must interpret Pay Note 10 in the entire context of the collective agreement and in harmony with its overall scheme. In doing so, I believe that Pay Note 10 can operate harmoniously with clause 21.06 just as it can operate harmoniously with other pay-administration provisions within the collective agreement or imported into it by clause 15.01. Put simply, I do not accept that there is a necessary tension between Pay Note 10 (or Pay Note 13) and clause 21.06 requiring that I prefer one over the other. Both provisions enjoy equal status under the scheme of the collective agreement and both must be assumed to mean what they say. Both must be read in their grammatical and ordinary sense. Doing so, they jointly reveal the parties’ intent.

[112] The parties agree that express language is required to oust a collective agreement benefit, as is clear in the case law of the Board and of external arbitrators. I concur with the employer that clause 21.06 has that effect. Reading clause 21.06 in its ordinary and grammatical sense, I find that the intent of the parties is that an employee’s pay-increment period and pay-increment date change, applying the rule stated in clause 21.06; i.e., periods of leave without pay greater than three months do not count.

[113] The grievor maintained that there is a rule against redundancy in collective agreement provisions. She alleged that the employer’s interpretation of clause 21.06 as applying to all forms of leave without pay renders redundant, for example, clause 19.11(e) (Leave Without Pay for Personal Needs), which reads as follows:

19.11 Leave Without Pay for Personal Needs

Leave without pay will be granted for personal needs, in the following manner:

...

(e) Leave without pay granted under paragraph (b) of this clause shall be deducted from the calculation of “continuous employment” for the purpose of calculating severance pay and “service” for the purpose of calculating vacation leave for the lawyer involved. Time spent on such leave shall not be counted for pay increment purposes.

[114] I have found two recent Board decisions that mention the rule against redundancy. In Gresley-Jones v. Treasury Board (Canada Border Services Agency), 2020 FPSLREB 65 at para. 49, the Board identifies the proposition that “each word should be given some meaning” as the rule against redundancy. In Fields v. Treasury Board (Department of Transport), 2016 PSLREB 78 at para. 122, the Board mentions the rule against redundancy in the following context:

122. As set out in Collective Agreement Arbitration in Canada, at Chapter 2, “Interpretation of the Collective Agreement”, Part 2, Section A, “Words to be Given Ordinary Meaning”, and Section D, “Each Word Should Be Given some Meaning: The Rule Against Redundancy”, the words “on leaving the public service”, which follow the word “except” in clause 38.02(h) of the TS collective agreement, not only must be given meaning, as they are not redundant, but also should be given their ordinary meaning....

[115] With respect, I do not see how the grievor’s argument that the rule against redundancy applies with respect to the interaction of clause 21.06 and a clause such as clause 19.11(e). I find no conflict between the two provisions and find that they both can be harmoniously interpreted, giving all words “some meaning”. Similarly, they address the exclusion of time for increment purposes, but in the case of clause 19.11(e), the distinction allowing for periods of less than three months to count is not present. Even were their wording identical, I would not necessarily be convinced that repetition poses a problem of redundancy.

[116] The foregoing analysis leads me to find that the employer did not breach the collective agreement when it changed the grievor’s pay-increment date after her return from leave without pay under the authority of clause 21.06. That leaves before the Board the grievor’s alternate argument that nonetheless, the employer misinterpreted clause 21.06 by failing to count the first three months of her leave in determining when her pay increment came due.

[117] The grievor submitted that there are two parts to clause 21.06 separated by a semi-colon (“;”), which must be separately applied. The second part, after the semi-colon, limits the exclusion in calculating pay-increment periods to time in excess of three months.

[118] The grievor did not offer interpretative or grammatical authorities to support the proposition that a semi-colon has the effect of separating what precedes and what follows into two provisions, each with independent application. My search of federal case law using the CanLII database revealed over 30 cases that discussed the use of semi-colons, many in the field of tariff law. The most prevalent view is reflected, for example, in Wolseley Engineered Pipe Group v. Canada Border Services Agency, 2010 CanLII 15685 (CA CITT) at para.32, which appears to support the grievor’s view in finding as follows: “... it is an accepted principle ... that a semi-colon denotes a complete stop and that the provision before the semi-colon and the provision after the semi-colon are unrelated.”

[119] The sentence that follows the semi-colon in clause 21.06 reads as follows: “...time spent on such leave which is for a period of more than three (3) months shall not be counted for pay increment purposes.”

[120] If I consider the sentence independently, I must interpret the words “such leave which is for a period of more than three (3) months” in their ordinary and grammatical meaning. Apart from the immediate requirement to understand that “such leave” must be understood as “leave without pay” from the wording that precedes the semi-colon — suggesting that the two sections are not, in fact, fully independent — the ordinary meaning of “a period of more than three (3) months” does not seem to me controversial. The parties do not use, for example, words such as “time spent in excess of three (3) months”, which would make clear their intent to exclude from the calculation of a pay-increment period only the time beyond three months. It is the calculation of the “period” of leave without pay that drives the interpretation of the sentence. If the period of leave without pay exceeds three months, then that period, of whatever length, “shall not be counted for pay increment purposes”.

[121] I believe that the French text confirms the foregoing interpretation. It reads as follows:

21.06 Sauf disposition contraire dans la présente convention, lorsqu’un congé non payé est accordé́ à un juriste pour une période de plus de trois (3) mois, la période totale du congé accordé est déduite de la période d’« emploi continu » servant à calculer l’indemnité de départ et de la période de « service » servant à calculer les congés annuels; le temps consacré à un tel congé d’une durée de plus de trois (3) mois ne compte pas aux fins de l’augmentation d’échelon de rémunération.

[122] The key word, durée, connotes the total duration of the period of leave. If that duration exceeds three months, then the exclusion of the period takes effect.

[123] Therefore, I find no basis to allow the grievor’s alternate argument.

[124] I note parenthetically that the French version of clause 21.06 uses both the word “période” and the word “durée” for the term “period” used in the English version. The French version thus contains a distinction not found in the English text. However, I do not believe that this difference affects my finding.

[125] In sum, I find that the employer did not breach the collective agreement by extending the grievor’s pay-increment period by the six months of her leave without pay under clause 19.19(b) with the effect that her next pay increment became due on November 9, 2015.

[126] For all of the above reasons, the Board makes the following order:

(The Order appears on the next page)

VI. Order

[127] The grievance is denied.

March 22, 2021.

Dan Butler,

a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board