FPSLREB Decisions
Decision Information
The grievance concerned the work schedules of fisheries officers in British Columbia and the Yukon – during peak season, from June to September, the officers were required to work evenings, nights, and weekends – the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) alleged that the officers were day workers at all times and that all hours they worked outside Monday to Friday, 06:00 to 18:00, were to be paid at the overtime rate – however, the employer argued that it had the right to assign irregular hours of work under the collective agreement – the Board found that the employer had had an urgent need to assign irregular shifts to the fisheries officers so that they could conduct their duties – moreover, clause 25.09 of the collective agreement, which allows for “irregular” work, applied to fisheries officers – fisheries officers’ work is tied to the ebb and flow of the peaks of activity of the natural resources they help protect – the Board concluded that the PSAC’s interpretation of clause 25.09 would violate the definition of “overtime” in the collective agreement – read in its entirety, the collective agreement did not provide for a fisheries officer to work 37.5 hours in a week and to have some of those hours, worked on a weekend in the summer, paid at the overtime rate.
Grievance denied.
Decision Content
Date: 20230216
Citation: 2023 FPSLREB 19
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Labour Relations Act
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Between
Public Service Alliance of Canada
Bargaining Agent
and
Treasury Board
(Department of Fisheries and Oceans)
Employer
Indexed as
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Treasury Board (Department of Fisheries and Oceans)
In the matter of a group grievance referred to adjudication
Before: Bryan R. Gray, a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board
For the Bargaining Agent: Pamela Sihota
For the Employer: Laetitia Auguste
REASONS FOR DECISION
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I.
Summary
[1] This group grievance concerns fisheries officers who perform inspections and conduct enforcement operations in British Columbia and the Yukon. Their work schedules are heavily impacted by seasonal trends in fishery resources, such as the annual salmon run and the related resource user or harvester activities.
[2] During the peak of activity, from approximately June to September inclusively, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (“the employer”) schedules inspection and enforcement activities throughout the week and weekend during both days and nights. The evening, night, and weekend work during the summer peak-activity season ensures that the illegal poaching of fish and other resources cannot enjoy a predictable pattern of daytime only enforcement.
[3] Such peak activities contrast with off-peak-season work, which is usually carried out from 06:00 to 18:00. Some overtime is used throughout the entire year for inspection and enforcement and is not at issue in this matter.
[4] At issue in the grievance is management’s reliance upon statutory management rights and the collective agreement’s shift-work provision to assign irregular hours of work in the peak summer season but then day work in the off-peak winter season. That agreement was between the Treasury Board and the Public Service Alliance of Canada (“the bargaining agent”) for the Technical Services Group, and it expired on June 21, 2014 (“the collective agreement”)
[5] The grievances allege that the officers are day workers at all times, and that accordingly, all hours worked outside Monday to Friday, 06:00 to 18:00, must be paid at the overtime rate. The bargaining agent submitted that this would apply even if a normal 37.5-hour workweek was assigned to occur Wednesday through Sunday, inclusively, thus possibly meaning that 15 out of their 37.5 hours of work in a week would be paid at the overtime rate.
[6] I disagree. The employer properly relied upon statutory management rights and the “irregular” hours provision, clause 25.09, which allowed assigning shifts that did not necessarily need to fit within what the grievor asserted were the normal Monday to Friday day-work hours.
[7] The grievance is denied.
II.
Collective agreement
[8] The parties jointly submitted that at all times material to the matter before me, the collective agreement governed their rights and responsibilities.
[9] In particular, the parties made submissions on article 2 of the collective agreement, entitled “Interpretation and Definitions” and containing the definition of “overtime”. The parties relied on that definition and these other provisions:
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[10] I note that the exception for the applicability of article 27 to employees covered by Appendix M to the collective agreement is not relevant to this matter as that appendix refers to members of the Primary Product Inspection (PI) group, who deal with product inspections.
III.
Testimony
[11] Each party called one witness.
[12] Perry Powers testified on behalf of the grievors. His career with the employer began in 1997. He has vast experience in conservation and protection field operations and enforcement and has held management positions with the employer as well as an executive position in his bargaining unit.
[13] Mr. Powers provided testimony as to the important duties and vast geographical scope of the fisheries officers’ work as well as the many responsibilities they have within their regulatory mandate related to the inspection and enforcement of fish, other marine life, and habitat related matters.
[14] He testified as follows:
· The employer changed the days of work to include weekend hours to avoid paying overtime.
· Fisheries officers were day workers in his opinion with normal “core” hours of work from 08:00 to 16:00, Monday to Friday.
· Most of the year, these hours and days of work were not at issue as most of their work was scheduled within them.
· Occasionally during the year, special projects or operations were planned outside the normal core hours and often at night, to target the illegal harvesting of fish.
· There were not enough fisheries officers to staff the shifts, so the employer would assign them to after-hours operations and pay them at an overtime rate.
· His overtime was sometimes substantial. It amounted to approximately $18,000 in 1998-1999 on top of his regular salary, which then was approximately $28,000.
· However, in 2013, the employer made more demands for increased activities during the peak season, which ran approximately from mid-June to mid-September and was dictated for example by the annual salmon run, which had a related peak of resource use and harvester activity.
· The increased work hours during the summer months of peak activity meant that the officers were assigned evening, sometimes night, and, regularly, weekend work. They were scheduled to work from Tuesday to Saturday, which the bargaining agent believed contravened clause 25.04 of the collective agreement — the day-work provision.
· Overtime continued to be added to these scheduled and paid summer weekend hours, which meant that inspection or enforcement priorities required the officers to work beyond their 37.5-hour workweek.
[15] During his testimony, Mr. Powers opined that fisheries officers were at all times day workers, as defined in clause 25.04 of the collective agreement, and that there were no shifts in their agency because there were not enough officers to fully staff a series of shifts through the day, evening and night. He added that all work assigned outside Monday to Friday day-work office hours must be paid at the overtime rate as required by the collective agreement.
[16] Mr. Powers referred to an email dated March 25, 2014, from a co-worker that stated as follows:
Perry;
The attached document was what we received in regards to shifting in 2013 for the Fraser Valley East Detachment. The shifting started on June 20 and ended in September on the 13th. As you can see by the attached document that Management wanted the shifts to be extended into October, as well as giving up both weekend days. You can read in the document the sender refers to dwindling resources, not getting additional Officers and shift splitting all to reduce overtime costs.
We requested to work Monday-Friday, with the hours of work 0800 - 1600. This offer was declined and the following shift imposed.
The end result was Chilliwack staff was directed to work 5-2 with their days of rest being Fri-Sat (0800 - 1600) Mission staff requested a compressed work week with days of rest being Sat-Sun, Sat-Sun -Mon. They were directed to worked [sic] a 5-2, 4-3 with days of rest being Sun-Mon. Sun- Mon-Tues.
The following signatures have read and agreed that they were directed to this shift
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[17] While it is not determinative of the matter at bar, I note the frequent (six-time) use of the term “shift”, in different forms, in which a fisheries officer describes the employer giving notice of the summer peak-season work schedule with hours (shifts) of work outside the normal day-work hours. And the variable days of the week (shifts) were assigned so that enforcement staff would be on duty seven days per week.
[18] In cross-examination, Mr. Perry admitted that the fisheries officers were paid a shift premium when they were assigned weekend hours. He was presented with his June 2013 “Extra Duty Pay/Shift Work” timesheet report and confirmed that it showed that he received weekend premium pay for being assigned a Tuesday-to-Saturday workweek.
[19] When asked in cross-examination about the “irregular” hours allowed in clause 25.09 of the collective agreement, he opined that this clause did not apply as the officers were not shift workers but rather day workers with regular daytime hours from Monday to Friday.
[20] The employer called Nicole Gallant to testify. She began her career with the employer 29 years ago and since late 2020 has worked as the regional director of conservation and protection in the employer’s Pacific region, encompassing B.C. and the Yukon.
[21] She testified as follows:
· The inspections and enforcement activities she oversees rely upon fisheries officers classified at the GT-2, 3 and 4 level. GT-5 officers are field supervisors, and above them are supervisors promoted to the PM classification. She had two such supervisors in her area, including Mr. Powers.
· For many years, the field operations of the officers under her purview had been assigned to summer peak-activity shifts that ensured enforcement for all seven days of the week and that included some early morning work commencing at 05:00 and other work commencing at 16:00 to cover the late evening. Although she explained that the full 24-hour shift coverage of enforcement was not always in place, many overnight or “dark” shifts were used to ensure that those carrying out illegal activity could not expect to be free from the risk of interdiction by enforcement officers even in the middle of the night.
· These shifts were critical to avoid having enforcement activities fall into a predictable time-of-day or day-of-week pattern that would have provided illegal harvesters with virtually unmitigated access to salmon and other marine resources.
· The normal pattern of summer peak-operating shifts were these three: one morning shift starting at 05:00, the day shift starting at 08:00, and the evening shift starting at 16:00.
· Each shift was driven by resource and harvester activities such as fishery openings early in the morning or a steep decline in harvester activity during the extreme of the afternoon heat in the Fraser Valley and the B.C. interior.
· She also explained that evening fishery closures and illegal harvesting activities often used the cover of darkness to try to avoid detection, thus requiring regular enforcement patrols through late evening.
· Such summer peak activities requiring these shifts would begin by mid-June and often conclude by mid-September, but factors related to the natural resources they were protecting could require somewhat different seasonal start times and then would return to the winter day-work schedule.
· Different regular patrols required specific numbers of officers as the work dictated that a lone-officer patrol was not possible. Extra officers from other regions or operating units were regularly called in to staff specific short-term operations.
IV.
Jurisprudence
[22] The bargaining agent relied upon the decision of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (“the Board”; note that in this decision, “the Board” refers to its current incarnation as well as any of its predecessors) in Cooke v. Treasury Board (Department of the Environment), 2021 FPSLREB 42, which states this:
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[49] In this case, the employer did not provide evidence of an operational need for how it exercised its management rights. It relied on the facts that Mr. Cooke’s amended letter of appointment indicated that he might have to work shifts and that it had consulted the union about changing the wildlife enforcement officers to shift workers.
[50] But what most distinguishes this case from Hodgson is the employer’s decision to transform Mr. Cooke from a day worker to a shift worker, and back again, within the space of one week. I do not believe that Hodgson stands for that proposition. I agree with the Board’s conclusion in Hodgson that changing an employee’s work status is a fundamental change of employment conditions. Management needs a good reason to exercise its rights to do that.
[51] Furthermore, the language of the collective agreement at clause 25.09 does not say, “shift workers will be scheduled as follows ...”. It commences with the phrase, “[f]or employees who work on a rotating or irregular basis”. All its provisions flow from that basis.
[52] Despite the wording of his amended letter of appointment, Mr. Cooke was not an employee who worked on a rotating or irregular basis. He was a day worker from the date of his appointment in 2009 until September 12, 2012. The employer assigned him to irregular and rotating shifts for a 56-day period starting on September 13, 2012. However, he worked only two such shifts, on the weekend of September 15 and 16, 2012. After that, he only worked days.
[53] As the grievor was not an employee who worked on a rotating or irregular basis, the employer’s assertion that he was covered by clause 25.09 must fail. By default, the collective agreement provides that employees not covered by clause 25.09 are day workers whose hours of work must be scheduled in accordance with clause 25.04.
[54] Given that the hours he worked on the weekend of September 15 and 16, 2012, were outside the hours of work allowed for under clause 25.04, they cannot be considered regular hours of work scheduled in accordance with the collective agreement.
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[Emphasis in the original]
[23] The bargaining agent noted the finding at paragraphs 51and 52 that the grievor in Cooke was at all times a day worker, despite that his employer assigned him to irregular and rotating shifts.
[24] The employer replied to this submission and noted the importance of taking these passages from Cooke in the context of the Board’s decision in Hodgson v. Treasury Board (Transport Canada), 2005 PSSRB 30. The employer relied upon the Board’s words in paragraph 50 of Cooke, which distinguish its facts from Hodgson.
[25] The employer submitted that the very same issue of different facts that the Board noted in Cooke should distinguish its conclusion from this case, specifically the fact that Cooke dealt with the assignment of only two shifts as being significantly different from the assignment of a season of four months of irregular shifts.
[26] The employer also drew attention to the fact that the bargaining agent submissions did not address the matter of “irregular” hours in clause 25.09 of the collective agreement.
[27] It further noted the fact that the bargaining agent suggested that the “rotating” shifts set out in that clause were limited in that they were somehow required to be constituted of regular shifts of regular duration, each with a full staff complement, and that there were not enough fisheries officers on staff to adequately fill each shift.
[28] In support of that limit on what shift work had to entail, the bargaining agent relied upon the Board’s decision in Chafe v. Treasury Board (Department of Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 PSLRB 112, which found as follows:
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61 The question here is what article 27 of the collective agreement means by “working on shifts.” Neither “shift” nor “shift work” nor “working on shifts” are defined terms in the collective agreement. I must consider then whether there is an ordinary, generally accepted understanding or definition of what is meant by “shift work” (that is, “working on shifts”). In this regard I note that the Canadian Oxford Dictionary (Toronto, 1998) defines “shift work” as “work conducted in often variable periods independent of a standard work day, usually at night (tired after a month of shift work).” The website for the Sloan Work and Family Research Network of Boston College provides the following definitions of “shift work”:
Shift work refers to a job schedule in which employees work hours other than the standard hours of 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. or a schedule other than the standard workweek - Monday through Friday in the United States (Grosswald, 2004, p. 414).
In general, the term ‘shift work’ is quite vague and includes any organization of working hours that differ from the traditional diurnal work period; sometimes it is a (sic) synonymous of irregular or odd working hours (Costa, 2003, p. 264).
1/4most studies on shiftwork classify shift workers as anyone working outside regular daytime hours (i.e. between approximately 7 a.m. and 6 p.m., Monday through Friday). Under these definitions, shift workers include all people working evening shift, night shift, rotating shifts, split shifts, or irregular or on-call schedules both during the week and on weekends (Institute for Work & Health, n.d.).
Shiftwork is defined as work outside day hours, Monday to Friday. It includes weekend work, and jobs which start substantially before 7 am and finish at 7 p.m. or later (Wallace, n.d.).
The standard workday unfolds during an 8-5 timeframe. We consider shift workers to be individuals who work nonstandard hours.” (Root, 2004).
62 Similarly the website dictionary.com provides the following definition of “shift:
a person’s scheduled period of work, esp. the portion of the day scheduled as a day’s work when a shop, service, office, or industry operates continuously during both the day and night: She prefers the morning shift.
63 In my opinion all of these definitions describe a situation where normal operations during a 24-hour cycle are broken into two or three work periods, each period representing a full “day’s” work for an employee. A common example of such work would be found in hospitals, where nursing staff must be present 24-hours a day. Since no one can routinely work 24 hours per day, the 24-hour cycle is split into two 12-hour or three 8-hour “shifts.” Of course, not all work places operate on 24-hour cycles. Some operate on shorter cycles. But whatever the cycle, it is long enough that it cannot ordinarily and routinely be filled by one employee; it must be split into “shifts,” with each shift being filled by a (normally) different employee. Hence to work “on shift” means that there would be at least two, if not three, work periods during the 24-hour cycle that would be filled by two (or three, as the case may be) employees.
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[29] In support of their assertion on this point, the bargaining agent cited the reference to hospital shifts in paragraph 63, which found that workplaces such as hospitals work 24 hours per day and have employees fully staff the operations with 3 identical 8-hour shifts.
[30] However, the employer replied that that is not an accurate depiction of the Board’s decision on that point. I agree.
[31] Rather, the Board added the following at paragraph 63:
63 ... Of course, not all work places operate on 24-hour cycles. Some operate on shorter cycles. But whatever the cycle, it is long enough that it cannot ordinarily and routinely be filled by one employee; it must be split into “shifts,” with each shift being filled by a (normally) different employee. Hence to work “on shift” means that there would be at least two, if not three, work periods during the 24-hour cycle that would be filled by two (or three, as the case may be) employees.
[32] The employer relied upon the Board’s Hodgson decision in its closing submissions, noting this finding:
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[128] It is clear that the general management rights conferred on the Treasury Board may be substantially circumscribed by negotiated terms and conditions of employment contained in a collective agreement (e.g., see Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canadian Grain Commission (supra). In this case, I have determined that the collective agreement does not restrict the right of the employer to determine the hours of work such that an employee who was formerly a day worker becomes a shift worker. There is still an obligation on management’s part to consult with the bargaining agent on such fundamental changes in conditions of employment (see the joint consultation article - Article 21).
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[Emphasis added]
[33] I agree with the employer’s submission that Cooke must be distinguished on its facts. The Board noted the situation in Cooke, which was that employees were only being reassigned irregular hours for two shifts, as a distinguishing feature from Hodgson.
[34] And finally, the bargaining agent noted the Board’s decision in Paudel v. Treasury Board (Department of Fisheries and Oceans), 2021 FPSLREB 79 at para. 90, which states as follows:
[90] However, I will comment briefly on the approach in Keen. The Board Member relied on definitions of “shift work” set out in Chafe that did not include the definition of “working on shift” accepted by the adjudicator in that decision. As set out earlier, in Chafe, the adjudicator determined that to work “on shift” means that there would be at least 2, if not 3, work periods during a 24-hour cycle that would be filled by 2 or more employees. This interpretation was also accepted in Vaillancourt. I find the decisions in Chafe and Vaillancourt more persuasive in determining what is or is not “shift work”, since the interpretations in those decisions were necessary for determining the grievances and were not, as in Keen, merely an aside (or obiter).
[35] The bargaining agent suggested that this passage supported their assertion that they were at all times day workers and as such could not be changed from day to shift work. They noted clause 25.05 of the collective agreement, entitled “Summer and Winter Hours”, which states, “The scheduled weekly and daily hours of work stipulated in 25.04 may be varied by the Employer, following consultation with the Alliance, to allow for summer and winter hours, provided the annual total is not changed.” I note the bargaining agent made no submissions at all regarding the matter of consultation.
[36] The bargaining agent submitted that a literal interpretation of this clause speaks only to hours and not days of work. Therefore, this clause should not allow the employer to assign summer peak shifts that covered all or part of weekends as that altered the days of work, as such should be seen as contrary to the “hours” of work set out in clause 25.05 of the collective agreement.
[37] The bargaining agent provided no jurisprudence in support of their submissions on the plain-English meaning of “hours” of work and the literal interpretation of it referring only to the hours of the day and not the days of the week. The employer replied by stating that there was no precedent for this and that the “hours” of work had always been interpreted as applying to hours of work assigned on any day.
[38] I reject the bargaining agent’s literal interpretation of “hours” in clause 25.05 of the collective agreement as doing so falls within the ambit of what Brown and Beatty, in Canadian Labour Arbitration, caution against as a possible absurd outcome of such a manner of interpretation as I found as follows was the case in Lodge v. Treasury Board (Department of Transport), 2021 FPSLREB 5:
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[66] The adjudicator in Lessard noted the risk of following the path of the “normal or ordinary” meaning of words to seek the intent of the parties when she noted the following:
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32 In settling the dispute, I must interpret the wording of Appendix “P” to ascertain the parties’ intentions. In Canadian Labour Arbitration, authors Brown and Beatty clearly summarize the rules of interpretation that must guide an adjudicator who is called on to interpret the provisions of a collective agreement:
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It has often been stated that the fundamental object in construing the terms of a collective agreement is to discover the intention of the parties who agreed to it...
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Accordingly, in determining the intention of the parties, the cardinal presumption is that the parties are assumed to have intended what they have said, and that the meaning of the collective agreement is to be sought in its express provisions...
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In searching for the parties’ intention with respect to a particular provision in the agreement, arbitrators have generally assumed that the language before them should be viewed in its normal or ordinary sense unless that would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the collective agreement, or unless the context reveals that the words were used in some other sense....
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[Emphasis added]
[67] I am neither bound by, nor can I agree with the result in Lessard. I find the outcome in it as it relates to approaching interpretation fits within the class of absurd outcomes that Brown and Beatty warn should cause one to pause and reconsider following a normal and ordinary analysis of the text at issue when faced with a highly technical and regulated workplace as it at issue here.
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[39] The employer relied upon Hodgson as an authority for the proposition that the employer enjoys management rights created in the Financial Administration Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11; “FAA”) at ss. 7(1)(e) and 11(1)(a) that allow it to assign employees to day work or shift or irregular work. I agree.
[40] Specifically, Hodgson states as follows at paragraph 128:
[128] It is clear that the general management rights conferred on the Treasury Board may be substantially circumscribed by negotiated terms and conditions of employment contained in a collective agreement (e.g., see Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canadian Grain Commission (supra). In this case, I have determined that the collective agreement does not restrict the right of the employer to determine the hours of work such that an employee who was formerly a day worker becomes a shift worker. There is still an obligation on management’s part to consult with the bargaining agent on such fundamental changes in conditions of employment (see the joint consultation article - Article 21).
[41] The employer noted that the Board’s decision in Piotrowski v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2001 PSSRB 94, is consistent with that finding that management rights allow it to move an employee from day hours to irregular hours or shifts, as follows:
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[23] I come to the conclusion that the new schedule for Dr. Piotrowski, starting in May 2000, has to be considered as shift work following Article B2 of the collective agreement. The wording of the “Non-Shift Work” clause (B1.02) states that the normal work day shall be between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. and cannot include a schedule outside this time frame. The new schedule of Dr. Piotrowski has a start time of 4:30 a.m. and a finishing time of 12:30 p.m. and is outside the 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. timeframe for non-shift work as defined in clause B1.02. A work schedule which does not come under the definition of “Non-Shift Work” under clause B1.02 is, in my view, shift work under Article B2 of the collective agreement.
[24] Subclause B2.01(a) recognizes that management has the right to modify hours of work and to change them from a non-shift work to a shift work basis because of operational requirement. The new hours of operation of the Establishment created a new operational requirement for a schedule located outside the timeframe of the “Non-Shift Work” normal workday. In imposing the schedule from 4:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. on Dr. Piotrowski, management transferred him to a “Shift Work” schedule following Article B2 of the collective agreement.
V.
Reasons
[42] Given that the fisheries officers’ work is tied inexorably to the resources they help protect, namely, salmon and many other species in aquaculture, it is eminently reasonable that their hours of work correspond to the ebb and flow of the peaks of activity of those natural resources.
[43] While it was not contested by the bargaining agent, for greater certainty, I find there to be ample evidence upon which I conclude that an urgent need existed for the employer to assign irregular shifts to conduct the duties as described previously by Ms. Gallant.
[44] The bargaining agent’s case largely rested upon Mr. Powers’ opinion that there were not enough fisheries officers to occupy a series of separate shifts and that if such shifts were created, they would normally comprise a 24-hour workday.
[45] While the bargaining agent’s representative distanced herself from that assertion, she continued the assertion that the employer could not rely upon clause 25.09 of the collective agreement, entitled “Shift Work”.
[46] While the employer stated in argument that clause 25.09 speaks not only to shift work but also to “irregular” work, the bargaining agent stated in rebuttal that this would be relevant only for more temporary work and suggested that I should distinguish Hodgson as that case dealt with a 9/11-era special situation with a near 24/7 coverage of work shifts, which it said is not present in this case.
[47] I cannot agree. A reading of the full collective agreement does not support the assertion that clause 25.09, which states that “[f]or employees who work on a rotating or irregular basis ...”, is meant to apply only to casual employees who may work only a few hours per week or only a brief time during the year, as the bargaining agent suggested, or as only related to the 24/7 work coverage as in Hodgson.
[48] Consistent with the conclusion in Hodgson, I find that the management rights granted in the FAA apply in the matter as they are not limited by the collective agreement as analyzed in this decision.
[49] Additionally, and as the employer noted, the assertion that up to 15 hours out of a 37.5-hour workweek could be paid at an overtime rate would violate the definition of “overtime” in article 2 of the collective agreement.
[50] Read in its entirety, the collective agreement does not provide for a fisheries officer to work 37.5 hours in a week and to have some of those hours (worked on a weekend in the summer) paid at the overtime rate.
[51] For greater certainty, I note that in their closing argument about clause 25.09, for employees working on a rotating or on an irregular basis, the bargaining agent made no submission that that clause is directed at some other group of workers of the employer.
[52] I also note that other collective agreement clauses, such as clause 25.09(f), specifically state that they apply to a “specialized” area or alternately exclude a particular group (such as clause 25.09(e)). Given these other explicit carve-outs, I find it more likely than not that the parties did intend for this clause to apply to fisheries officers.
[53] For all of the above reasons, the Board makes the following order:
(The Order appears on the next page)
VI.
Order
[54] The grievance is denied.
February 16, 2023.
Bryan R. Gray,
a panel of the Federal Public Sector
Labour Relations and Employment Board