Date: 20250228

File: 568-34-46757

XR: 566-34-46011

 

Citation: 2025 FPSLREB 21

Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act

Before a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board

Between

 

Perpetua Oladeinde

Applicant

 

and

 

Canada Revenue Agency

 

Respondent

Indexed as

Oladeinde v. Canada Revenue Agency

In the matter of an application for an extension of time referred to in section 61(b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Regulations

Before: Deborah Cooper, a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board

For the Applicant: Kalapi Roy, Public Service Alliance of Canada

For the Respondent: Nicholas Gualtieri

Decided on the basis of written submissions,
filed November 28, 2022, February 8, 2023, and June 4, 2024.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] I have been appointed as a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (“the Board”) to deal with this application for an extension of time. The parties were given the opportunity to provide written submissions to support their respective positions on the application. Under s. 22 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act (S.C. 2013, c. 40, s. 365), the Board may decide any matter before it without holding an oral hearing. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the cases that they cited, I am satisfied that this application can be dealt with on the basis of the written submissions on file.

I. Application before the Board

[2] Perpetua Oladeinde (“the applicant”) is an employee of the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA or “the respondent”). On November 3, 2022, she referred a grievance to adjudication pertaining to the respondent’s decision to deny her an exemption from the application of the Policy on COVID-19 Vaccination for the Canada Revenue Agency (“the Policy”) and to place her on leave without pay as of December 13, 2021. She referred the grievance under s. 209(1)(b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act (S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2; “the Act”). Accordingly, a file was opened (Board file no. 568-34-46757).

[3] On November 28, 2022, the respondent raised two preliminary objections in which it argued that the Board is without jurisdiction to hear the grievance. It submitted that the grievance was not filed in compliance with the timeline set out in the collective agreement between it and the Public Service Alliance of Canada (“the bargaining agent”) for the Services and Programs (SP) group, which expired on October 31, 2021 (“the collective agreement”), and therefore, the grievance is untimely. Second, it submitted that placing the applicant on leave without pay was an administrative measure over which the Board does not have jurisdiction. As a result, a second Board file was opened (Board file no. 566-34-46011).

[4] This decision deals only with the application for an extension of time and the respondent’s timeliness objection.

[5] After the respondent made its preliminary objection on timeliness, the Board wrote to the applicant on January 30, 2023, and asked for her response to that objection.

[6] As a result, the applicant filed submissions on February 8, 2023, in which she made an application for an extension of time to file her grievance. Her submissions focused mainly on her position that the grievance timelines should be extended, as the delay, which was four days, was entirely attributable to the bargaining agent and that she had exercised due diligence. In the alternative, the bargaining agent argued that the grievance is timely because it is continuing. However, no further details were given or supporting arguments made on that point. The respondent filed nothing further at that time.

[7] On February 15, 2024, the Board wrote to the parties, indicating that it was considering deciding the respondent’s preliminary timeliness objection based on written submissions. It provided them with an opportunity to provide written submissions, according to a set timeline. The bargaining agent representative sought, and was granted, an extension of those timelines. Despite this, neither the bargaining agent nor the respondent filed any further submissions.

[8] On May 24, 2024, a different Board member was assigned to the preliminary objection and wrote to the parties again in order to provide them with an additional opportunity to provide written submissions. As before, a timeline was provided, and both parties were advised that the matter could proceed to a decision based on those submissions. As a result, the respondent filed written submissions on June 4, 2024. However, the applicant filed nothing in reply. On July 10, 2024, the Board wrote to the parties to indicate that it would decide the preliminary matter based on the written submissions on file.

[9] For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that, in the interest of fairness, the applicant’s application for an extension of time is granted, and the respondent’s timeliness objection is denied.

II. Summary of the facts, as described by the parties

[10] The relevant facts can be summarized concisely. The parties do not appear to have any disagreement with respect to these facts, although they may disagree about how portions of them should be interpreted.

[11] The Policy, which is at the crux of this grievance, came into effect in November 2021. Under it, all CRA employees were required to be fully vaccinated, unless they were granted an exemption based on a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6; CHRA). Employees who were not granted an exemption were required to attest to their vaccination status by November 26, 2021.

[12] The Policy further mandated that employees who were unwilling to disclose their vaccination status by the attestation deadline were required to complete online training on COVID-19 vaccination and were advised that they would be placed on administrative leave without pay (LWOP) should they remain unwilling to comply or if they did not receive an approved requested accommodation. Those who had not been granted an exemption and who did not comply with the Policy were to be placed on LWOP.

[13] After the Policy came into effect, the applicant did not complete the attestation by the deadline, and she was placed on LWOP on December 13, 2021. On December 20, 2021, she requested an exemption from the Policy based on the prohibited ground of religion. On February 10, 2022, she was informed in a letter from management that her exemption request was denied.

[14] The applicant filed the grievance at issue on March 23, 2022, with the respondent. In it, she alleged that it denied her exemption request, which was based on her “protected rights and freedoms”. She also alleged that that denial was contrary to the Policy’s requirements, the CHRA, the “no discrimination” clause of the collective agreement, and ss. 2, 7, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)). Although she and her representative signed the grievance on March 11, 2022, both parties appear to agree that it was filed 4 days past the 25-day deadline set out in the collective agreement.

III. Summary of the arguments on timeliness

A. For the applicant

[15] In her submissions dated February 8, 2023, which were made in response to the respondent’s preliminary objection, the applicant made her application for an extension of time under s. 61 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Regulations (SOR/2005-79; “the Regulations”). Although she did not explicitly acknowledge that the applicable framework for determining an application under s. 61 of the Regulations is set out in Schenkman v. Treasury Board (Public Works and Government Services Canada), 2004 PSSRB 1, the arguments she made followed the Schenkman criteria and included brief submissions on the factors as outlined further in the next paragraphs.

[16] The applicant agreed that the application was presented 4 days past the 25-day deadline set out in the collective agreement. Her submissions further indicated that the delay was entirely attributable to the bargaining agent and that it was in no way her fault. No specific details were provided as to how or why the delay was attributable to the bargaining agent. In her submissions, she further argued that she was diligent in her efforts to file the grievance on time, and as evidence, she signed it in a timely manner on March 11, 2022. As such, she argued that this is a clear, cogent, and compelling reason for the delay.

[17] To support the argument that the applicant was diligent and that the bargaining agent’s error is a clear, cogent, and compelling reason for the delay filing the grievance, the bargaining agent cited D’Alessandro v. Treasury Board (Department of Justice), 2019 FPSLREB 79, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2228 v. Treasury Board, 2013 PSLRB 144 (“IBEW”), and Savard v. Treasury Board (Passport Canada), 2014 PSLRB 8.

[18] Turning to the other criteria, the applicant argued that the length of the delay, four days, is not excessive.

[19] Next, the applicant submitted that the injustice to her would be significant and that it would outweigh the prejudice to the respondent were the application not granted, given that she contested a denial of an accommodation and related alleged disciplinary action, as well as a substantial financial penalty that accompanied it. She further argued that the respondent did not demonstrate evidence of the prejudice that it could suffer and that it is not open to the respondent to state that it would be prejudiced without presenting evidence as to how it would be prejudiced.

[20] The merits of the grievance involve a suspension without pay and a significant financial penalty. The applicant presented documents in defence of her accommodation request, and she continued submitting strong evidence to the CRA demonstrating that her religious beliefs were sincerely held. She cited Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, to support this point.

[21] The applicant submitted an affidavit and responded to the respondent’s supplementary questions. The financial penalty that she suffered is substantial and uncontested. Should the grievance be denied, she would suffer grave prejudice.

[22] Lastly, the applicant argued that the respondent provided reasons on the merits in its final-level response. As such, filing the grievance four days late would not have made a difference to the grievance process as it unfolded.

B. For the respondent

[23] The respondent argued that the applicant did not complete her attestation by the deadline. Its management informed her that she was not compliant with the Policy. She was then placed on LWOP, effective December 13, 2021. On December 20, 2021, she requested an exemption from the Policy on the prohibited ground of religion. On February 10, 2022, she was informed in a letter from management that her exemption request was denied. She provided additional information on February 23, 2022, to support of her exemption request. However, the information submitted did not provide any further clarification or expansion on her affidavit, and on March 1, 2022, she was informed that the decision remained unchanged. On March 23, 2022, she filed her grievance in an untimely manner in that it was several months after she had been placed on LWOP and 29 days after she was advised that her accommodation request was denied.

[24] The respondent made submissions specific to the Schenkman criteria. First, it argued that the bargaining agent provided no substantive explanation for the late filing, other than stating that it was four days late and that it was due to the bargaining agent’s error.

[25] With respect to the length of the delay, the respondent argued that timelines are meant to be respected. It cited Bowden v. Treasury Board (Canada Border Services Agency), 2021 FPSLREB 93, to support the argument that timelines should be extended only in exceptional circumstances. According to it, the applicant outlined no exceptional circumstances.

[26] While the applicant might have signed the grievance on March 11, 2022, there is no evidence that she exercised due diligence and followed up with the bargaining agent as to it filing her grievance. While she might have been on leave when the grievance was filed, the collective agreement was available to her at all times, and she had access to information pertaining to her rights outside the workplace.

[27] Neither the applicant nor the bargaining agent provided clear, cogent, and compelling explanations for the late filing of this grievance. Accordingly, the respondent argued that granting an extension, in the absence of such an explanation, would be prejudicial to it. Furthermore, with respect to the injustice to the applicant, its decision was in line with the Policy.

[28] Citing the Bowden decision at paragraph 81, the respondent submitted that little weight should be given to the chances of success, quoting as follows: “In Bertrand, I have found that in the absence of a cogent and compelling reason for a delay filing a grievance, there is no need to assess the other factors.”

[29] While acknowledging that the adjudicator in Bowden found that there was an arguable case, the respondent argued that little weight should be given to this particular factor.

IV. Reasons

[30] Timelines for processing grievances are governed by statute and applicable collective agreement provisions. Section 237(1) of the Act mandates the Board to make regulations respecting the processes for dealing with grievances, including timelines. These provisions are comprehensively outlined in the Regulations. Most collective agreement provisions relating to grievance processing are modelled on these legislative provisions.

[31] In this case, the applicable collective agreement clause is clause 18.11.

[32] The applicant did not deny that her grievance was filed beyond the 25-day deadline set out in the collective agreement. She acknowledged that she was placed on LWOP on December 13, 2021.

[33] The respondent’s final-level response indicated that she received the final decision on her accommodation request on February 10, 2022. As of that date, she knew of the respondent’s decision to deny her accommodation request. Her grievance was filed more than 25 days after the date on which she learned of the action that gave rise to the grievance. On its face, the grievance is untimely.

[34] Section 61(b) of the Regulations allows the Board to exercise its discretion to extend prescribed time limits “in the interest of fairness”.

[35] The applicant requested an extension of time to file her grievance. Were the Board to grant it, her grievance would be deemed timely and could proceed to a determination on the merits.

[36] The Board normally assesses applications for extensions of time against what are commonly referred to as the “Schenkman” criteria. The five criteria are the following: whether a clear, cogent, and compelling reason for the delay has been provided; the length of the delay; the applicant’s due diligence; balancing the injustice to the applicant if the application is denied against the prejudice to the respondent if it is granted; and the grievance’s chances of success. The burden of proof rests with the applicant.

[37] The criteria are not necessarily of equal weight and importance (see Bowden, at para. 55). I prefer the balanced approach to determine whether the extension should be granted. In that regard, the overriding objective is for the Board to determine what is fair based on the facts of each case. This is well stated in the Board’s decision in Van de Ven v. Treasury Board (Canada Border Services Agency), 2023 FPSLREB 60 at para. 74:

[74] I agree with the Board’s decision in IBEW that keeping in mind the wording of s. 61, the overall consideration is one of fairness. I also agree with the Board in N.L. at paragraph 28, which states, “The circumstances of each case affect the importance and weight given to each criterion.”…

 

[38] I will review the Schenkman criteria based on the applicant’s arguments and submissions and the respondent’s submissions. I will begin with the Schenkman criterion that requires me to determine whether the applicant provided a clear, cogent, and compelling reason for the delay.

[39] The limited information that the bargaining agent provided about this factor was a submission indicating that the delay was fully attributable to the bargaining agent and not the applicant. To support it, the bargaining agent stated that the applicant signed the grievance on March 11, 2022, which was within the 25-day deadline.

[40] The applicant relied on a number of cases to support her argument that a bargaining agent’s error provides a clear, cogent, and compelling reason to grant an extension of time. In D’Alessandro and IBEW, substantial evidence was heard for the Board to assess the bargaining agent’s negligence. In Prior v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2014 PSLRB 96, which also heard evidence on the reasons for the delay, the applicant was able to demonstrate their due diligence in a situation in which both they and the bargaining agent representative testified as to illness as a factor in filing a grievance late. The fact that the respondent provided a response on the merits during the grievance process, in and of itself, cannot overcome a failure to provide clear, cogent, and compelling reasons for the delay in this case.

[41] Although the applicant signed the grievance within the applicable time limit, she provided the Board no additional information as to why a grievance was filed on March 23, 2022, 4 days beyond the 25-day deadline set out in the collective agreement. Neither she, nor the bargaining agent identified any specific reason for the bargaining agent’s delay, which leaves the Board guessing as to what it could be. She submitted that the bargaining agent error is the sole cause and that it is a compelling and cogent reason for such a delay. The Board’s case law has acknowledged that a bargaining agent’s negligence or error can constitute clear, cogent and compelling reasons, particularly where the grievor has not lacked diligence (see D’Alessandro; Barbe v. Treasury Board (Correctional Service of Canada), 2022 FPSLREB 42; and Mercier v. Correctional Service of Canada, 2023 FPSLREB 113, at para. 25); however, as the Board mentioned in Cherid v. Deputy Head (Department of Employment and Social Development), 2024 FPSLREB 8, at para. 23, it must be fully explained:

[23] However, not every situation in which a union tries to claim responsibility fits within those two ideas. It is not enough for a union to declare that it was responsible for the delay and that, therefore, the delay is excusable. A union that claims responsibility for missing a deadline still must show the Board why the delay occurred. If the delay was the result of a mistake (as in the seven cases I mentioned earlier), the union needs to explain what mistake occurred and how it happened.

 

[42] The onus was on the applicant. As the reasons provided in this case were lacking, I find that this factor weighs in favour of the respondent.

[43] As the Board has found previously, time limits in collective agreements are meant to be respected by the parties and should be extended only in exceptional circumstances (see Bowden, at para. 77). The grievance system is designed to be an effective and efficient way of dealing with workplace disputes. Time limits should be generally respected and should be extended only when there are compelling reasons. At the same time, in the interests of fairness, I cannot agree in this case that a failure to meet the first criterion alone should negate a balanced assessment of the other criteria.

[44] The next Schenkman criterion pertains to the length of the delay presenting the grievance to the respondent. In this case, it was four days. It was not an excessive delay. As the Board stated in Rinke v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2005 PSSRB 23, at para. 16, there is no threshold before which a delay is automatically considered reasonable. In Van de Ven, at para. 75, the Board slightly reformulated this criterion to take into account at which stage of the grievance process the delay occurred. A delay at the initial filing of the grievance generally weighs against the grievor (Van de Ven, at para. 80; Cherid, at para. 28). In Trenholm v. Staff of the Non-Public Funds, Canadian Forces, 2005 PSLRB 65, the extension of time was being sought for the last step in the grievance process, the referral to adjudication. The grievance had been filed in time and had been heard by the respondent in the internal grievance process. That fact was, arguably, of significant importance to the former Board. It dedicated an entire paragraph of its reasons to the fact that in that case, the delay occurred at the last step of the process (see Trenholm, at para. 46). That is not so in this case.

[45] In this case, while the delay occurred at the outset of the grievance process, the delay of four days remains minimal.

[46] I will now turn to the applicant’s due diligence.

[47] The applicant submitted that she acted with due diligence by signing the grievance on March 11, 2022. For the purposes of this analysis, I accept that she signed the grievance form before the 25-day period in which to file a grievance had elapsed. I also find that she had sought assistance from her bargaining agent in a timely fashion. However, her submissions do not indicate any information or actions on her part beyond that fact. There was no evidence that she asked her bargaining agent to advocate on her behalf or to file a grievance by a specific date. No emails, other documentation, evidence, or arguments were introduced to explain what happened between February 10 and March 11, 2022, and from March 11 to 23, 2022.

[48] Based on the applicant’s written submissions, I am not able to conclude that she asked her bargaining agent, within the applicable time limits, to ensure they filed a grievance on her behalf. In addition, she did not suggest in her submissions that she was under the impression that the bargaining agent would file a grievance on her behalf after she signed the grievance form. No evidence was provided to indicate that she took steps to follow up with her bargaining agent between March 11, and 19, 2022 (the end of the 25-day period), to inquire about the status of her file or filing the grievance. At the same time, there was no evidence proffered that she specifically failed to respond to any requests or that she failed to take a step that was required. I note that given her grievance alleged discipline under s. 209(1)(b) of the Act, she could have filed the grievance without bargaining agent support. However, she had an experienced bargaining agent as her representative. Furthermore, the applicant is presumably not a labour relations expert.

[49] From the submissions, it seems that the applicant understood that her accommodation request was denied on February 10, 2022. The respondent’s submissions mention that she provided further information to support that request after the denial. Interestingly, she made no mention of this additional information in her original submissions on the timeliness preliminary objection, and no reply was filed in response that could have confirmed or elaborated this point. In any case, this additional information did not change the decision, which was communicated to the applicant on March 1, 2022, according to the respondent’s submissions. As such, I conclude that the applicant was live to the situation and the requirement to file a grievance. This is supported by the fact that the form was signed on March 11, 2022. On a balance of probabilities, she did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate due diligence pursuing her grievance. As such, this criterion weighs more in favour of the respondent.

[50] The next portion of the applicant’s submissions focussed on the Schenkman criterion of balancing the injustice to the applicant were the application for an extension of time denied against the prejudice to the respondent were it granted. She argued that the injustice to her would far outweigh the prejudice to the respondent.

[51] I agree with the applicant that the injustice to her if the application for an extension of time were denied as untimely would be significant. She would be deprived of the opportunity to challenge the LWOP and to seek remedies for lost wages and benefits. I also take note of the fact that this grievance was undertaken in an exceptionally challenging environment during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Decisions were often made without full information, or with conflicting information and so I have taken this into account in these particular circumstances. While the reasons for the delay are deficient, a four-day delay is not significant given the potential prejudice to the applicant. Furthermore, when weighed against any potential injustice to the respondent, I assess this factor in favour of the applicant.

[52] I turn now to the last Schenkman criterion, the grievance’s chances of success. As of this preliminary stage of the proceedings, the Board has not received evidence on the merits of the grievance. It is premature for the Board to assess those merits. In Van de Ven, at para. 75, the Board reformulated this criterion as whether the grievance has no chance of success or is frivolous or vexatious. Having said that, at first glance, a grievance challenging LWOP over several months, as well as a component involving an alleged human rights violation, does not appear frivolous and is an arguable case. As such, I give this criterion little weight.

[53] Whatever the reason behind the bargaining agent filing the grievance four days late, the applicant did not present her grievance in time, and neither she nor the bargaining agent took the opportunities afforded to them to explain the delay in any substantive manner. As such, the issue to be determined in this case is whether she demonstrated that it is in the interest of fairness for the Board to grant her application to extend the time to file the grievance.

[54] Relief from mandatory deadlines may be granted in cases in which an applicant has been diligent, the grievance has merit, and the injustice to the applicant from denying the application for an extension outweighs the prejudice to the respondent from granting it (see Trenholm).

[55] An application for an extension of time is not granted automatically, and a party requesting an extension is required to provide fulsome submissions to support its request. Such a request will be granted only after the decision maker has rigorously assessed the circumstances and the parties’ submissions. That is done because timelines serve an important labour relations purpose. They contribute to labour relations stability by ensuring certainty or closure with respect to labour relations disputes (see Grouchy v. Deputy Head (Department of Fisheries and Oceans), 2009 PSLRB 92 at para. 46, and Trenholm, at para. 54). At the same time, in Mercier, at para. 25, it was held that the interests of fairness tend to weigh in favour of an extension where the bargaining agent has made an error.

[56] Balancing the criteria for granting an extension, I find that in the interests of fairness, it is appropriate to grant one in this case. In the circumstances of this case, I have prioritized the criteria of length of delay and the potential injustice to the applicant as significant and have determined that it outweighs any prejudice to the respondent in reaching this conclusion. The applicant signed the grievance in a timely manner and was active throughout the process. She was represented by a sophisticated and experienced bargaining agent and was entitled to rely upon it. I have assessed an overall weighing of the criteria. Although the reasons for the delay were not well-explained, I conclude that the other criteria balanced in favour of the extension in the interests of fairness.

[57] That said, I note that parties who provide scant reasons for a delay do so at their own risk and peril. Had the delay been longer, or the facts of the potential prejudice suffered by either party been assessed differently, the outcome may not have been the same.

[58] The applicant argued in the alternative that this is a continuing grievance. However, this argument was very cursory and did not contain any evidence or argument. In its response, the respondent disagreed but also did not elaborate in any substantive way.

[59] In Bowden, the Board Member discussed the issue of a continuing grievance and referred to the definition of one, including as follows at paragraph 35:

[35] The arbitrator in British Columbia v. B.C.N.U. (1982), 5 L.A.C. (3d) 404, relied on the definition of a continuing grievance in Professor Gorsky’s Evidence and Procedure in Canadian Labour Arbitration, at page 35, as follows:

… The recurrence of damage will not make a grievance a continuing grievance. It is necessary that the party in breach violate a recurring duty. When a duty arises at intervals and is breached each time, a “continuing” violation occurs, and the agreement’s limitation period does not run until the final breach. When no regular duty exists and the harm merely continues or increases without any further breach, the grievance is isolated, and the period runs from the breach, irrespective of damage.

 

[60] In Ontario Public Service Employees Bargaining agent v. Ontario (Ministry of the Attorney General), 2003 CanLII 52888 (ON GSB), the arbitrator posed the question to be answered as follows: “Does it [the grievance] involve a continuing course of conduct rather than one action which happens to have continuing consequences?”

[61] In Mazzini v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2024 FPSLREB 105, at para. 19 the Board found that the decision to place the grievor on LWOP (pursuant to the COVID policy) was not a continuing grievance:

[19] Although in its written submissions of January 23, 2023, the bargaining agent argued that the grievance is continuing and that the issue remained live while the applicant remained on leave without pay, it did not pursue that line of argument in its written submissions of January 11, 2024. Even had it maintained that argument, I would have found it unpersuasive. The grievance’s wording is unambiguous. It clearly indicates that the applicant grieves the employer’s denial of his exemption request and its decision to place him on leave without pay as of December 30, 2021. The grievance does not pertain to a repeated violation, by the employer, of a recurring duty. Rather, its details and the corrective measures it seeks indicate that the grievance relates to specific decisions made in December 2021. The fact that the decision to place the applicant on leave without pay had continuing consequences does not, by that fact alone, make the grievance continuing (see the discussion about the nature of continuing grievances in Bowden v. Treasury Board (Canada Border Services Agency), 2021 FPSLREB 93 at paras. 33 to 36). Similarly, continued disagreement with the employer’s decisions does not make a grievance continuing.

 

[62] In the absence of any substantive argument from the applicant, I find that this grievance involves events that happened to have continuing consequences: the denial to grant an exemption to the grievor, and the subsequent event of the grievor being placed on LWOP. Its wording clearly indicates that it relates to specific decisions made in December 2021 and February 2022. The fact that the decision to place the applicant on LWOP had continuing consequences did not, by that fact alone, make it a continuing grievance.

[63] For all of the above reasons, the Board makes the following order:

(The Order appears on the next page)

V. Order

[64] The application for an extension of time is granted.

[65] The respondent’s timeliness objection is denied.

[66] The grievances in Board file nos. 568-34-46757 and 566-34-46011 shall be set down for hearing on the merits.

February 28, 2025.

Deborah Cooper,

a panel of the Federal Public Sector

Labour Relations and Employment Board